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5PREFACE
The most current and relevant issue in relations between the European Union
and Western Balkan countries is the visa regime. The EU visa serves as a way of
pressuring and motivating the aforementioned countries into meeting the criteria
for admission into the Union. On the other hand, Western Balkan countries
perceive the pressure as a measure of discrimination, slowing the progress of
reforms necessary to meet all requirements.
In the Western Balkans potential candidates for EU membership include
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Croatia and
Macedonia as current candidate countries. The total number of inhabitants living in
the Western Balkans is 24 million (m): Albania (3.2m), Bosnia-Herzegovina (3.8
m), Croatia (4.4 m), Macedonia (2.0 m), and Serbia and Montenegro including
Kosovo and Metohija (10.6 m).1 However, nationals of the southeast area of the
Western Balkans cannot enjoy a fundamental freedom, one of which the European
Union itself is based: the freedom of movement. Truly, Croatia is on the short stay
‘visa white list’, which means their nationals can visit EU countries for short stays
of up to three months without a visa.
Obstacles in the movement of Western Balkan nationals throughout the EU are
clear. The main setback inhibiting the flow of human capital from the Western
Balkans to the EU is that five of the six states are on the mandatory EU ‘visa black
list’. According to a statement from the International Crisis Group, “the EU’s
present visa regime with the countries of the Western Balkans … is fostering
resentment, inhibiting progress on trade, business, education and more open civil
societies, and as a result contributing negatively to regional stability.”2 The issue
of visa liberalization and facilitation and movement of people are directly related
to the overall stabilization of the region. Because of the unstable situation in the
region since 1990, the “Schengen wall” has been growing thicker and more
impenetrable. 
1 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition report 2005, Business in transition,
London 2005 (http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/factssh/country~pdf).
2 International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, “EU Visas and the Western
Balkans”, Europe Report No 168, 29 November 2005.
6However, the European Union has been seeking solutions for countries that
remained outside the Schengen area in last few years. The Thessaloniki European
Council of the 19th and 20th of June, 2003 reiterated that it will fully and effectively
support the European perspective of Western Balkan countries and stated that “the
Western Balkans countries will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet
the established criteria.”
The International Commission on the Balkans reports that: “Among the most
discouraging findings of the Commission is that the European generation of the
Balkans, young men and women under 30 who share the values of Europe most
keenly and who vote for pro-European parties most regularly, are those who
experience the greatest difficulties in visiting the EU. More than 70% of students
in Serbia have never traveled abroad. The Commission believes that as an urgent
matter, this should change. This is most urgent for the youth of countries that have
been most isolated from Europe: Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, and Albania.
Bulgaria and Romania have demonstrated that freedom of movement within the
EU is the strongest signal that the EU can send both to the public and to
governments in the Balkans.” The Commission furthermore proposes the
introduction of a smart EU visa policy: “A smart visa policy of the EU that opens
its borders to Balkan youth and Balkan businesses while closing them for criminals
should be at the very centre of policies that will mobilize popular support for
building EU member states in the Balkans. The Schengen wall is the last wall that
separates the Balkans from Europe.” 
‘The Western Balkans: Regional Response to Visa Liberalization Issue’ project
was jointly implemented by the Institute of International Politics and Economics
(IIPE), European Movement in Serbia (EMinS) and Group 484. The project aims
to support the reform of Western Balkan countries’ in their approximation toward
EU standards, and especially in their efforts to join EU ‘white Schengen list’, as
well as to further strengthen and support measures, activities, initiatives towards
visa liberalization that are already being launched or implemented in the region.
Constituent objectives are: 
a) To develop recommendations to governments in the region for the reforms
necessary in the domain of free movement; 
b) To exert pressure and influence governments to conduct reforms and legal
harmonization, as well as the efficient implementation of these reforms; 
c) To create a network of dedicated experts and stakeholders at the national and
regional level; 
d) To create an increasingly active collaboration between the government and
civil society;
e) To promote political reform, civic education, and the monitoring of a
governments’ performance;
f) To ensure greater transparency of government institutions so that citizens may
hold governments accountable for their actions.
7According to the results of the project the implementation these activities will
contribute to:
a) The creation of a sustainable network of experts, as well as government
employees, NGO activists, politicians, and media at the national level, and,
b) The creation of the same type of network at the regional level.
These changes will be brought about as follows:
a) A better understanding of the required preconditions with regard to the visa
liberalization process;
b) Pressure on relevant governments to strengthen the efforts needed in the
process of visa liberalization;
c) Stimulation of a joint regional approach — a unified response to the issue.
Stronger cross-border cooperation among civil society groups, the sharing of
best practices, networks linking like-minded citizens, and networks among
governments, NGOs, and civic initiatives are all necessary to improve
understanding and co-operation throughout the region, and are furthermore, in line
with long-term goals fostering regional academic, research, and policy
collaboration. 
During the implementation of the project, different sectors of civil society and
state institutions are actively involved. Moreover, they are key promoters of the
changes to be produced, and the main guarantors that the defined regional map will
be implemented and, if needed, upgraded.
Four national workshops held from January to April 2006. ‘The Balkans as an
Emigration, Transit and Immigration Area Moving Toward the EU’, was held on the
25th of January 2006 at the Institute of International Politics and Economics, where
issues surrounding illegal migration, human trafficking, asylum, corruption, and the
fight against organized crime were discussed. The second workshop, ‘European
Integration and Readmission’, was held on the 20th of February 2006 to consider the
problems and processes of European integration as well as those issues concerning
the implementation of the Agreement on Readmission. The third workshop,
‘European Integration and the Reform of the Visa System in Serbia and
Montenegro’ was held on the 13th, March 2006. The fourth workshop, ‘Border
Control/Integrated Border Management and EU Standards’ was held on 12th of
April 2006.
Finally, the Regional Roundtable held on the 18th and 19th of May 2006, ‘The
Western Balkans: Regional Response to Visa Liberalization Issue’, gathered experts
from Balkan countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro
(representing potential candidates for EU membership), Macedonia and Croatia
(representing candidate countries), Bulgaria and Romania (representing acceding
countries) as well as Slovakia (the new EU member state), who presented their
experiences on the road to the ‘white Schengen list’. The following topics were
discussed: 
a) Illegal migration, including human trafficking and asylum; 
8b) Readmission agreements as a tool in the battle against illegal migration, and
cooperation of EU member states with the countries of origin consequently
building the sustainable solutions; 
c) The current visa system and relevant EU standards; 
d) Border control/integrated border management and EU standards; 
e) Regional cooperation;
The authors’ findings can be outlined as follows: the Schengen regime is a part
of the wider European project of creating a single market and free movement of
citizens within the European Union by abolishing internal border controls. The
natural outcome of this internal liberalization had been stricter and more
concentrated external border controls. In a 2001 regulation, updated in 2003, the
EU council listed those countries whose nationals do not require a visa (the white
list) and those who do (the black list).3 Those countries on the black list are
implicitly not trusted as their citizens are viewed as potential large-scale
immigrants.4 In fact, illegal migration into the EU is one of the main criteria for
determining whether a country will be placed on the positive or negative list. The
problem is with the countries’ “ability to efficiency control the illegal migration of
its own nationals and aliens who pass through its territory en route to the EU”. 
The complications are multifaceted but the foremost problems are: human
trafficking, smuggling, and the issue of readmission.  The Western Balkan region
is linked by poverty, misery and the shadow economy. Consequently, these states
have become connected by transnational organized crime. Because crime is not
selective about the nationality or religion of people, it brings together those who
feel a sense of purpose in profiting from misery, there is a distinct need for
comprehensive reforms in the of rule of law, corruption, and illegal migration.
Establishing integrated border management means a permeable border, one
capable of distinguishing between the legitimate movement of people and goods,
and illegal activities ranging from the smuggling of goods to human trafficking.
Border management must be reformed in order to meet EU standards, but also to
improve regional movement. Regional cooperation is essential in preparing for
integration into the EU. 
The papers submitted at the national workshops and Regional Roundtable
conference have been published in this book. 
Vladimir GREČIĆ
Project Manager
3 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose
nationals must have visas when crossing the external borders (Annex I) and those whose nationals
are exempt (Annex II), updated in Council Regulation (EC) No. 453/2003 of 6 March 2003.
4 The Schengen countries follow a rule of reverse reciprocity: if a country on the white list requires
the nationals of an EU member state to get a visa, it will be moved to the Schengen black list.
However, a country on the black list will not be transferred to the white list for granting visa-free
entry to EU citizens. Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, Article 1.4.
9BALKAN COUNTRIES AND MASS MIGRATION TO 
THE EUROPEAN UNION: NOTABLE DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS
by
Vladimir Grečić1
Introduction
In fact all the countries of the continent, except Norway and Switzerland, strive
to join the integration group. Its policy in the last years has contributed to the
acceleration of transformation in Central and Eastern Europe from communist
regimes to modern, functional democratic states. It has de facto prompted the
speeding up of the reforms in Turkey and Croatia, and before that in Bulgaria and
Romania, and in the other countries of the Western Balkans, including Serbia and
Montenegro. The citizens of this part of the world benefit from their neighbors,
countries with stable democracy and a prosperous market economy. The EU
enlargement implies improvement in peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human
rights and the rule of law throughout Europe.
Ten new members (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus) joined the EU on May 1st, 2004, and
the agreements were signed with Bulgaria and Romania in April 2005. In October
of the same year, the EU opened accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey,
and negotiations on Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia and
Montenegro. Each of these events is justified by the progress the countries made in
fulfilling the relevant conditions. 
The EU Strategic Document on Enlargement (561) from November 9th, 2005
states, among other things, that the last enlargement of the EU “has not brought
considerable changes in the area of movement of people and the right of individuals to
found firms”.
1 Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.
I — BALKAN MIGRATION AND THE CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST ILLEGAL MIGRATION 
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The intention of this article is to analyze human resources in European
countries, with a special emphasis on the countries aiming to join the European
Union (EU), and to make an overview of emigration potential as well as possible
threats of intra-illegal migrant flows and migrant flows towards the EU.
Human resources in the countries of the last and 
next rounds of the EU enlargements
The last enlargement have brought close to 74 million people to the EU (Table
3). What is characteristic for these countries is the fact that they all share a low
population growth rate. Poland, whose citizens went to temporary or permanent
work to Germany even before, is the biggest in the group with 38.2 million people.
So, the emigration pressure for the new member states is more stable than was
expected. However, in the rest of Balkan countries, which are waiting for EU
Enlargement and which are hoping to join it in the days to come, have a one and a
half times larger population and therefore, bigger emigration potential. Bulgaria
and Romania, countries accessing to the EU have a population of close to 30
million people, but also have low or negative population growth. 
Croatia and Turkey, which opened accession negotiations have, according to
data from 2005, a total population of over 75 million, and Macedonia has a
population of over 2 million. What is characteristic is that Turkey has over 71
million people and still has a high population growth rate (Table 5), and registered
emigration, in UN publications, of around 10,000 a year.2
The rest of the Western Balkan countries have more modest human potential.
According to UN data from 2005, these countries together had slightly less than 18
million people. The population structure is different, and the emigration is
different. The biggest number of potential migrants is in Albania and Kosovo and
Metohija, because those areas have the highest participation of youth.3
Five Countries of the Western Balkans as a Challenge for the EU
Even though Macedonia has become a candidate for EU membership, it still has
not gotten onto the so-called White Schengen list. Its citizens still have to wait in lines
for Schengen visas. So, the five countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro and Serbia including Kosovo and
Metohija) present a great challenge for the EU. Enlargement policy needs to
demonstrate de facto the ability for transformation in the region in which the states are
weak and societies divided. A perspective of the final accession to the EU is of the
2 UN, World Population Prospects. The 2000 Revision, vol. I: Comprehensive Table, United Nation,
New York 2001, p. 442.
3 Article 4996 of the Treaty of European Union.
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utmost importance for the carrying out the reforms in these countries. However, it is
clear that these countries will join the EU only when they fulfill the established criteria. 
The European Union has political and economic criteria for membership, as
well as criteria which refer to the obligations of member states and administrative
ability to implement and carry out laws and policies of the EU.4
Table 1: The process of EU accession
 “The realistic 
scenario” 
“The reform 
scenario” 
Bulgaria 
 
Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia, Albania 
Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia, Albania 
1993 Association Agreement 2006 2006 
1995 AA enters into force 2008 2007 
1995 Membership application 2008 2007 
1997 Candidate status 2010 2008 
2000 Opening negotiations 2013 2009 
2004 Closing negotiations 2017 2013 
2007 Membership 2020 2014-2015 
14 years Total 14 years 8-9 years 
Source: Breaking out of the Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA should be changed”, ESI – European
Stability Initiative, Brussels, 1 June 2005 (www.esiweb.org), p. 11.
Four countries of the Western Balkans will, according to the realist scenario,5
join the EU in 2020, and according to the reformist scenario, in 2015. 
These scenarios show that the countries of the Western Balkans will remain
isolated from the integrated and developed Europe for a long time. Whether they
will fulfill the conditions and become members of the EU in 2015 or 2020 depends
on themselves, but also on the European Union and its assistance — material and
any other. The EU’s budget illustrates the following areas of assistance in countries
of the Western Balkans (Table 2). 
The EU Summit in Thessaloniki on June 21st, 2003, among other things,
concluded that “the map of the Union will not be complete until the Western
Balkans join”.6 The Stabilization and Association process will, as it was stated, be
enriched with the elements that will come from the enlargement process, including
the expansion of the support for institutional capacity building, the rule of law, and
cooperation in areas of justice and internal affairs. 
4 Conclusions of the European Councils in Copenhagen 1953, and Madrid 1995. 
5 “Breaking out of the Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA should be changed”, ESI – European Stability
Initiative, Brussels, 1 June 2005 (www.esiweb.org)
6 Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relation, “A milestone in the European Union s relations with
the Westerbn Balkan countries”, at, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sum_06_03/
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Table 2: Planned assistance for potential candidates, 2007-2013 
(in million Euros)
States Population 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Serbia 8.0m 113 138 117 159 234 233 220 1,214 
Kosovo 1.8m 25 31 26 35 52 52 49 270 
Montenegro 0.6m 10 12 10 14 21 21 20 108 
Albania 3.2m 45 55 47 63 94 93 88 485 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
4.1m 59 71 60 82 119 118 113 622 
Total 17.8m 252 307 260 353 520 517 490 2,699 
Per capita  €14.16 €17.25 €14.61 €19.83 €29.21 €29.04 €27.53  
Source: Breaking out of the Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA should be changed”, ESI – European
Stability Initiative, Brussels, 1 June 2005 (www.esiweb.org), p. 5.
The participation of these countries in the Union’s programs and economic
development implies that the CARDS budget will increase, bigger regional
cooperation and efforts to strengthen democracy, parliamentary and political
cooperation increase.
The current EU visa regime towards the countries of the Western Balkans
(Albania, BiH, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia including Kosovo and Metohija)
adds to people’s bitterness, slows down the process of foreign trade, business,
education and a more open civil society, and as a result, contributes to regional
instability.7 The full visa regime liberalization for everybody will most probably have
to wait until all of the Balkan countries come closer to EU membership. However,
selective liberalization for certain groups of people and the facilitation of issuing
visas to all applicants including simplifying and expediting the issuing would help
further reforms. It would also support the necessary economic reforms. According to
2003 data, the GDP of 5 of the Western Balkan countries reached only 8% of the EU’s
average. Given data shows part of the population below the poverty level.8
• Albania — 25% of the population lives below poverty level (2004 data).
• Bosnia and Herzegovina — 25% of the population lives below poverty level
(2004 data)
• Macedonia — 30.2% of the total population lives in poverty (2003 data). 
• Serbia and Montenegro — 29% of the population lives below poverty level
(2004 data)
The rate of unemployment in the 5 countries of the Western Balkans is also high.9
7 International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, “EU Visas and the Western
Balkans”, Europe Report No 168, 29 November 2005.
8 International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, “EU Visas and the Western
Balkans”, Europe Report No 168, 29 November 2005.
9 International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, “EU Visas and the Western
Balkans”, Europe Report No 168, 29 November 2005.
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• Albania around 30% (2004)
• BiH around 24% (2004)
• Macedonia around 37% (2004), and
• Serbia and Montenegro around 30%, and Kosovo close to 50% (2004)
This further stimulates an active work force to emigrate. 
The economic and political situation in the countries of the Western Balkans is
not enviable. However, the reform process in the area of visas and other factors
which determine visa regimes are overlapping with the process of negotiating and
implementing agreements with the European Union. One is conditional upon the
other. Abolishing visas from the side of the European Union for the citizens of
these countries will come after prescribed conditions are met. Before that, the issue
of migration control has to be an integral part of reforms comprehensive reforms.
The questions of illegal migration must be solved with the countries which are
involved in it. Full attention needs to be paid to combating illegal migration. This
means that measures need to be taken which would prevent illegal migration of
foreigners towards the EU, including transit migration.
Literature recognizes three types of international migration of the work force:
• permanent migration
• temporary migration, and 
• brain drain (migration of a highly qualified work force).
In the global economic order the demand for migrant workers as a source of
cheap labor, together with restrictive and non-existent immigration policies, create
conditions for the fourth type of migration – illegal migration.10
External migration politics should be based on standards set by the European
Union. Also, as long as the number of economic migrants who are accepted to the
EU for reasons of employment is the responsibility of member states, it is clear that
the entrance of citizens of third countries in one of the EU member states can affect
other countries of the Union and their labor markets.
The politics of effective migration cannot be limited to instruments for
accepting immigrants. Other equally important legal and operational measures are
necessary, having in mind that immigration presents a complex phenomenon which
imposes the need for seeing all its dimensions. On one hand there is the integration
of economic migrants and measures for their integration, and the fight against
illegal immigration and employment, including trafficking, on the other. In that
context, the EU intensifies its efforts to reduce informal economy, which is
considered to be a “pull factor” for illegal immigration as well as one of the
catalysts for exploitation. Pointing out the importance of this issue, a special
Communication of European Communities, which sets future priorities in the area
of illegal immigration, was issued.
10 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission. Policy Plan on
Legal Migration (SEC(2005)1680), Brussels, 21. 12. 2005, COM(2005)669 final.
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Table 3: Population projections for the EU25 + Bulgaria and Romania: 
total population
Member 
States 
Population at 1 January (1000 inhabitants) 
Percentage increase with respect to 
1.1. 2004 
 2004 2015 2025 2050 2015 2025 2050 
EU – 25 456 815 467 307 470 057 449 831 2.3 2.9 -1.5 
EU – 15 882 674 394 727 398 780 384 356 3.1 4.2 0.4 
New 
Member 
States 
74 141 72 580 71 278 65 475 -2.1 -3.9 -11.7 
Belgium 10 396 10 674 10 898 10 906 2.7 4.8 4.9 
Czech 
Republic 
10 212 10 012 9 812 8 894 -2.0 -3.9 -12.9 
Denmark 5 398 5 498 5 557 5 430 1.9 2.9 0.6 
Germany 82 532 82 864 82 106 74 642 0.4 -0.5 -9.6 
Estonia 1 351 1 279 1 224 1 126 -5.3 -9.4 -16.6 
Greece 11 041 11 390 11 394 10 632 3.2 3.2 -3.7 
Spain 42 345 45 264 45 556 42 834 6.9 7.6 1.2 
France 59 901 62 616 64 392 65 704 4.5 7.5 9.7 
Ireland 4 028 4 555 4 922 5 478 13.1 22.2 36.0 
Italy 57 888 58 630 57 751 52 709 1.3 -0.2 -8.9 
Cyprus 730 828 897 975 13.3 22.8 33.5 
Latvia 2 319 2 174 2 068 1 873 -6.3 -10.8 -19.2 
Lithuania 3 446 3 258 3 134 2 881 -5.5 -9.1 -16.4 
Luxembourg 452 499 544 643 10.4 20.5 42.3 
Hungary 10 117 9 834 9 588 8 915 -2.8 -5.2 -11.9 
Malta 400 439 468 508 9.8 17.0 27.1 
Netherlands 16 258 16 957 17 429 17 406 4.3 7.2 7.1 
Austria 8 114 8 358 8 501 8 216 3.0 4.8 1.3 
Poland 38 191 37 429 36 836 33 665 -2.0 -3.5 -11.8 
Portugal 10 475 10 762 10 730 10 009 2.7 2.4 -4.4 
Slovenia 1 996 2 019 2 014 1 901 1.1 0.9 -4.8 
Slovakia 5 380 5 309 5 237 4 738 -1.3 -2.7 -11.9 
Finland 5 220 5 354 5 439 5 217 2.6 4.2 -0.1 
Sweden 8 976 9 373 9 769 10 202 4.4 8.8 13.7 
United 
Kingdom 
59 652 61 934 63 792 64 330 3.8 6.9 7.8 
Bulgaria 7 801 7 130 6 465 5 094 -8.6 -17.1 -34.7 
Romania 21 711 20 917 19 746 17 125 -3.7 -9.1 -21.1 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission.
Policy Plan on Legal Migration (SEC(2005)1680), Brussels, 21. 12. 2005, COM(2005)669
final, p. 23.
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According to it, the Communication of the European Communities
(SEC(2005)1680) commences initiatives for the development of all these areas,
including cooperation with the countries of origin of migrants. In the development
of various initiatives, due attention will be dedicated to gender equality, with a
special attention to the protection of the most vulnerable groups.
With regard to economic immigration, the present state and perspectives in the
labor market in the EU can be simply explained as a scenario of one “need”. Some
member states already felt the lack in labor force and experts in some sectors of the
Table 4: Population projections for the EU25 + Bulgaria and Romania:
population structure – main age groups
Percentage aged 0-14 Percentage aged 15-64 Percentage aged 65 + Member 
States 2004 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050 
EU - 25 16.4 14. 13.4 67.2 63.0 56.7 16.4 22.6 29.9 
EU - 15 16.3 14.4 13.5 66.7 62.8 56.5 17.0 22.8 30.0 
New Member 
States 
16.7 14.4 13.2 69.7 64.5 57.7 13.6 21.1 29.1 
Belgium 17.3 15.6 14.7 65.6 61.9 57.6 17.1 22.5 27.7 
Czech 
Republic 
15.2 13.5 12.6 70.8 64.1 56.5 14.0 22.4 30.9 
Denmark 18.9 15.9 15.7 66.2 62.9 60.2 14.9 21.2 24.1 
Germany 14.7 12.9 11.9 67.3 62.5 56.5 18.0 24.6 31.6 
Estonia 16.0 16.2 14.8 67.9 63.9 59.6 16.1 19.9 25.6 
Greece 14.5 13.3 12.3 67.7 63.9 55.2 17.8 22.8 32.5 
Spain 14.5 12.8 11.5 68.6 65.2 52.9 16.9 22.0 35.6 
France 18.6 16.7 15.8 65.1 60.9 57.0 16.3 22.4 27.2 
Ireland 20.9 18.2 16.0 68.0 65.3 57.8 11.1 16.5 26.2 
Italy 14.2 12.1 11.2 66.6 62.9 53.5 19.2 25.0 35.3 
Cyprus 20.0 15.6 13.3 68.1 65.2 60.5 11.9 19.2 26.2 
Latvia 15.4 16.2 14.8 68.4 64.1 59.1 16.2 19.7 26.1 
Lithuania 17.7 15.1 13.7 67.3 65.7 59.6 15.0 19.2 26.7 
Luxembourg 18.8 17.1 16.6 67.1 64.9 61.3 14.1 18.0 22.1 
Hungary 15.9 14.3 13.8 68.6 63.7 58.1 15.5 22.0 28.1 
Malta 18.2 15.6 14.5 68.7 63.1 60.8 13.1 21.3 24.7 
Netherlands 18.5 16.1 15.8 67.6 63.3 60.7 13.9 20.6 23.5 
Austria 16.3 13.8 12.3 68.2 64.1 57.3 15.5 22.1 30.4 
Poland 17.2 14.6 13.0 69.8 64.3 57.6 13.0 21.1 29.4 
Portugal 15.7 14.2 13.1 67.4 63.7 55.0 16.9 22.1 31.9 
Slovenia 14.6 13.4 12.8 70.4 63.8 56.0 15.0 22.8 31.2 
Slovakia 17.6 14.0 12.8 70.9 67.1 57.9 11.5 18.9 29.3 
Finland 17.6 16.0 15.3 66.8 59.4 57.8 15.6 24.6 26.9 
Sweden 17.8 17.1 16.3 65.0 60.7 59.4 17.2 22.2 24.3 
United 
Kingdom 
18.3 16.1 14.7 65.7 63.0 58.7 16.0 20.9 26.6 
Bulgaria 14.2 11.7 11.5 68.7 64.5 55.0 17.1 23.8 33.5 
Romania 16.4 14.1 12.5 69.1 66.9 57.9 14.5 19.0 29.6 
Source: Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the Commission.
Policy Plan on Legal Migration (SEC(2005)1680). Brussels. 21. 12. 2005. COM(2005)669
final. p. 24.
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economy which cannot be eliminated within national labor markets. This
phenomenon applies to all professions — from non qualified workers to academic
experts.
Emigration potential of the Balkans
Eurostat projections show that “the growth in population until 2025 will
mainly be due to net migration, because from 2010 the total number of deaths will
consistently overcome the total number of births. The effect of net migration will
not be more important than the natural decrease in the number of population after
2025.” This will have serious repercussions on the number of population employed
in 25 EU member states, since, according to the projections, “the share of working
age population (15-65 years old) will decline sharply, from 67.2% in 2004 to
56.7% in 2050”.11 There is a working age population of more than 52 million. So,
a decrease in the total number of population is expected until 2025, and of the
working age population until 2011. This draws a conclusion that the Balkan
countries, which are expecting accession to the EU, be the area from which the
work force will come until the middle of this century. However, the countries of
the EU will control the migration in the years to come.
Conclusion
The analysis of the scope and structure of human potential in the countries of
the Western Balkans brings us to at least four conclusions:
— First, the countries of the Western Balkans, which are potential candidates for
membership in the EU, have a more modest human potential.
— Second, there is a difference in population growth rate which is, largely,
determined by historical, ethnic and religious heritage. Parts of the Western
Balkans with a Muslim population still have a very high population growth
rate, a large part of the population is between 0-14 years of age, there is a high
participation rate of the male population, and they present the biggest
emigration pressure for some countries. Albania and the Serbian southern
province have, during the 1990s and now, presented the most dynamic sources
of legal, but mostly illegal, migrations towards the EU member states.
— Third, illegal migration in the region of the Western Balkans are, mostly, a part
of transit migration which gravitate in the direction of the European Union.
Albanians from Albania and Albanians from the province of Kosovo and
Metohija use mixed types of migration. When it comes to Serbia (without the
province of Kosovo and Metohija) and Montenegro, analyses show that illegal
migration are brought to the lowest level during the harvest season. With the
tendency decreasing, there is illegal migration in the form of transit and
11 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission. Policy Plan on
Legal Migration (SEC(2005)1680), Brussels, 21. 12. 2005, COM(2005)669 final, p. 4.
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smuggling people. The possibilities for illegal migration are also brought down
to the lowest possible level. It is through this that the research shows that the
“push factors” are much stronger in Serbia than the “pull factors”, but these
apply to the category of highly qualified work force, which is not a big concern
from the point of view of EU member states. On the contrary, these countries
encourage this category of migration.
— Fourth, data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2004) show that
internally displaced people are concentrated in three countries of the Western
Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina (327.200), Croatia (12.600) and Serbia and
Montenegro (256.900). The same source points out that, at the same time,
Table 5: Population projections for the selected Balkan countries: 
total population
States Population at 1 January (1000 inhabitants) 
Percentage increase with respect 
to 1.1. 2005 
 2005 2015 2025 2050 2015 2025 2050 
Albania 3 234 3 439 3 676 3 905 6.3 11.4 12.1 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
4 209 4 279 4 165 3 458 1.7 -1.0 -18.0 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
10 475 10 309 10 044 9 030 -1.6 -4.1 -13.8 
Subtotal 17 918 18 027 17 885 16 393 0.6 0.2 -8.5 
Croatia 4 661 4 622 4 519 4 179 -0.8 -3.0 -10.3 
Macedonia 2 064 2 075 2 067 1 894 0.5 0.1 -8.2 
Subtotal 6 725 6 697 6 586 6 073 -0.4 -2.1 -9.7 
Turkey 71 209 79 004 86 611 98 818 11.1 12.2 13.9 
Total 95 852 103 728 111 082 121 284 8.2 15.9 26.5 
Source: Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. World Population
Prospects. The 2000 Revision. Vol. II. United Nations. New York. 2001. pp. 177-909.
Table 6: Population projections for the selected Balkan countries:
population structure – main age groups
Percentage aged 0-14 Percentage aged 15-64 Percentage aged 65 + 
States 
2005 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050 
Albania 27.2 21.9 19.0 67.2 67.3 62.7 6.7 10.9 18.3 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
15.8 72.4 11.8 13.3 67.1 19.6 13.0 57.9 29.1 
Serbia and 
Montenegro(a) 
18.1 15.5 15.2 67.8 66.3 59.8 14.1 18.2 25.0 
Croatia 17.3 16.2 16.3 67.0 63.8 59.4 15.7 20.0 24.3 
Macedonia 20.0 14.8 14.1 69.0 68.5 59.8 11.0 16.7 26.1 
Turkey 29.1 22.5 19.5 64.7 68.0 62.6 6.2 9.5 17.9 
(a) Including Kosovo and Metohija.
Source: Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. World Population
Prospects. The 2000 Revision. Vol. II. United Nations. New York. 2001. pp. 177-909.
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318.500 refugees were registered: in Bosnia and Herzegovina 22.500 (19.500
from Croatia and 3.000 from Serbia), in Croatia 4.400 (500 from Serbia and
3.500 from Bosnia and Herzegovina), in Macedonia 200 (all from Serbia) and
in Serbia and Montenegro 291 400 refugees (187 770 from Croatia and 99 800
from Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The movement of people in the region of the Western Balkans indicates the
need for action, both on national and regional plans.
On the national plan, Serbia and Montenegro needs to: redefine mutual
relations in all areas which concern the movement of people, manage these
movements, and adopt standards set by the EU. The processes of reform in the area
of visas and other things which establish the visa system overlap with the
negotiation process and implementation of the agreements with the European
Union. It is understood that the issue of control and management of migration must
be a part of the reforms. The issues of illegal migration have to be solved with the
countries which are involved in them. The International Labor Organization
defines an illegal immigrant as a person who, for illegal entry in the country of the
expired visa does not have legal status in the transit or receiving country. This
applies to migrants who broke the law on entering of the foreign citizens of the host
country, seek asylum without legal reason and any other person who does not have
the right of residence in the given country. Therefore, full attention should be paid
to combating illegal migration. This means that measures should be taken which
would be in function of preventing illegal migration of foreigners towards the EU,
including transit migration. Measures and activities must be based on the
Information of the Commission on Common Politics in Issue of Illegal
Immigration (COM(2001)672, final version, 15/11/2001) in which the Council of
the European Union calls for putting together a common Action plan for combating
illegal immigration, pointing to the activities which have to be a priority. Those are
activities in the area of visa policy, information exchange and analysis, pre-border
measures, border management, readmission and return policy, measures expanding
the role of Europol and sanctions.
On the regional plan, it is needed to have intergovernmental dialogues and
cooperation in the area of work and other kinds of migration, cooperation of
employers organizations and trade unions, researchers and others. Exchange of
information between the countries is of particular importance. It should be done
both on bilateral and regional level, through already existing regional organizations
(MARRI and others). Bilateral and multilateral agreements between countries of
origin and countries of destination, which include various forms of movement of
people should be improved. The regional policy in the fight against illegal
immigration needs to be a priority of all subjects in the region. Finally, cooperation
in the area of migration research in the countries of the Western Balkans needs to
be improved.
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SEEKING THE VIRTUOUS CIRCLE: MIGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE BALKANS
by
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi1
Executive summary
Reliable data on migration has been largely missing in Southeastern Europe.
Each country in the region has developed its own system of measuring population
movements, which often makes it difficult to aggregate data across countries or
make valid comparisons. This report aims to fill the void. It is the first UNDP
cross-regional attempt at summarizing data from individual countries to capture
current migration trends.
The main finding of this report is that people in Southeastern Europe don’t
move as much as is presumed — or feared — in the West. Just 3 per cent of
Romanians, 4 per cent of Bulgarians, and only 2 per cent of Macedonians would
settle permanently abroad. The large majority of people in these countries would
not even travel at all, let alone for work, if given the opportunity. The survey shows
that 88 per cent of Romanians have never travelled to a neighbouring country.
Fifty-eight per cent have not made it as far as Bucharest, the national capital, and
41 per cent, most of whom are peasants, have not travelled to the capital of their
county. Eighty-four per cent of Bulgarians have never been to a distant foreign
country and 78 per cent have not travelled to a neighbouring country. Even if
Schengen visas are lifted for the Western Balkan countries, as they have been for
Romania and Bulgaria, the large majority of the population would not even travel,
not to speak of settling abroad.
1 This report is authored by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, UNDP consultant for Early Warning Systems and
post conflict environments. The comparative regional survey quoted here, as well as the work of the
team, was funded by UNDP RBEC. Contributions were received from individual country teams
producing UNDP Early Warning Reports in Macedonia, Romania and Kosovo. Survey data from
EWR Albania 2004 was also used. The views and recommendations expressed in this article are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations or UNDP.
20
The report finds that there are positive economic effects of migration, both for the
sending and receiving countries. A recent study finds that migration to the West of 1
per cent of the population from the new member states would increase aggregate
GDP in the sending and receiving countries by 0.2 to 0.3 per cent respectively.
Evidence from Albania, Romania and Bulgaria shows that the money which migrants
send home prevents a large number of people from falling below the poverty
threshold, contributes modestly to local development as well as boosts consumption
spending, which contributes to the high rates of growth in these three countries.
From forced to voluntary migration
After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, many observers expected a wave of mass
migration from the East to the West. The per capita GDP of the new member states
was just 49 per cent of incomes in the EU-15, and in the Balkans was less than a
quarter.2 However, the expectations turned out to be overblown. Cumulative net
emigration since 1989 from the eight new member
states and the two accession candidates (Bulgaria and Romania) to the EU is
estimated at only 1.1 million people, just 1 per cent of their population.3
The EU visa regime for Central and Southeastern Europe varies: The European
Union lifted the Schengen visa regime for Bulgaria and Romania in 2000 and 2001
respectively, thus removing a main barrier to travel in Europe. Croatia has enjoyed
bilateral agreements with various European countries, which allow its citizens
considerable freedom of travel. The other Western Balkans countries, as well as
Turkey, are separated from Europe, both old and new (since EU candidates are
compelled to introduce visas for their neighbours), by the means of Schengen visas
and increasingly tighter border controls.
The 1990s were a period of political upheaval, particularly in Southeastern
Europe during and after the collapse of communism and the dismantling of the
former Yugoslavia. Since 1989, between 10 and 15 per cent of the population of the
Balkan countries was displaced in one way or another. About 15 per cent of
Albanians allegedly live abroad; the figure might be double for Bosnia, although
this battered country has also seen important numbers return. The massive
population movement which resulted was only the last of a long series in Balkan
history. The Ottoman Empire practiced frequently the displacement of entire
populations on political or economical grounds, and the current demography of the
Balkans still bears the traces of this policy. In more recent times as well, millions
of people were forced to become refugees in other countries or internally displaced
persons (IDPs). Others deserted voluntarily the chaotic societies which resulted
from civil wars and contested secessions. Some emigrated or applied for political
asylum in Western countries.
2 Figures are PPP (parity purchase power). Eurostat data, 2003.
3 OECD (2003): Trends in International Migration, Paris: OECD.
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Migrants from the Eastern Balkans were initially considered ‘refugees’, which
entailed a greater degree of rights, but were later downgraded to ‘economic
migrants’ once the region stabilized in the late 1990s. As the pressure grew to
curtail immigration, Western European governments tightened entry requirements.
As a result, more people tried to enter illegally, either travelling on their own
initiative or with the help of smugglers.
Many refugees returned voluntarily with the help of the UN’s refugee agency,
UNHCR, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In Bosnia, the
number of returning IDPs and refugees reached 1 million in July 2004 out of 2.2
million displaced by the war (see Table 1). But the picture is not all bright. For
example, according to 2005 UNHCR data, Serbia and Montenegro, primarily
through Kosovo, remains the second largest source of asylum seekers in the
European Union after the Russian Federation.
Table 1. The legacy of the 1990s. 
Displaced persons in the first quarter of 2005
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Numbers 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Numbers 
IDPs 309 200 IDPs 248 200 
Refugees outside 
country 
100 000 Croatia refugees 180 100 
Croatia refugees in 
country 
19 200 B&H refugees 95 300 
Returned IDPs in 
country 
17 900 
Local residents at 
risk 
85 000 
Serbia and Montenegro 
refugees in country 
3 000 
Germany 
returnees 
3 000 
Various countries 
returnees in country 
1 560 
Switzerland 
returnees 
900 
Serbia and Montenegro 
returnees in country 
880 
FYR Macedonia 
refugees 
800 
Serbia and Montenegro 
asylum seekers in 
country 
400 
FYR Macedonia 
asylum seekers 
400 
Source: UNHCR 2005
Besides the voluntary resettling of refugees — following bilateral agreements — some
unsuccessful asylum seekers have started to be repatriated to their original countries. The
movement of people is largely responsible for the yearly variation in population growth. With
the exception of Albania, the rest of the region has negative natural growth rates. (see Table 2).
The present report is the first UNDP cross-regional attempt at summarizing
data from individual countries to capture current migration trends. It draws mostly
on data collected by UNDP-supported teams in Macedonia, Kosovo and Romania
in 2005, and on a regional EU Fifth Framework Programme Survey ‘Integrating
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Source: World Bank.
Reliable hard comparative data on migration is lacking. Each country has
developed a system of migration measurement based on its own particular
requirements, which makes it difficult to aggregate data across Europe or make
valid cross-country comparisons. Information based on public opinion surveys is
also scarce: Eurobarometers miss Western Balkan countries, focusing on accession
countries only. The surveys presented in this report try to fill this void.
How many migrants?
The UN Population Division defines a migrant as someone outside his or her
country of birth or citizenship for 12 months or more. At present, some 175 million
people, or roughly 3 per cent of the world’s population, are migrants who have
lived outside their countries of birth or citizenship for a year or more. This number
roughly doubled between 1975 and 2000.5 These migrants include refugees and
asylum seekers, foreign students and other long-term visitors, unauthorized
Population 
(million) 
Population growth (annual %) 
Country 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Albania 3.1 -0.03 0.4 0.59 0.59 0.59 
3.9 Feb. 83 Feb. 65 Jan. 99 Jan. 34 0.68 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  3 873 060 3 977 000 4 057 056 4 111 688 4 139 835 
Bulgaria 8 -0.6 -1.83 -1.88 -0.52 -0.59 
Croatia 4.4 .. -3.81 .. 0 0.1 
Macedonia, 
FYR 
2.1 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.15 0.54 
Romania 22 -0.2 -0.07 -1.4 -1.5 -0.27 
8.4      Serbia and 
Montenegro  0.11 0.04 0.13 -23.39 -0.69 
Kosovo 1.9      
4 This survey was designed by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi for the IBEU Fifth Framework EU Research
Project ‘Functional Borders and Sustainable Security: Integrating the Balkans in the European
Union’ IBEU. Athens: ELIAMEP.
5 See Salt, John 2003. Current Trends in International Migration in Europe. Strasbourg: Council of
Europe. CMDG 2003 (39).
the Balkans in the European Union (IBEU) in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and
Montenegro’ by BBSS Gallup International in 2003 and in Romania by the Centre
for Regional Studies (CURS).4 It also draws on secondary analysis using data from
organizations such as the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the
Council of Europe, as well as from country research teams.
Table 2: Evolution of population growth in the Balkans
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foreigners, and naturalized foreign-born citizens of the European Union. The
evidence from Germany, which has been a preferred destination for migrants,
should alleviate fears of invasion, however (see Table 3). Poland and Romania are
key source countries, but migrants from all accession countries (Central Europe
and Eastern Balkans together) make up less than 10 per cent of the total number of
migrants to the EU. Surveys in new member countries have always shown that
only a tiny minority is interested in leaving permanently, though more would seek
short-term work in the EU.
Table 3. Citizens of selected accession countries
in Germany 2002 and 2003
Country of origin 2002 2003 
Bulgaria 42 420 44 300 
Poland 317 603 326 882 
Romania 88 679 89 104 
Slovakia 18 327 19 567 
Slovenia 20 550 21 795 
Sum CEEC 614 344 629 100 
Sum 15 EU countries 1 859 811 1 847 777 
Sum of all nationalities 7 335 593 9 578 288 
Share of CEEC of foreign 
population % 
8.4 8.4 
Source: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugee, data of the Central Registry of Alien.
The UNDP survey in South-Eastern Europe shows some variety in migration
intentions across countries (see Table 4). The share of Romanians and Bulgarians,
who enjoy freedom of travel (although not freedom of labour), and whose countries
signed EU accession treaties in April 2005, and who plan to seek work in Western
countries, are just 12 and 7 per cent respectively. The figure for those who would
settle permanently abroad is far smaller, just 3 per cent in Romania and roughly 4
per cent in Bulgaria. Only a third of respondents possess the needed social and hard
capital to move abroad. By contrast, inhabitants of Kosovo and Macedonia are
more prone to leaving their homes: 30 per cent of Kosovars and 19 per cent of
Macedonians would move in search of economic opportunity. But since the
population of the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia is some 2.2 million
and Kosovo is 1.9 million, even these percentages would produce a relatively small
number of additional migrants.
The gap between aims and means persists when respondents are asked if they
have any experience as a migrant. Cross-tabulations of the data show that of all
respondents who would consider emigrating, only half have had some experience
abroad. Many of those considering leaving to find better jobs have some relatives
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Source: UNDP Early Warning Survey Kosovo 2004 by Riinvest, Macedonia 2005 by BSS
Gallup. Public Opinion Barometer Romania Survey by Gallup International May 2005;
Bulgarian International Organization of Migration IOM Survey 2003. Bulgarian data
comes from Rossitza Guentcheva, Petya Kabakchieva, Plamen Kolarski (2003).
Bulgaria.The social impact of seasonal migration. Sofia: International Organization for
Migration Bulgaria.
Migrating to foreign countries is not part of most people’s way of life. Humans
tend to remain in their home environments, which they know and master best.
Under normal circumstances, only small numbers of people travel to foreign
countries seeking a new home. This is particularly true in rural societies. Our
survey shows that 88 per cent of Romanians have never travelled to a neighbouring
country, and 92 per cent have never been to another foreign country. Fifty-eight per
cent have not made it as far as Bucharest, the national capital, and 41 per cent, the
majority of which are mostly peasants, have not travelled to the capital of their
county. Bulgarians are only slightly better travelled than Romanians, with 78 per
cent who have not travelled to a neighbouring country, and 84 per cent who have
never been to a non-neighbouring foreign country. However, 88 per cent have
already abroad, leading us to the first important conclusion: a good predictor of the
intention to leave is the existence of a family member or a friend abroad, simply
because a would-be migrant could rely on him or her for temporary shelter and help
finding a job. Regression models from the Romanian sample with various controls
(such as economic and employment status) confirm this hypothesis. Germany is a
leading destination for would-be migrants in the Western Balkans. Besides
Germany, Southeast Europeans prefer neighbouring EU countries, such as Italy
and Greece. Bulgarians also prefer the United States, and Romanians Ireland, due
to its high demand for labour.
Table 4: Migration intentions and experience
Survey item Kosovo Romania Macedonia Bulgaria 
Intention to leave temporarily [“Do you plan 
to leave country temporarily to seek work 
abroad?”] Intention to leave permanently 
30 12 11 7 
[Do you plan to emigrate and to live there?] Na 3 2 4 
Personal migration experience [“Have you 
worked abroad in the last 10 years?”] 
Na 6 9 Na 
Family migration experience/ past [“Has 
any member of your household worked 
abroad for a while?] 
Na 14 17 Na 
Family migration experience/ present [“Is 
anybody from your household currently 
working abroad?”] 
27 10 10 Na 
Favoured countries of destination 
Germany, 
Swiss, 
USA 
Italy, 
Spain, 
Ireland 
Greece, 
Germany 
Greece, 
Germany, 
USA 
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% of population 
that has never 
travelled to… 
Regional 
capital 
Country 
capital 
Neighbor 
country 
Other foreign 
country 
Romania 41 58 88 92 
Bulgaria 12 18 78 84 
Serbia 12 22 6 81 
Montenegro 4 8 71 94 
Macedonia 7 36 41 63 
managed to see Sofia, the capital. In smaller Macedonia and Kosovo, which were
part of a multinational federation, only 6 per cent of Serbs have not been in a
neighbouring country, compared with 41 per cent of Macedonians and 71 per cent
of Montenegrins. Beyond the immediate borders, however, the liberal travel policy
of Communist Yugoslavia did not generate significant differences from the Eastern
Balkans: 81 per cent of Serbia’s inhabitants have never been to a non-neighbouring
country, compared with 63 per cent of Macedonians and 94 per cent of
Montenegrins (see Table 5).
Table 5: Travel patterns in SEE
6 See Florentina Constantin (2004). Migrating or Commuting? The Case of Romanian Workers in
Italy: Niches for Labour Commuting to the EU. Budapest, OSI: EUMAP also Sebastian Lazaroiu,
The circulatory migration of the Romanian work force. Consequences on European integration,
Bucharest, 2002. Available in Romanian at: http://www.osf.ro/ro/initiative.pdf.
7 See Antigone Lyberaki & Thanos Maroukis (2004). Albanian Immigrants in Athens: Some recent
findings. Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy. WP 5 WORKING PAPER No.
5.2/2004.
Functional Borders and Sustainable Security: Integrating the Balkans in the European Union
IBEU Fifth Framework EU Research Project.
Source: IBEU survey 2003.
Moreover, as some have argued, economic migrants are increasingly likely to
commute rather than settle permanently.6 The term ‘migration’ has become
increasingly inadequate to describe many of the migrant workers in the EU,
although it is difficult to pin down precisely how many people commute. Romanian
and Bulgarian short–term labour migrants are limited by the three-month terms of
their Schengen visas, after which they may not return to the EU for the next three
months, unless they have a work permit in the respective EU country. Those
migrants with some form of permit tend to return for at least three months and
spend most of their earnings in their home country. They also tend to pass their
temporary job, for instance, in construction, to a relative who then takes the
position for the next three months. Albanians show greater propensity to settle more
and pay social security in their host country, but they also seem to commute
considerably and spend most of their money at home.7 Countries like Italy, which
record stays longer than eight days and thus create a legal niche for short-term
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Source: Immigrazione. Dossier Statistico 2003. XIII Rapporto sull'immigrazione —
Caritas/ Migrantes.
The survey data points to two conclusions. First, in the case of the former
Yugoslavia, the tide has turned (see Table 1). During and immediately following
the war many Yugoslav citizens left the country. But now some of these people are
now returning. Second, the data show that the potential number of migrants from
Southeastern Europe is relatively small, seeing how small the population is. Those
who can find a job and shelter are more likely to move, but they are relatively few.
Romanians are most likely to migrate, but they already have the freedom to do so.
Can we estimate the number of temporary migrants from the Western Balkans
who would travel to the EU if they were free to do so? If the Schengen visas were
lifted for Macedonia, 88,000 might consider temporary work abroad (11 per cent
of 800,000, representing the work-age population). If we take into consideration
people’s connections abroad and starting capital, the figure drops to less than
44,000. For Kosovo, which has 1 million inhabitants, only 30 per cent of the
working-age population would consider migrating, which is a small figures
compared with the migration potential of countries like Poland or Romania. Thirty
per cent of the Kosovar labour force is insignificant for Europe, but the remittances
they could send home would provide a significant boost for Kosovo’s economy.
Migration theory divides the causes for migration into pull factors (conditions
in destination countries) and push factors (conditions in migrants’ home countries).
Among the pull factors, demography weighs heavily. The European Union is not
just wealthy and enjoys the best social protection systems in the world, but it is
ageing and has considerable demand for low-skilled or unskilled labour, partly
legal and partly illegal. Given these opportunities, networks of family and friends
will emerge to facilitate the flow of labour from home to destination country.
On the push side, some factors are political, others economic. Civil war or
danger of civil war, as well as continuous struggles for control over the state among
fractious ethnic groups are one of the main causes of migration, as are fears on the
part of the weaker group, often justified, that it will be the target of retaliatory and
Motivations as stated in 
permesso di soggiorno 2002 
Albanians  
(in %) 
Romanians  
(in %) 
Work 53.8 58.3 
Family reasons 38.8 31.4 
Study 4.1 1 
Religious reasons 0.1 0.9 
Other reasons 3.3 8.4 
work, provide useful statistics illuminating this phenomenon. Longer-term visitors
come mostly to work, or to join a family in order to find a job.
Table 6: The motives behind long-term sojourns in Italy, by nationality
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discriminative policies. There is always some movement of the poor towards rich
countries, but the massive population movements often signify the tacit desertion of
what people perceive as hopeless societies and the inability of their governments to
address problems. It is a vicious cycle: failed states create hopeless societies, which
tolerate state failure in their turn. This is not the case in Southeast Europe. Economic
growth in the Eastern Balkans, Albania and Serbia are currently high, and foreign
direct investment is slowly catching up with the levels in Central Europe.
The trend is positive, but the region is still far from catching up to Central
Europe. Except for Croatia, Southeast Europeans earn less than half of what
Central Europeans do. Not only depressed Macedonia and Albania have low per
capita GDP, but also Romania and Bulgaria, whose macroeconomic situation is on
the whole good. Overall, except for Albania, real incomes have not yet matched
those of 1989, when the transition started, in any of these countries. By
comparison, Central Europe was originally richer and has well surpassed 1989
income levels. Unemployment has reached peaks in Macedonia and Kosovo, and
lows in Romania (which, having the largest number of peasants, has extensive
hidden unemployment). Overall, young people (under 35 years of age) have
considerable difficulties finding their first job.
Regression analysis of our survey data shows that an unemployed person is
more likely (though not much more likely) to seek to emigrate than an employed
person. The difference is small because often officially unemployed people have
undeclared income that they earn in the informal sector. More than a third of
workers acknowledge in our survey that they work without a contract (see table 8).
Table 7. Economic performance in SEE countries
 
GDP per 
head (US$) 
2003 
Real GDP 
(1989=100) 
2004 GDP 
growth (%, 
estimate) 
Unemployment 
% 
Average 
monthly gross 
wage (US$) 
2003 
Albania 1 980 125.7 6.8 15 150 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1 690 67.5 5 16 330 
Croatia 6 500 90.6 3.7 14 842 
Macedonia, FYR 2 300 81.6 1.0 32 213 
6.0 14 Serbia and 
Montenegro 
 
2 450 
 
52   
 
213 
UN Administrated 
Kosovo 
  
5.0  
(source  
EWS 9) 
50 
182 (source 
Ministry of 
trade and 
industry) 
Romania 2 550 92.6 7 6 202 
Bulgaria 2 560 87 5 14.3 167 
 122.9 2.6 - - Central Europe 
average 6 710     
Source: Kekić 2004 International Labour Organization.
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Table 8: Worked without contract in the past ten years
Country 
Worked without 
contract 
Still working with no 
contract 
Romania 23 34 
Bulgaria 27 25 
Serbia 31 38 
Montenegro 16 26 
Macedonia 18 37 
Source: IBEU survey 2003.
The same regression analysis shows that people who are more likely to
emigrate are males between 18 and 45, residing equally in rural and urban areas.
More educated people are not more likely to emigrate as we would expect given
the brain drain theory: graduates of high schools and vocational schools are in fact
more likely to seek work abroad than are university graduates, because their
relative gain is higher, and so is the demand for the low skilled jobs that they do.
In Romania, contractors estimate that more construction workers work abroad than
within the country. According to their estimates, in 2002 alone over 300,000
construction workers laboured abroad as opposed to approximately 270,000 in the
country. Romanian construction workers who work legally in EU countries can
earn 1,500-2,000 euros per month, while those who work illegally make about
1,000 euros. By comparison, in the domestic construction market workers earn less
than 200 euros per month.8
Minorities, particularly the Roma, are also likely to migrate. Evidence is scarce
from surveys, due to Roma’s tendency not to identify themselves as Roma. The
West European media, especially in countries like Austria and Italy, report
frequently on East European ‘Gypsy’ beggars. There is, however insufficient
evidence, that this group — which is often the target of discrimination — is most
likely to emigrate. Other minorities are certainly more likely to leave, for instance
Hungarians in Romania, Turks in Bulgaria and Albanians in Macedonia, according
to regression analysis of our UNDP surveys. To sum up, individuals are more likely
to consider temporary or permanent migration if they are underemployed, are
males of an active age and belong to a minority group.
Who benefits?
How does migration affect the origin and destination countries? On the one
hand, both the theoretical labour economics literature and the available empirical
evidence clearly point to the many positive benefits immigration has for the host
economy, even though the magnitude of the gain depends on the type of immigrant
8 Constantin, D. L. and all. (2004). The migration phenomenon from the perspective of Romania’s
accession to the European Union Bucharest: European Institute of Romania. 5/2004.
29
labour, as well as the specific features of the host economy. On the other hand, the
problem with migration is that, although it raises aggregate incomes, it does tend
to reduce, other things being equal, the wages of some of the receiving country’s
workers. One can take for granted that migration raises the incomes of the migrants
— otherwise they would not choose to migrate. Migration also raises the return to
capital, hence profits, in the receiving country. But the increase in the receiving
country’s labour pool might reduce the wages of incumbent workers in certain
industries. But the net result is an increase in the receiving country’s aggregate
income and an expansion in its tax base. From this overall gain, governments could
compensate the domestic labourers who see their incomes fall and still leave
everybody better off.9
Harvard’s Dani Rodrik, in addition to many other economists, has argued that
even a modest freeing up of labour would create gains for the world economy
greater than those of liberalizing trade. Moving 100 million migrants from poor to
rich countries, other things being equal, would raise global GDP by 8 per cent.10
In a recent study by the Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) in Bonn, the authors
conclude that under realistic assumptions about the convergence of GDP and wage
levels, migration to the West of 1 per cent of the population in the new member
states would increase the aggregate GDP in the sending and receiving countries by
0.2 to 0.3 per cent respectively.11 In other words, both sides win.
People have different views on the effects of emigration for sending countries.
Critics argue that the brain drain and slower labour growth could hurt the origin
countries’ economies. If migrants pay tax, they do so in the country where they
work, not in the sending country. But none of these arguments holds in
Southeastern Europe. Most migrants don’t have jobs in their home countries and
thus don’t make any contribution to GDP, or just a small one. Second, as we have
shown before, in the Balkans educated people do not emigrate in significantly
greater numbers than do other people. The bulk of temporary migrants are low-
skilled workers, and the jobs they take in destination countries might otherwise not
be filled by local workers.
Local economies, therefore, cannot lose from migration. But do they win? To
answer this question, we must first understand what awaits migrants in the
European Union. Generally, migrants from Southeastern Europe, both long-term
and temporary workers, are able to find work. This is not surprising, because they
leave with some job prospects or they are networked to people who can help them
get a job. But the work they find is seldom quality work. Migrants from
Southeastern Europe work more on a day-to-day basis, engaging in the jobs
Westerners do not do. Women work as housewives, men work in construction or
9 Migration and development. May 6th 2004 From Economist.com.
10 Rodrik, D. (2002), “Final Remarks”, in: Faini, R., J. DeMelo, K.F. Zimmermann (eds.), Migration.
The Controversies and the Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 314-317.
11 Boeri, Tito and Herbert Brücker (2005). Migration, Co-ordination Failures and EU Enlargement
Discussion Paper No. 1600. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. May 2005.
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drive taxis. After the Poles, migrants from Southeastern Europe have come to do
most of the agriculture seasonal work in countries like Spain or Germany. A study
of Albanian migrants in Greece found that 96 per cent of Albanian men had jobs;
women also displayed a considerably higher employment participation rate
compared with Greek women (65 per cent versus 40 per cent, respectively). While
88 per cent of men paid social security contributions on a regular basis, the
respective percentage of women was found to be much lower (22 per cent),
especially due to their employment in traditionally informal jobs, such as house
cleaning. The main occupations for men are wage employment in construction (41
per cent), in manufacturing and tertiary sectors (31 per cent) and a surprisingly
high percentage of self-employment (business ownership) that usually falls outside
the reach of immigrants (25 per cent).12 Almost without exception, they send
money home or save money to spend later in their home countries. Most of this
spending (about 60 per cent) goes to help impoverished families back home
survive. But some is used for home improvements (40 per cent), including
improvement of sewage and energy systems.
The value of remittances is considerable for home economies. In 2003, for
instance, remittances ranged from 700 million euros in Albania and Croatia,
respectively to 1.5 billion euros in Bulgaria and 2 billion euros in Romania. In
some years, remittances exceeded the level of direct foreign investment. In
Albania nearly half of the population benefits, although unequally, as it is
traditional to support people outside the nuclear family. (Albanian UNDP Early
Warning Report Survey, 2004). In Romania and Bulgaria, only migrants’ close
family members receive remittances (about 10 per cent of the population). For at
least half of families receiving remittances, this aid is important for survival. In
only about 10 per cent of cases, however, is this aid higher than 1,000 euros per
month, according to our data. The average, if we divide the remittances by the
total population, is less than 100 euros per head. In Macedonia about a tenth of
the population receives money from abroad, in Kosovo about 15 per cent,
according to our survey.
The case of Albania is illustrative (see Figure 1). In Albania, remittances are
the main source of foreign currency income. Between 1991–2002, they amounted
to 10 to 22 per cent of GDP.13 They surpass direct foreign investment and foreign
aid. Apparently they surpass export revenues as well, and have helped to
counterbalance the growing trade balance deficit.14 Remittances are the key to
poverty alleviation in Albania, turning poor households into relatively prosperous
12 Lyberaki, A. & Thanos Maroukis (2003). Albanian Immigrants in Athens: Some recent findings
Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy. WP 5.2, Unpublished paper.
13 Bank of Albania, 2003, quoted in the UNDP sponsored report by Gedeshi, Ilir, Hekuran Mara
and Xhilda Preni (2003) ‘The encouragement of social-economic development in relation to the
growth of the role of the remittances’ Tirana: Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS).
14 See Germenji, E and all (2000). Estimating Remittance Functions for Rural-Based Albanian
Emigrants. Tiranë : Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS).
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ones.15 In rural areas, remittances are the second largest component of income,
lifting families above the poverty line.16
Critics stress that most remittance income is usually spent on consumption.
However, increased consumption is critical to poverty reduction for households
living close to the poverty line. Evidence from Albania, Romania and Bulgaria
shows that remittances prevent a large number of people from falling below the
poverty threshold, contribute modestly to local development (through household
improvements) and boost consumption spending, which contributes to the high
rates of growth in these three countries.17 Remittances cannot by themselves,
however, replace other development strategies and especially the optimal
combination of FDI, trade liberalization, aid, return migration and improved
governance.
Migrants from Southeastern Europe do return to invest, although they do not have
much for this purpose. The evidence from our Romanian study shows that
businesspeople are more likely to have worked abroad than people in other
Figure 1: Dynamics of remittances, exports and FDI 1992-2001 in Albania
15 De Soto, H and all. (2002) Poverty in Albania. A Qualitative Assessment, The World Bank
Washington D.C.
16 Lyberaki, A. & Thanos Maroukis (2003). Albanian Immigrants in Athens: Some recent findings
Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy. WP 5.2, Unpublished paper.
17 See World Bank (2003): ‘Workers’ Remittances’, Ch. 7 in Global Development Finance, World
Bank, also Gammeltoft, P. (2002): ‘Remittances and other financial flows to developing
countries’, International Migration, 40/5; World Bank (ibid); anonymous (2002): Policy Paper
for the Greek EU Presidency: Western Balkans, an agenda for stability, development and
integration, Athens: December 2002, mimeo; King, R, N. Mai and M. Dalipaj, Exploding the
Migration Myths: Analysis and Recommendation for the European Union, the UK and Albania,
Sussex Center for Migration Research, University of Sussex, 2003.
Source: Bank of Albania, Annual Report 2003. Bank of Albania, 2003, quoted in the
UNDP sponsored report by Gedeshi, Ilir, Hekuran Mara and Xhilda Preni (2003) ‘The
encouragement of social-economic development in relation to the growth of the role of
the remittances’ Tirana: Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS).
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professions. They save money while abroad and bring it home to invest in their home
countries. Qualitative research in Romania and Albania has shown that a small part of
remittances is used for investment in the small and medium enterprise sector. In other
words, remittances are crucial for growth and poverty reduction, but they cannot by
themselves contribute to development of infrastructure that regional economies need
badly. Those have to come through assistance or foreign direct investment.
Migration: A virtuous circle?
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, emigration barriers in the East have
been replaced by immigration barriers in the West. Free labour mobility from the
new member states has been postponed for up to seven years, and new member
states must tighten external borders as mandated by the Schengen Agreement
(1985). The obligation to implement the new policy was partly transferred from
European border guards to domestic border guards. To travel, an individual has to
present proof of accommodation, medical insurance, return tickets and quite a
considerable sum of money per diem. Drivers need also to present the car’s special
‘green card’ insurance.
Can Europe trust national border authorities to screen potential migrants? The
data from Romania and Bulgaria — where Schengen visa requirements for short
stays (under three months) were lifted soon after the start of accession negotiations
— show that the system works, and that it has improved over time. 16 per cent of
Romanians were denied exit in 2003, of which two-thirds for failing to present the
per diem money (in cash). In the first semester of 2005 this figure has grown to
468,905 individuals. This means the proportion of people denied exit has increased
considerably as border guards come to grips with the EU requirements. About
10,000 individuals were repatriated from the Schengen space in the same interval,
0.4 per cent of those who exited the country. Pure illegal behaviour (such as using
false passports) was under 0.1 per cent. Romanian authorities took steps against the
individuals repatriated by Schengen countries (such as drawing up of criminal
files) and confiscated their passports for periods varying between six months and
five years. However, their numbers do not exceed 0.3 per cent of the number of
those who went out of the country.18 IOM reports that in 2001, when visa
restrictions for short-term travel by Bulgarians in the Schengen zone were lifted,
the number of border crossings exceeded those in 2000 by only 9 per cent. Data
from the national censuses conducted in 1992 and 2001 show that between these
two censuses approximately 196,000 people emigrated from Bulgaria, while the
number of persons who have returned or settled in Bulgaria was of 19,000.
In 2002, 300 individuals tried to illegally cross the Romanian border; in 2003
the number fell to 28. Illegal crossings of Bulgarian citizens totalled 560 in 2002,
18 Figures provided by IOM Bulgaria (Guentcheva,R., P. Kabakchieva and P. Kolarski. Bulgaria
The social impact of seasonal migration Sofia: International Organization of Migration,
September 2003) and Romanian European Institute (see note 7).
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down from 2,785 in 2000. Thus lifting visa restrictions for short-term entry in the
Schengen space resulted in a considerable decrease in the number of border regime
violations by Romanians and Bulgarians.
These figures show that, with European assistance, border guards in Western
Balkan countries can be trained to apply the Schengen requirements. Of course
there will also be some corrupt crossings, but experience from the Eastern Balkans
shows that illegal behaviour actually drops massively once visas are given up. And
the number of potential of migrants from, say, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia is
close to that of Bulgaria, no more. Despite this, the Stability Pact focuses so far
almost exclusively on border controls, dealing with the Balkans as transit countries
for trafficking and smuggling of migrants into the EU, even though most reports
show a sharp decline in illegal border crossings. The rigid border controls imposed
by the EU in fact tend to accentuate and encourage permanent migration to the
detriment of seasonal migration, which is more beneficial for both sides.
Why don’t European governments liberalize the visa regime vis-à-vis the
Western Balkans, which could help these small economies more than aid flows?
Rather than taking this step, EU governments have installed ‘transitional
arrangements’ with newcomers, which only diminish the economic potential of
freedom of labour, and which carry substantial economic costs.19 Paradoxically,
labour demand is growing in Europe. Even with slow economic growth, most
European countries find themselves short of skilled and unskilled workers who are
prepared to do jobs that national workers shun. Birth rates are also falling in most
countries of the EU-15.
As the EU expands eastward, it needs to open itself to migrant labour, just as it
did for Italy, Portugal, and Spain in the 1950s and 1960s.20 Southeastern Europe,
which has already received the EU’s promise of integration, is the place to start.
The Schengen visa regime must stop impeding regional economic development.
Our data shows that the European Union would do well to replicate its successful
policies towards the Eastern Balkans in the Western Balkans, thus building the
foundation for real poverty reduction in the region. This is even more necessary
seeing the setbacks that the European Constitution suffered in 2005. Despite the
goodwill of the European Commission there is a real risk that the accession
perspectives for Western Balkans have become even more distant, and so the
development gap between these countries and Eastern Balkans grows further.
Allowing short term migrants and seasonal workers becomes the main facilitating
instrument that the EU can offer in this interval of uncertainty to prompt
development, not stagnation of the Western Balkans.
19 Boeri, Tito and Herbert Brücker. Migration, Co-ordination Failures and EU Enlargement
Discussion Paper No. 1600. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. May 2005.
20 Stalker, P. ‘Migration Trends and Migration Policy in Europe; in International Migration
London: Blackwell 40: 5, 2/2002.
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Recommendations
At the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003 the
European perspective of the Western Balkans was reinforced. The future
integration into European structures and ultimate membership into the Union was
declared a high priority for the EU. ‘The Balkans will be an integral part of a
unified Europe’ the summit statement read.21 The EU also committed itself to a
more liberal visa regime for the Western Balkan countries at the Thessaloniki
summit in 2003. There was no substantial follow up to this promise, although
negotiations were initiated on visa facilitation with Russia, Ukraine and China,
which do not have
similar EU perspectives.22 Western Balkan countries citizens, despite their
countries having signed SAP treaties with EU as a preliminary accession step are still
treated as any third-country nationals, who need a Schengen visa or a residence
permit in a EU country to travel in the European Union. The possibility of a special
travel authorisation, which would enable third-country nationals to stay up to six
months per year in the territory of the Member States on condition that the stay in one
Member State does not exceed three months, enabled by the Commission’s proposal
(COM(2001) 388 final) was applied to Eastern Balkans only.23 However, the
December 2005 European Council summit acknowledged the progress of applicant
countries of the region, from Croatia to Macedonia. Both the instruments and the
explicit goal to open Europe more to these countries exist. Concrete steps are needed,
however, to pass to the implementation phase. We therefore recommend:
To the Balkan Stability Pact:
As the Pact hands increasingly its tasks to regionally owned agencies or to
countries, this one issue that still concerns the region as a whole remains unsolved.
The pact should advocate at the level of European Commission and the EU
member states for the liberalization of the Schengen visa regime for Western
Balkan countries. Only when this is accomplished one can truly acknowledge that
the objectives for which the pact was created were finally reached.
To the European Commission:
1. Design road maps with each and every country so to set clear targets for border
capacity improvement and to provide a clear timeframe for the end of the visa
regime and the passage to a regime similar to Romania and Bulgaria.
2. Step us the assistance to increase border capacity on the model of Romania and
Bulgaria so that the screening of EU entrants in entrusted to Western Balkan
21 http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/6/20/3121/
22 International Crisis Group Report, November 2005, EU Visas and the Western Balkans,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3809&m=1
23 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/ce270/ce27020010925en02440250.pdf
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countries, not Schengen border guards. Encourage and assist governments to
adopt and popularize legislation that allows such screening, so that a legal basis
is created and citizens are informed of requirements needed to travel to the
Schengen space.
3. Open negotiations already on this issue during the Austrian presidency of the
European Union in 2006. The discussion should concern Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro, with the understanding that
each country will be treated according to its merits. A country should be
recommended for a lift of Schengen visas once it meets the criteria set in the
roadmap, which should not be more restrictive than those met by Bulgaria and
Romania when this policy was applied to them.
To EU Member States:
Begin negotiations with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia-
Montenegro on a the basis of the Commission’s recommendation.
To the Governments of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro:
Adopt and implement legislation following the path set by Bulgaria in 2001
and Romania in 2002 to obtain the lift of Schengen visas, including readmission
agreements with individual EU member states taking responsibility for all third-
country nationals who arrive in the EU from their territory. Ask for the assistance
of these two neighboring countries to design and implement realistic and effective
road maps with the goal of preventing cross-border crime, money laundering and
traffic, while allowing freedom of travel of law abiding citizens who satisfy the
requirements agreed with the European Union states.
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MIGRATION AND
ILLEGAL MIGRATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE
LIBERALIZATION OF THE VISA REGIME
by
Jasna Bacovska1
In the post-Communist period, a number of political and military conflicts
occurred on the European continent. Consequently, the European Union faced
millions of migrants, of which 5 million were refugees from the former Yugoslavia.
After a political reconciliation, countries in Southeastern Europe have been faced
with dismal economies and social crises. Many have sought redemption in the
European Union as refugees and economic migrants.
Immigration has therefore become a critical question in the EU’s political
agenda resulting in a restrictive migration and visa policy.
Social crises in the Western Balkans propel the increase of migration toward
Europe. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the macro-economic indicators within the
Western Balkans. Positive economic results and a clear political will for
membership in the EU should be proven through fast and efficient reforms. These
two aspects are needed to liberalize the visa regime.
The Republic of Macedonia is included in the newly created political category
of the ‘Western Balkans’. The question to consider is this: whether economic
development is the sole reason migrants leave their countries of origin. The
following issues must be examined.
a) The social composition of migrants: ethnic group, educational attainment,
gender, age, and so forth.
b) Illegal factors that influence migration: corruption, organized crime, human
trafficking, and negligent border control. 
1 Center for Strategic Studies, MASA, Skopje.
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Globalization has meant that migration is a forefront issue on the European
policy agenda. Within the last decade, social and political developments as well as
military conflicts have meant that the European Union confronted millions of
migrants, 5 million from the Yugoslav region.2 The sudden influx of immigrants
produced negative reactions within the EU. In 1991 and 1992, we witnessed
hundreds of brutal attacks on foreigners. These events had an impact on European
policy and resulted in the restrictive visa policy employed today. To counter the
obstructive visa policy, illegal migration and organized crime flourished. 
The International Organization for Migration (the IOM) has estimated that
400,000 illegal migrants cross into the EU every year. Culprit countries are
Albania, Turkey, Iraq, and countries of the former Yugoslavia. The most opportune
entry point is Italy, and as such Italy was forced to tighten its border control after
adopting the Schengen system.
The newly designated ‘Western Balkans’ has been marked as an
underdeveloped area with the livelihoods of 24 million people at stake — or 6.5%
of the population of the EU.
Upon the announcement of Romanian and Bulgarian ascension into the EU in
2007, international institutions and organizations replaced the term ‘Southeastern
Europe’ with ‘Western Balkans’ which includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. Frequently Kosovo is mentioned
separately from Serbia and Montenegro contrary to UN Resolution 1244, which
designates Kosovo as part of that union. 
GDP in the Western Balkans approximates 50 billion euro or 2300 euro per
capita, with significant disparity within the region. For example, GDP per capita is
5400 euro in Croatia and 2700 euro in the Republic of Macedonia. Due to political,
economic, and security problems, the Western Balkans continuously lags behind
Central Europe. In order to clearly illustrate the economic situation, it is important
to stress several indicators.
Economists expect positive trends to continue in line with favorable foreign
political and market reforms. 
A single digit inflation rate has been sustained in Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Croatia due to a “policy based on external anchors”.
Meaning that the domestic currency is bound to convertible foreign currency
simultaneously respecting the macroeconomic agenda of the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund. Moreover, in 2003 the budget deficit was 4% of the
GDP. Foreign trade in the Western Balkans is not reflexively affected by
fluctuations in the global economy. In the past few years, there was nominal growth
in exports and imports, however imports outpaced exports which has negatively
affected the trade balance. There exists a 7.9 billion euro trade deficit with the EU.3
2 Anthony Giddens, Sociology, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001.
3 E.Economy, E. Commission, Occasional Papers, 01. 2004, str. 1. Bank of Austria, Creditanstalt,
South–Eastern Europe — On the right track, May 2005, str. 13, 15, 18, 21, 25.
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Private transactions, which are particularly important for Albania, Macedonia, and
Kosovo, arrive from workers abroad.
Services in all countries are sufficient, however only Croatia outpaces the rest
of the region due to their burgeoning tourism industry.
Foreign donations account for 2.7% of the GDP with vast disparities. From 2
to 3.8%, to 40% of the GDP as is the case in Kosovo.4
Foreign direct investment is critical. The overall amount of FDI between
1997 and 2004 was 16.4 billion euro, or 2 billion per year. The largest beneficiary
of FDI is Croatia with 54%, then Serbia and Montenegro with 22%, followed by
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Calculated per capita, Croatia
receives 2045 euro, Macedonia 500 euro, Serbia and Montenegro 455 euro, and
Albania 348 euro. 
Restoring peace and security as well as prospective integration has benefited the
region. Progress has been made in certain countries, particularly in the privatization
of small and medium enterprises, as well as in trade liberalization, due to a trade
initiative sponsored by the Stability Pact, which assembled a wide network of free
trade contracts. Progress has been made in the banking sector as well.
There remains a need for more reform. Respect for the rule of law, anti-
corruption measures, legislative transparency, creating efficient infrastructure, and
chiefly fostering commercial initiatives. Finalizing the privatization process,
building an efficient capital market, reforming the public sector, and establishing a
central treasury (like ones already in place in Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia), are
also necessary to attract foreign direct investment and/or indirect investment.
Donator support in the form of grants or loans will likewise play a significant role
in financing investment, reform, and balance of payments in the Western Balkans. 
Western Balkan countries retain significant debts.5 Nominally, in 2001 the
most heavily indebted was Serbia and Montenegro with 12 billion US dollars. 
By export related debt — 414%, and GDP — 114%, Serbia and Montenegro
remains heavily indebted. This is understandable after considering the years of
sanctions, wars, and similar domestic quagmires. 
Albania’s debt as a percentage of GDP is 27%, and Macedonia’s is 42%. With
rapid increments of overall debt, up to 2 billion US dollars, the impression of
Macedonia is changed.
In 2001, Croatia with a debt of 4.7 billion US dollars has achieved the largest
currency reserves.
4 E.Economy, E. Commission, Occasional Papers, 01. 2004, str. 1 i 2, i E. Economy, E. Commission,
01. 2004, str. 2. Bank of Austria, Creditanstalt, South–Eastern Europe — On the right track, May
2005, str. 13, 15, 18, 21, 25.
5 Denzo David, E. Commission i Milica Uvalic, Dept. of Economics, University of Perugia: Exchange
Rates in the W. Balkans and Their Evaluation towards EMU, Preliminary Draft, 30. 01. 2004, p. 28.
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The Republic of Macedonia is on the lower lever of medium-developed
countries.6 In 2000, the poverty line was 150 euro per 4 member family. 80,000
families received social aid. In the past 4 years, recipients of social aid increased
by 28.8%. 70% of the employed received salaries below 150 euro. 50% of the
population is below the poverty line.
Foreign migratory trends continue upward in the last half-century. The
strongest instances of migration of our population were tracked in the 50s and 60s,
particularly the 200,000 strong migration of ethnic Turks back to their native
republic. Tens of thousands of ethnic Macedonians are permanently immigrating to
trans-continental countries such as Canada, the United States and New Zealand.
This trend continues and has manifested itself as an economic migration which is
more intensively directed to Western Europe. The migratory wave of ethnic
Macedonians contains pockets of ethnic Albanians and Roma. According to the
Council of Europe, the largest populations of Macedonians are found in Germany,
Switzerland, and Italy.7 In the 1996-2003 period, the number increased by 42,000
in Germany and Switzerland, about 6000 per year. In 2003, 120,000 citizens of
Macedonia were currently residing in those countries.
Table 1: Number of citizens of the Republic of Macedonia living in diferent
European countries, 1996-2004
6 “National strategy for economic development of the republic of Macedonia, development and
modernization” Skopje 1997, page 26.
7 Acording to information of Italian Ministry of Interior, closing with 30.april.2001 in this country
there were 23106 citizens from Macedonia.
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Germany 33.984 38.774 42.550 46.167 49.420 56.000 58.300 61.000 61.000 
Italy  11.596 13.456 16.647 21.110 26.051    
Nederland  449 482 507 500 590 646 677 677 
Slovenia  2.200 2.412 2.277 3.565 4.125 3.897   
Sweden  1.303 1.594 1.676 1.819 1.925 1.715 1.420 1.420 
Switzerland  45.234 48.604 51.142 54.300 56.317 59.456 61.211 61.455 
Source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe 2003, 2004.
Table 2. Number of Macedonian Immigrants in the overseas countries
Country 
Number of 
imigrants 
Australia   2001 81.898 
Canada      1996 30.915 
USA          2000 43.783 
Source: www.emigration.gov.mk
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Macedonian immigration has also included a contingent of young people with
higher educational attainment. Statistics for our citizens show that the overall
number is more than 150,000 in the following three countries. The actual figure is
estimated to be much larger.
During the instability of the past 15 years a trend of illegal immigration from
the Republic of Albania, the Protectorate of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
south Serbia to the Republic of Macedonia has emerged. This impacts the ethnic
structure of Macedonia.
Those migratory trends out of Macedonia are creating problems in population
growth, and must be further studied.
What is required to liberalize the visa regime is a successful campaign against
the crimes of human trafficking and smuggling. 
The Republic of Macedonia is not the country of origin for most victims of
trafficking, but it has been identified as a convenient country for transit and
possibly as a final destination. Because it borders Greece an EU country,
Macedonia is an attractive endpoint. In its effort to combat trafficking, The
Republic of Macedonia has accepted all relevant legislation from the UN, EU,
Council of Europe, and the Stability Pact.8
Thus, the fight against illegal migration should be generally directed. A public
relations campaign must be launched to raise awareness, particularly among youth.
Campaigns against corruption must be waged as well. Corruption remains not only
rule of law issue but a sociological problem moreover, and is difficult to oust,
especially in smaller countries.
Intensive regional co-operation is necessary, ranging from academic debates to
police co-operation. Measures that must be taken are:
• Anti-corruption training for relevant officials.
• Clearly defined roles for prosecutors and attorneys in corruption cases.
• Clearly defined boundaries for judges in corruption cases.
• Legitimate and efficient border management which meet EU standards.
These measures should be implemented in the short term, but the long-term
goal should be economic stability. Economic stability will improve the standard of
living in the Balkans.
Positive economic results and clear political will towards membership in the
European Union should be attained through fast and efficient reforms. These are
necessary requirements to liberalize the visa regime.
8 Practicum, On The Combat Against Trafficking in human beings and Illegal migration, 2005.
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ILLEGAL MIGRATION AND THE FIGHT
AGAINST HUMAN TRAFFICKING
by
Brankica Grupković1
The subject of migration, especially illegal or irregular migration, is a very
broad and dynamic one. In the world, this topic draws a lot of attention, not only
from governments, but their citizens as well.
On a global level all 190 independent countries of the world are either the
countries of origin, transit or destination of migrants, and very often, the countries
are in all three positions. 
The UN’s official estimate on the number of migrants in the year 2000 was 175
million, and it was estimated that this number will rise to 185 to 192 million in 2005.
However, what worries governments and citizens are the illegal migrants. 
Before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the arguments on the risks
following illegal migration basically revolved around economic and social issues as
well as worries about budgetary expenditures. Nevertheless, since 2001,
connections between terrorism, human trafficking, the smuggling of migrants and
other forms of transnational organized crime have become primary on the security
agenda. Nowadays, state bodies are faced with the two seemingly opposite tasks.
They have to provide uninterrupted flow of bona fidae travelers, regular migration,
movement of business people and tourists, and on the other hand there is a need for
the prevention and fight against illegal migrations, which use very sophisticated
methods of abuse. There is a need to prevent illegal migration both because of its
connection with terrorism, and to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. On the
other hand, organizations dealing with this problem have serious troubles due to
lack of financial resources needed for investing in the most modern information
systems, lack of personnel, but also the problems in respect and application of the
appropriate standards of domestic and international law. Another problem is lack of
1 Representative of the ICMPD to SCG.
cooperation, not only on the international level, but also between agencies within
one country.
According to the EUROPOL report on organized crime, published in October
last year, illegal migrations are not decreasing. On the contrary, even stronger
consolidation of groups involved in organized crime is present. These groups now
control the entire process from the country of origin to the country of destination.
Now, when measures for preventing illegal migration and border control are being
strengthened, the only possible option left for illegal migrants to reach their
destination is through the channels of organized crime. At the same time, it is stated
that the profits made in illegal migration is far less than in narcotics, but the risk is
also considerably lower. The report says that during their journey, which is in
several stages, the illegal migrant goes from one cell to another, through a chain of
territorially bounded criminal networks which cooperate with great efficiency. The
question of human trafficking, which is much crueler, is also connected with this.
The latest trend is the participation of women perpetrators who gain the trust of
potential victims much more easily. Criminal groups show no scruple in exploiting
children, from selling them for illegal adoption to being forced to beg, coerced into
labor and prostitution. In addition, it is stated, criminal groups have increased the
level of professionalism, logistics and efficiency. 
The European Union strives to build a comprehensive approach to migrations,
particularly in cooperation with the countries of origin of illegal migrants, which
entail the issues of political nature, human rights and development. In the countries
of origin and transit, this approach requires fighting against poverty, improving the
living conditions and job opportunities, conflict prevention and consolidation of
democratic states, and the respect of human rights, especially the rights of
minorities, women and children.
A general recommendation is that the countries of origin and transit of illegal
migrants, in the framework of general and joint management of migration flow,
with the utmost urgency, do the following:
Sign, ratify and implement the UN Convention against transnational organized
crime with added protocols, as well as other relevant international instruments, in
particular the Geneva Convention with the New York Protocol. 
Reinforce the measures of border control in order to prevent illegal entries,
transits and stays in the EU countries, followed by measures of police control
within their own territories, with an aim to discover and destroy the networks of
smugglers and human traffickers, and according to appropriate international
instruments, including the ones concerning human rights.
Adopt suitable changes in criminal legislature (punishment for crimes of
human trafficking, smuggling migrants, forging documents, accountability of
drivers, etc.)
Promote or enable campaigns for raising awareness on problems and risks
connected with illegal migrations.
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EU member states are developing a common immigration policy whose aim is
better control of migrations through coordinated activities, having in mind the
economic and demographic situation in the EU. This is done through the
establishing of a common legal framework in terms of conditions for entering and
stay of the citizens from the third countries on its territory. Prevention and fight
against illegal migrations are an inseparable part of the comprehensive common
asylum and immigration policy.
Priorities in areas of administering law and internal affairs are: border control,
visas, correct and comprehensive treatment of migrations, asylum, and fighting
against drug smuggling, money laundering, fight against organized crime,
terrorism, fraud and corruption with the cooperation of the authorities and police.
In its five-year Plan of Activities (2005-2010) in areas of freedom, justice and
security, based on The Hague Program, the European Commission has identified
activities of the EU in ten key areas: basic human rights and citizenship, the fight
against terrorism, managing migrations, internal and external borders and visas,
asylum, integration, exchange of information, fight against organized crime,
administering of justice, and individual responsibilities and solidarity of the
member states.
In the fight against organized crime a special emphasis is always put on the
importance of the fight against illegal migrations, human trafficking and the
smuggling of migrants. The countries of the Western Balkans are singled out as
important and this is confirmed in the conclusions of relevant international
conferences. The conference held in London in November 2002 was entirely
dedicated to the fight against organized crime in the countries of the Western
Balkans. It is estimated that this area is the “gate through which channels of illegal
migration, illegal drug smuggling, human trafficking (especially women and
children) go, making millions for the criminal groups in countries of Western
Europe.”
For the countries of the Western Balkans, it is important that it has been pointed
out that the organized crime and corruption are obstacles for setting up democratic
stability, strong and responsible institutions, the rule of law principle and economic
development. Special attention should be directed towards the fight against all
forms of illegal trafficking; trafficking humans, drugs and weapons. In terms of
cooperation in areas of migrations, border management, it is stated that it is the key
to establish strong and efficient border management, which contributes to the fight
against organized crime and illegal migrations, as well as increasing the degree of
internal security of which the citizens of those states are entitled to. This was
reiterated in the speech given by the European Commissioner for issues of justice,
freedom and security who said that the issue of liberalization of the visa regime
was closely connected to issues of enforcing necessary reforms in areas of
administration of justice, internal affairs in each individual country of the Western
Balkans, according to the criteria set by Council’s Regulation, where the first
criterion is the issue of illegal migrations.
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On the other hand, it seems as though we do not give appropriate attention to this
topic. Only individual topics attract public attention, and even then it is not
continuous. For example, only sporadically, the public is informed about the return
of the Roma population, and the problems they are facing. Even though we are faced
with a very complicated migration scenario, we still do not have real answers to these
problems/challenges, starting from the policy of entering the territory of Serbia and
Montenegro. That it is so we can see in the area of visa regime where we can notice
different regimes for entering the territory of Serbia and territory of Montenegro.
A separate matter, maybe the most important one, presents the issue of illegal
migration in our own territory, through it of it and from it, in other words, Serbia
and Montenegro as a country of destination, transit and origin.
The subject of the fight against trafficking humans, especially women and
children, and smuggling people is current.  The problem of human trafficking is
specific because it has more dimensions; it is a political-security problem
connected to the existence and activities of organized criminal groups which use
the profits from this criminal activity to finance other. It is present in politically
instable societies, but not only in them, with undeveloped or insufficiently
developed institutions and with a marked corruption of state officials. However,
another important dimension is a violation of human rights of the victims. 
The general legal framework for the subject of migrations is the Law on
Movement and Stay of Foreigners from 1980, and the Law on Crossing the State
Border from 1979. So, even though we are dealing with a very dynamic issue,
which needs constant adjustment, solutions present in our relevant laws are
completely outdated.
When it comes to measures in fight against illegal migrations, the human right
standards must be respected, before all the European Convention on Human
Rights, Geneva Convention on Refugees. In the field of fight against human
trafficking, only multidisciplinary approach is effective which covers both
repressive measures and prevention. In cases tried in front of the Special Court for
Organized Crime in Belgrade I will mention two cases. In December last year a
group of ten members from the Pancevo criminal group was convicted for a total
of 20 years in prison for crimes of human trafficking, while in January the charges
were brought against eight of our citizens, three Chinese and one citizen of Bosnia
and Herzegovina for suspicion that they had committed a crime of human
trafficking. The media report states that they are charged for the smuggling and
trafficking of Chinese citizens for $10,000 per person. According to the NGO data
in 2005, Shelter for Victims of Human Trafficking has taken care of 54 victims,
while NGO Atina provided shelter for 7 victims of human trafficking. The Service
for Coordination of Assistance for the Victims of Human Trafficking has assisted
52 victims. The NGO ASTRA has received 1,712 calls on their SOS line and
assisted 82 victims, out which 59 have been identified this year. Also, in 2005, 13
criminal charges were brought against 21 persons for crimes of human trafficking
according to Article 111b of Criminal Law of Republic of Serbia.
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Nevertheless, it appears that the prevention component is missing –
investigating causes, understanding the phenomena, information campaigns
together with non-governmental organizations, as well as the analysis of new
trends – which is the key element in the fight against human trafficking.
Also, the legal framework for the fight against illegal migrations is inadequate.
Penal law introduced adequate sanctions for criminal acts, but the punishment
of legal persons, freezing and seizure of assets earned by these criminal acts by the
smugglers and human traffickers. Also, a general principle for prevention of
committing acts of crime, their detection and punishment is also important.
It is necessary to further improve visa policy in order to enable free movement
of bona fidae travelers, but also to prevent illegal migrations, as well as to
harmonize visa policy on the whole territory. This should be followed by secure
travel documents, visas, and exchange of data in visa issuing practices, trends in
forging documents, data collection, and analysis.
In short, my opinion is that the answer should be found for a number of
interconnected areas, especially because of the complicated migration scenario, it
is necessary to have comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach to the issue of
migration in Serbia and Montenegro. In front lies the construction of a completely
new system of border security, and control on border crossings, where the
movement of people, goods and services must be uninterrupted; borders must be
open for the movement of bona fidae travelers and commerce. Also, it is necessary
to make easier the regular cross-border movement which would stimulate the
economic development of the region itself. It is necessary to finish the demarcation
and demilitarization, continue with professionalization and permanent education,
together with technical advancement, which requires the training of relevant state
bodies in usage of integrated border management; that there is cooperation and
synchronized action of offices within one agency-ministry. This cooperation
should be both vertical and horizontal in order to secure international, cross-border,
bilateral and multilateral cooperation. On several occasions it was stated that the
capacity and readiness of each individual country in the Western Balkans to fully
integrate in the mechanism of regional cooperation are the key indicators of the
readiness and ability of that country to adjust to the European obligations, accept
them, and join the EU. 
An important element of cooperation in fight against illegal migrations is the
signing and implementation of the Agreement on Readmission.
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THE REGIONAL ASYLUM SYSTEM 
by
Vladimir Petronijević1
On the road towards European accession, Serbia and Montenegro will have to
harmonise and build its migration policy with the respect of the European standards.
This is a rather comprehensive job, requesting a strategic support and full
coordination of all the competent bodies. At the moment when negotiations of the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement finalisation with EU have started, the
problem of migration management remains open, without suitable solutions.
The general impression is that there is no sufficient level of awareness among
decision-makers in SaM about challenges which defining of the migration strategy
in accordance with the regional initiatives and European standards brings with
itself. The asylum system, once it has finally and legally been established, will be a
completely new and unknown “organism” in the SaM legal system. The state union
can neither praise itself with a successful implementation of the Readmission
Agreement, namely the care it shows for returnees from Western Europe. The
position of internally displaced persons is very difficult and the process of
integration and return from the region of Croatia and BiH is slow and underway
with many difficulties. 
EU also monitors the reform policy which the candidate countries are
implementing in this field. One of the three working groups for negotiations with
EU, formed on the State Union level, will negotiate about the issues of visa, asylum,
border control and migration management. The Stabilisation and Association
Agreement per se will also contain provisions regarding this issue. The Agreements
signed by Croatia and Macedonia are also characterised by this. Articles dealing
with the migration policy of SaM can also be found in the documents, above all, of
the economic and trade character. This is a powerful message of EU, which will
expect full cooperation and true reforms from us in this field. 
1 Group 484, Belgrade.
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EU has also expressed its opinion through the Feasibility Study, section 3.6.2
covering the issues of asylum, visa, and migrations. ,,The constitutional dispute on
the distribution of competences is influencing the timely adoption of legislations in
this area. This is the reason of SaM lagging behind the countries in the Region (...)
The framework law on the State Union level was adopted by the Parliament, two
republic laws including the procedures, are in the advanced stage with a
considerable assistance of UNHCR(...)2 Special attention is paid to the
readmission issue, where positive developments have been noted in this area. 13
agreements have been signed and implemented with 15 countries. Nevertheless, it
has been noted that the process of further conclusion of readmission agreements is
slowed down as compared to the period before March 2003. A single agreement
has not been signed since then. The slow activity of the state in this field has been
emphasised by the French foreign minister as a possible reason of harshening the
visa regime of France towards SaM. The positive mark given in the Feasibility
Study can be replaced with the negative EU position, if the process of conclusion
of the Readmission agreement is not continued in a more dynamic manner. 
In 2006, the year of strenuous negotiations with EU, the republic laws on
asylum will probably be adopted. Our expert public is facing a task to assist that
solutions in the future regulations be in accordance with UN and EU standards. 
This document is also an expression of the civil society attempt to assist SaM
in defining its refugee law in the context of the European integrations. 
Asylum is a protection which a country gives to a foreigner to whom it has
recognised the refugee status. The refugee status is recognised after the legally set
proceedings where it has been determined that a foreigner has a justified fear that
he/she will be persecuted because of his/her race, religion, nationality, belonging
to a social group or because of his/her political opinion. 
The asylum system in one country serves as a protection of the persecuted
within the range of control measures namely the policy of migration management.
According to the provision of the Constitutional Charter, the State Union
Assembly should pass suitable legal solutions as regards the policies of migration,
asylum, visa regime and integrated state border management in accordance with
EU standards. The right to asylum is also guaranteed by the SaM Constitutional
Charter, by Article 38 Paragraph 2 of the Charter on human and minority rights
where “Any alien who reasonably fears that he/she might be persecuted because of
his/her race, colour, sex, language, religion, ethnic affiliation, member-ship of a
group or political conviction, shall have the right of asylum in Serbia and
Montenegro”. Article 50, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia
determines that “The right to asylum shall be guaranteed to a foreign citizen and
stateless person who is being persecuted for supporting democratic views and
participating in movements for social and national emancipation, for human rights
and freedoms, or for the freedom of scientific or artistic creativeness”. 
2 http://www.ssinf.sv.gov.yu/dokumenta/studija.pdf
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The solution adopted by the Constitutional charter, as it was noted in the National
strategy for Serbia and Montenegro’s accession to EU goes further in relation to the
1951 UN Convention on the Refugee Status, as is extends the possibility of protection
of refugees in relation to the persecution because of his/her gender, colour, and
language, which are not prescribed by the UN Convention as conditions for getting
a refugee status. But the Constitutional Charter and the Constitution of Serbia set that
the asylum system will be determined by a special legal regulation.
At this moment there is the Asylum Law at the state union level, passed on 21
March 2005, which is in its character the so-called framework law, adopting only
basic principles, while the detailed regulation of this area is left to the Member
Republics. Neither Serbia nor Montenegro has brought their Asylum laws. There is
a draft law in Montenegro, and a working group has been formed in Serbia, which
with the assistance of UNHCR experts should make the appropriated draft. Their
adoption is a necessary prerequisite of a successful migration policy. Solutions that
these laws will bring must clearly respect positions which UNHCR has established
through decades of its work. They must rely on the 1951 UN Convention on
refugee status, as well as standards and recommendations of the Council of Europe,
and special attention should be paid to standards established on the EU level and
in the region of South East Europe. 
As it is the case with the law on visa regime, and upon passing of the republic
laws on asylum, the issue of political will is disputable. Do state bodies of both
member republics want this law to be passed? The issue of money necessary for
the laws to be passed cannot be the reason for their not being passed. “The question
we should all ask ourselves is: how much does it cost that we are not on the white
Schengen list?”3 One precise calculation, which would encompass all the costs
which the entire state has because of the visa regime with EU, would certainly
prove the soundness of the set dilemma.
The Convention about the use of the Schengen agreement dedicates chapter
sever of its second part to the processing of submitted requests for asylum. The
basis of the system which today has a great number of critics among
representatives of numerous humanitarian organisation in Europe has been
determined. The intention of the makers of this convention was to set certain
mechanisms which would determine the member state which has the jurisdiction
to examine the submitted request for obtaining asylum protection. 
“The most important instruments of the restrictive strategy for accessing the
European asylum system came out of the Dublin Convention (which was signed
in 1990, and came into effect in 1997) and the London Resolution of 1992.”4
“According to the Dublin Convention, the authority for reviewing asylum requests
3 Nataša Dragojlović-Ćirić, Ministry for international economic relations, Preparation meeting, Hotel
“Palace”, 23 September, 2005.
4 Timothy J. Hatton, Australian National University, University of Essex, CEPR and IZA — Jeffrey
G. Williamson, Harward University and NBER, Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Policy in Europe,
July 2004, page 18.
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belongs to the state through which the asylum-seeker entered the territory of the
European Union. This concept was further developed at the meeting of ministers
in London. The concepts of “Safe Third Countries”, “Safe Countries of Origin”
and “Manifestly Unfounded Claim”, have been determined. The last one allows
refugee status to be denied to an asylum-seeker through an expedited process
where there is no right to appeal with a suspending effect. During 1993 and 1994,
based on the recommendations of the Council of Ministers, the countries of the
EU started to conclude bilateral readmission agreements with other countries. The
aim of these agreements was to return citizens of third countries who, on their way
to the EU, had transited through the signatory country of the readmission
agreement.”5
“Countries bordering EU do not have much choice, but they themselves but
accept standards determined by EU. The “Safe Third Country” principle comes out
of the Dublin Convention and spreads across the EU borders and represents the
foreign policy of the EU member countries. The concept of “Safe Third Country”
is firmly established in Western Europe and occupies a key position in the
proposals of the European Commission for the alignment of EU asylum policy
procedures. It is based on the assumption that under certain conditions asylum-
seekers who are found within their territory are the responsibility of a third country
through which the asylum-seeker travelled. The concept of “Safe Third Country”
centres around the practice of returning asylum-seekers to third countries (the
transit states) without questioning whether their requests are well-founded, based
on the opinion that the third country is allegedly a “Safe Third Country” and the
person should have asked for protection there. The designation can be set
unilaterally or can be a part of an agreement between two or more countries based
on a readmission agreement”.6
Set as such, the European system of asylum simply requires the countries
joining EU to build the strictly set standards into their internal legal solutions.
Neighbours of SaM have had the established systems of asylum protection for a
long time, which are more or less harmonised with the European standards: The
Law on Aliens of the Republic of Croatia adopted on 18 June 2003, The Law on
Movement and Stay of Aliens and Asylum of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted on
18 July 2003; The Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection of the Republic of
Macedonia adopted on 16 July 2003; The Law on Asylum of the Republic of
Albania adopted on 14 December 1998, The Law on Asylum of the Republic of
Bulgaria adopted on 16 May 2002.
At this moment SaM is the only country in the region which does not have a
complete system of asylum protection legally defined, so the care of potential
asylum seekers is carried out by UNHCR. This is another negative circumstance
creating obstacles to further European integrations of SaM. The readmission
5 Group 484, Return from Western Europe, 2005, p. 53.
6 Ibid, p. 55.
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agreements also have provisions defining SaM as a “safe third country”, but are not
implemented, as SaM cannot be the safe third country to citizens of third countries
and stateless persons due to the very undefined system of asylum protection. 
Experiences of UNHCR show that SaM is not a country “splashed” by a wave
of a great number of potential asylum seekers. The number of asylum seekers
decreased by the disintegration of SFRY. There were 2,840 requests in 1986, 3,081
requests in 1987, and even 7,112 requests in 1989. This number was reduced with
the beginning of war occurrences. 1,618 requests were filed in 1991, and the status
was granted to 825 persons. Not a single requests out of 114 submitted in 1996 had
a positive result. During 2004, 50 requests were filed, the status was granted to two
asylum seekers. In the period January–August 2005, 40 requests were filed, and the
refugee status has not been approved to anybody.7
Therefore, the number of possible asylum seekers, along with those who could
arrive to SaM on the basis of the readmission agreement, would not be a large one.
With a careful estimate upon the creation of the state budget, and with EU support,
with the knowledge of home and UNHCR experts, SaM can be expected to build a
system of asylum protection, by the international, and above all, European standards.
At this moment, SaM does not have a suitable infrastructure, above all, built
asylum centres, or a sufficient number of trained people. “The present practice
includes frequent deportations of asylum seekers (refoulement), without the right
to the suspensive effect appeal and inadequate conditions of reception of persons,
including the custody of asylum seekers during court proceedings and during
processing of the request for asylum.”8
“We think that in the process of standardisation of legislations and practice of
the West Balkans countries with EU standards, the conditions must be created for
the following: making consensus on the criterion a country must fulfil to be
pronounced as a “safe”, namely adopting a common list of countries that are
considered safe, regardless of existing of a list of potentially safe countries, ensuring
individual estimation of safety in each individual case, ensuring minimum
acceptable economic and social rights of asylum seekers, ensuring the right to legal
remedy against the decision saying that their claim should be directed to the third
country, as well as minimum standards of protection in the procedure of deportation
to the safe third country and quality process guarantees and transparency of the
procedure itself.”9
Thus the region of South East Europe would harmonise its legal regulations,
and as SaM is at the beginning of creation of its own system, a regional cooperation
would assist in catching up with the missing from the previous period. 
7 Asylum seekers and UNHCR Mandate refugees with BO Belgrade.
8 Group 484, Report on the condition of human rights of refugees, internally displaced persons,
returnees and asylum seekers in Serbia and Montengro for 2004, 2005.
9 Group 484, mr Tanja Pavlović-Križanić, unpublished text, Relevance and impact of EU
developments in South Eastern and Central and Easter Europe, 2004.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONS AND READMISSION 
by
Danilo Rakić1
Introduction 
With the abolition of internal borders and an affirmation of the principles
promoting the free flow of people and goods within the EU (based on the Schengen
Agreement of 1990, and the Maastricht Agreement of 1993) the need to strengthen
external borders and develop additional security measures controlling the flow of
people and goods into the EU, has arisen. During the eighties and particularly since
the nineties, the EU counties, encountered with a mass influx of refugees and
migrants2 have been increasingly setting up various restrictive mechanisms for
preventing their stay in the EU. In the twenty-first century as well, the fight against
illegal migration and migration flows management are one of the priorities of the
EU internal and foreign policy. The countries that wish to join the EU have clearly
set the conditions which the candidate countries should fulfil through different
phases in regards to the migration management and fight against illegal migration.
The readmission agreements are one of the mechanisms of migration flows control
used by the EU countries to return people to their countries of origin once they have
no legal grounds for staying in the EU. 
During the nineties, large numbers of citizens left of the former Yugoslavia
seeking protection from war, persecution and discrimination.3 Among them, large
numbers of Serbian and Montenegrian nationals received temporary protection in
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1 Group 484, Belgrade.
2 Unfavourable economic circumstances and especially the increased unemployment rate in the EU
have instigated xenophobia and racism of local population, articulated at the political level as a
threat to the EU security and stability. 
3 A million people from that region, almost five percent of the population have asked for permanent
or temporary protection in the countries of Central and Western Europe. (Judith Kumin, U.S.
Committee for Refugees, Asylum in Europe: Sharing or Shifting the Burden?, 1995)
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Western Europe. Since the democratic changes of 2000, the return of SaM
nationals from Western Europe based on the readmission agreements intensified. 
Even after 2000, thousands of SaM nationals have continued to seek asylum
protection in the countries of Western Europe. The UNHCR data for 2005 show
that SaM (including Kosovo and Metohija) is the first on the list of European
countries according to the origin of the asylum applications lodged in Europe. With
21,927 applications in 2005, SaM nationals were the most numerous in the world,
well ahead the nationals of China and Russia.4
In 2005, Serbia and Montenegro initiated talks on the conclusion of
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. In the agreement the EU
has signed with Croatia and Macedonia, the areas related to visas, border control,
asylum and migration are regulated by two and three articles respectively. Apart
from some slight differences, the articles in both agreements are almost the same,
and the special emphasis is placed on the area of migration and asylum. Within
that framework, the most concrete part is related to the issue of illegal migration,
the principle of reception obligation and signing the readmission agreements (with
the European Union and bilateral agreements with the member countries). It is
realistic to expect that the draft Stabilisation and Association Agreement between
the EU and SaM will contain similar provisions. In case of SaM, the conclusion
of the readmission agreements with all the EU countries and their effective
implementation is of outmost importance. 
The EU policy of migration management 
As already noted in the Introduction, during the 1980’s, the countries of the
European Union and Western Europe were faced with a growing wave of refugees
and forced migrants, recognised by politicians as a threat to the security and stability
of the EU. During the period, there was a strong belief that the flow of migrants
exceeded the capacities of the host countries to accommodate them and instigated
xenophobic and racist reactions amongst local citizens. The state authorities
responded by imposing protective legislative and administrative measures against
the people who were trying to enter or extend their stay in the EU.5 The concept of
“Fortress Europe”, a popular term defining a resistance to the acceptance of
foreigners to the EU, was expected to develop a way of strengthening the outside
border for keeping forced migrants outside the European Union.
During the nineties, the European Union viewed the opening of borders in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the former Socialist Block, as a possible
channel for mass migration. In response it offered these countries financial and
technical support to control migration. In compliance with the EU’s policy of
preventing access to its territory, the development of mechanisms for efficient
4 UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2005, March 2006.
5 Clotilde Marinho and Matti Heinonen, Dublin after Schengen, EIPA, Allocating Responsibility for
Examining Asylum Applications in Practice, 1998, page 2.
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6 At the EU Summit in Thessalonica in June 2003, the “new vision” on global management of
problems of asylum-seekers, refugees and other migrants, proposed by Great Britain, was not
discussed. The document of Great Britain Government on “New International Approaches for
Procedure and Protection of Asylum-Seekers” is based on principle of strengthening the protection
of refugees in the countries that are closer to their countries of origin. Therefore, the asylum-seekers
who reached the EU territory should be transported to the centers located in EU bordering countries,
where their requests for asylum would be considered. This proposal made by Great Britain was
strongly criticised as an attempt to avoid the responsibility for refugees, based on the Convention
and other international agreements
7 Statewatch, EU buffer states and UNHCR processing centres and “safe heavens”, June 2003.
8 Joanne van Selm, UNHCR, Access to Procedures “Safe Third Countries”, “Safe Countries of
Origin” and “Time Limits”, 2001, page 12.
9 Tatjana Pavlović-Križanić, Group 484, Relevance and Impact of EU Developments in South
Eastern and Central and Eastern Europe, 2004.
protection of refugees had much lower priority than the development of restrictive
border control measures. The restrictive border control measures were imposed in
order to stop the mass exodus of immigrants who were forced to leave their
countries because of armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 
One of the latest EU initiatives relating to international policies is the creation
of the “circle of friends” or “neighbours” of the European Union. Included in this
group are the countries of the former Soviet Union — Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus
and Moldova, the countries of the former Yugoslavia — Croatia, Macedonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and the countries of the
Southern Mediterranean — Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Syria and Tunisia which should receive and absorb new flows of
migrants. The proposal of Great Britain was to relocate asylum-seekers to
reception centres outside the EU borders in some of the “friendly countries”6 has
not been accepted yet, but all the countries of the new “buffer zone” are under
political and economic pressure to adopt EU standards for restrictive migration
controls. The idea is to create a “friendly environment” in order to protect the EU
from crime and terrorism.7
By insisting on the development of EU style asylum systems and imposing
restrictive measures as part of their obligations for eventual EU accession (aquis
communataire), current EU member countries leave little choice to the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe when it comes to the adoption of refugee legislation
and policies on humanitarian issues and human rights.8 Some of these countries are
under pressure to accept the return of their citizens whose request for asylum in EU
countries has been rejected, or who have lost their temporary protection, despite
the lack of basic living conditions for their reintegration in the now “safe and
democratic” countries of origin. 
In the last ten years, there has been a political consensus at the European Union
level that the management of migration flows should be the result of a balance
between the international obligations of the member states in respect of human
rights and the need to maintain state security.9
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The most important instruments of the restrictive strategy for accessing the
European asylum system came out of the Dublin Convention (which was signed in
1990, and came into effect in 1997) and the London Resolution of 1992.10
According to the Dublin Convention, the authority for reviewing asylum requests
belongs to the state through which the asylum-seeker entered the territory of the
European Union. This concept was further developed at the meeting of ministers in
London. These conventions also saw the creation of the concepts of “Safe Third
Countries”, “Safe Countries of Origin” and “Manifestly Unfounded Claim”. These
concepts allow refugee status to be denied to an asylum-seeker through an
expedited process where there is no right to appeal with a suspending effect.
During 1993 and 1994, based on the recommendations of the Council of Ministers,
the countries of the EU started to conclude bilateral readmission agreements with
other countries. The aim of these agreements was to return those without the legal
grounds for staying in the territory of the EU, but also the citizens of third countries
who, on their way to the EU, had transited through the signatory country of the
readmission agreement.
The efforts to develop a single system for asylum policy in the EU territory
based on the principle of division of responsibilities were the result of the Treaty
of Amsterdam of 1997, which became effective in 1999, and the EU Tampere
Summit of 1999. Translated into the EU terminology, the Treaty of Amsterdam set
the foundation for transferring the issue of asylum and migration from the “third
pillar” of national legislation, through which states can make their own choice, to
the “first pillar” where legislation is regulated at the EU level. 
While the conclusions reached at the Tampere Summit, EU officials fully
supported the obligations stemming from the Geneva Convention and other
relevant instruments for the protection of human rights and development of a
common system on asylum policies, at the EU Summit in Seville in 2002, the focus
was shifted on prevention of illegal migrations.11 ECRE (European Council on
Refugees and Exile) feels that the legislation adopted by the EU over the last
several years does not guarantee asylum-seekers and refugees efficient protection
on the territory of the enlarged EU, stating that changes were made in a
“deteriorated atmosphere and growing hostility of the public against asylum-
seekers and refugees, and irresponsible media reporting”.12 These restrictive
measures, instead of dealing with the reasons for migrations, are meant to keep
migrants and asylum-seekers outside the EU borders and thus directly influenced
10 Timothy J. Hatton, Australian National University, University of Essex, CEPR and IZA — Jeffrey
G. Williamson, Harvard University and NBER, Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Policy in Europe,
July 2004, page 18.
11 Tatjana Pavlović-Križanić, Group 484, Relevance and Impact of EU Developments in South
Eastern and Central and Eastern Europe, 2004.
12 ECRE, Broken Promises — Forgotten Principles, An ECRE Evaluation of Development of
Minimum Standards for Refugee Protection, 2004, page 3.
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and will continue to influence the processes of EU integration in the countries of
Central and East Europe, including Serbia and Montenegro. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam imposed an obligation on the signatory countries to
quickly develop legislation at the EU level that would play a crucial role in the
future of millions of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. In 2002, the European
Commission was granted the exclusive right to propose the structure of documents
for the harmonisation of asylum policies at the EU level. A part of the single
European system for asylum policy is represented as follows: 
— Establishment of criteria for determining the member state responsible for
examining an asylum application (Council Regulation Establishing the Criteria
and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining
an Asylum Application Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third Country
National — Dublin II. Directive N. 434/2003, of February 18, 2003);
— Adoption of minimum standards on the acceptance of asylum-seekers (Council
Directive 2003/9/EC Laying Down Minimum Standards on the Reception of
Applicants for Asylum in the Member States of January 27, 2003);
— Agreement and adoption of resolutions on the minimum standards for being
considered as a refugee (Proposal Directive on Laying Down Minimum
Standards for the Qualification and Status of the Third Country Nationals and
Stateless Persons as a Refugees in Accordance with the 1951 Convention, or
as Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection); 
— Adoption of minimum standards on granting and withdrawing refugee status
(Proposal Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States
for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status);
— Adoption of minimum standards on granting temporary protection to people
from third countries who do not meet the criteria set by the Geneva
Convention, or who seek international protection for other reasons. (Council
Directive on the Minimum Standards for the Temporary Protection);
— Adoption of standards on temporary protection of people from third countries
in the event of a mass influx of refugees (Council Directive on the Temporary
Protection);
— Promotion of a standard of balance between the member-states to support the
countries which bear the load of influx of refugees and asylum-seekers (The
European Refugee Fund — ERF, was founded in September 2000, with the
budget of 216 million euros, for the five-year period, from 1999 to 2004). 
In addition to these standards and resolutions, in February and June 2003, two
directives were adopted, one on the reunification of asylum-seeking families and
the other granting the right to residence (Council Directive on Family
Reunification, Council Directive on Long Term Resident Status).
The entire set of EU documents which represent the first phase of alignment to
the EU acquis is based on the controversial concept of the “Safe Third Country”. This
has been reaffirmed at EU level through Directive 434/2003 (Dublin II), which in
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most cases shifts the responsibility for reviewing requests for asylum outside the EU.
The concept of “Safe Third Country” became the foundation for the harmonisation
of the European asylum policies, despite the fact that such a policy bears a risk of
strengthening the crises in the regions, violating human rights and returning people
to the countries of origin where they may be exposed to persecution (refoulement).
The Dublin Convention is ambitiously envisaged as a contract which tackles the
issue of readmission of citizens of third countries and the authority for examining the
application for asylum. The Convention was signed in 1990, and became effective in
1997. In 2001, apart from the EU countries, it included Iceland and Norway. Briefly,
the signatory party of the Dublin agreement which is responsible for the access of
certain person on the territory of EU, is also responsible for examining of his/her
application for asylum. UNHCR cherished the Dublin Convention as a strategy for
adoption of agreed rules on responsibility for the decision on asylum application,
emphasising that certainty in this respect reduces the possibility of “launching” the
asylum-seekers to the refugee “orbit”. However, the Dublin Convention leaves the
space to the “orbit” and chain return of refugees. UNHCR and other international
organisations are concerned about the Article 3(5) of the Dublin Convention that
allows to the EU states to return the asylum-seeker to a non-member country that is
perceived as safe. It means that the EU country in which the request for asylum was
filed can return the asylum-seeker to the safe third country, rather than to some other
EU country that is bound by the Dublin Convention. The EU country can also, based
on the Dublin Convention, return an asylum-seeker to another EU country which can
again return him/her to the country outside the EU which, based on criterion of the
last country of EU destination, is not the safe third country.13
Through the aforementioned documents, the Dublin Convention and London
Resolution, the EU established the concept of “Safe Country of Origin” and “Safe
Third Country”. The both concepts are fundamental for the readmission
agreements SaM has so far concluded with the EU countries.
The concept of “Safe Third Country” centres on the practice of returning
asylum-seekers to third countries, the transit states, without questioning whether
their requests are well-founded, based on the opinion that the third country is
allegedly a “Safe Third Country” and the person should have asked for protection
there, before he/she stepped on the common EU territory. 
The concept of “Safe Country of Origin” was developed in the belief that the
asylum system was being abused as a back-door for illegal migrations. 
History of the readmission agreement 
For better understanding of the readmission issue, which is relevant in the
process of alignment to Euro-Atlantic integrations, it would be useful to perceive
13 Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third
Countries, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2003, page 15, taken from the text “Fortress Europe”.
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this problem from the perspective of a “safe country of origin” and “safe third
country” — Serbia and Montenegro.
In the mid-nineties, a number of countries of Western Europe intended to return
(expel) to the former FR Yugoslavia several hundred thousand persons who had
been deprived of asylum in the shortest time possible, majority of them being the
Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija. 
Having in mind a large number of asylum seekers, not only from FRY but those
from other European countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey), as well as from non-
European countries (Afro-Asian countries), the attitude towards the asylum issue
started to change in European countries, where it has become one of the most
important internal policy issues in these countries. The problem of asylum seekers
was at the same time linked with the changed status of foreigners, who continued
to be less required as a cheap labour force in the EU, becoming a serious social
problem/burden, and allegedly being a group of people connected with the
organised crime (drugs and arms trade, illegal entrances of new economic
migrants). Under the influence of these factors, European countries started to
change their attitude to asylum seekers, imposing measures for their mass
return/expel. For that purpose, they initiated the conclusion of agreements on
return of these people to either the countries within the EU or other European
countries the migrants originated from (Romania, Bulgaria, Poland), but also to
transit countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary).
In the mid-nineties and due to sanctions and isolation, FR Yugoslavia was not
a partner to European countries in regards to the bilateral solving of the return
problems of their nationals, those who had been rejected asylum. Instead, at the
beginning of 1994, a massive return of Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija was
planned, without the consent of FRY (the agreement was reached between FR
Germany and Romania on cooperation in the deportation to FR Yugoslavia of
around 40,000 persons who had been rejected asylum). However, it was an element
of additional pressure for the Government of FRY, since in that period of sanctions
and economic crisis there were over 700,000 refugees in the territory of FRY. 
The Federal Government of FRY thereupon decided to simultaneously impose
two measures: 
a) Imposing practical measures for the prevention of mass return of that particular
category of persons in regards to:
— Diplomatic and consular departments of FRY — restriction in issuing travel
documents, refusing consular services to persons who had been in the
asylum procedure;
— Border crossings — rigorous control according to stricter criteria for
entering the country;
— Air traffic — declining flight permissions for the flights that are doubted to
be used for mass return;
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— Addressing the international bodies responsible for the protection of refugee
rights — UNHCR, the International Red Cross, referring to relevant
provisions of the Geneva Convention and the request to prevent mass
expulsions with their activities.
b) Expressing readiness of FRY to receive back its nationals in accordance with
international law (upon the verification of identity and citizenship of every
individual), but solely through bilateral negotiations with all the interested
countries aiming at concluding agreements on organised and gradual return of the
persons verified as Yugoslav citizens in the procedure before the Yugoslav organs.
That is how the process of gradual solving of one of the very complex problems
was initiated, the problem that dominantly influenced bilateral relations of FRY with
the countries of Western Europe. It should be emphasised that, in the situation of
isolation and sanctions, the negotiations on concluding the agreements on the return
of the rejected asylum seekers were an important part of the foreign policy activity
of FRY, through which the former regime tried to present itself as an active and
constructive factor in bilateral relations with the influential countries of Western
Europe. Besides, these negotiations and agreements were instruments with which
FRY tried to influence bilateral relations with these countries on the line of their own
interests, even regarding the issues not necessarily related to this problem.
The strategy of the Federal Government of FRY was then comprised of the
following:
— Ensure gradual and organised return, during the longest possible period;
— Ensure the exclusive right of relevant Yugoslav organs to establish the identity
and citizenship of every rejected asylum seeker before the return;
— Provide transportation of the returnees by air exclusively;
— Include the provision of contribution (as much as possible) of the countries
returning the rejected asylum seekers for creating conditions for their economic
and social reintegration. 
Based on the consent of the Federal Government and the established platform,
negotiations with Switzerland and Sweden started during 1994 and with FR
Germany at the beginning of 1995. The mentioned countries of Western Europe
were forced to initiate negotiations, trying at the same time to simplify the problem
of returning the rejected asylum seekers. Their main starting point was the formula
that “every country is obliged to receive their citizens”.
In the changed international circumstances after the signing of the Dayton-Paris
Agreement and the acknowledgement of FR Yugoslavia by the countries of Western
Europe, the political, formal and legal conditions were met and the obstacles
removed for Germany and Switzerland to conclude bilateral agreements with FRY.
However, their justified estimations were that the Yugoslav side is trying to “buy
time” and that it was not really interested in solving the asylum problem, which was
the reason for the lack of progress after a number of negotiating rounds. Although
the normalisation of the overall bilateral relations was directly linked with the
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“improvement in solving the asylum issue”, along with the simultaneous pressure
on the Yugoslav side and threats that, in case of further delay of negotiations, the
counties of Western Europe would: withhold flight permissions of JAT to
destinations in their territory, include an even stricter visa regime for Yugoslav
nationals, postpone raising the level of diplomatic representation to the ambassador
level, hinder the unfreezing of Yugoslav funds in foreign banks, etc., the Yugoslav
delegation did not yield the firm mandate approved by the Government. For that
reason, only after two years from the beginning of negotiations with Germany,
Switzerland and Sweden, the first Readmission Agreement was signed (in 1996
with FR Germany and in July 1997 with Switzerland).
Concerning the dynamics of concluding agreements, which have been signed
in a relatively short period with 16 countries (the last one with France, at the end
of April 2006) it is obvious that now there is a clear difference in regards to the
approach and readiness of SaM to fulfil its international obligations. 
Readmission today 
The first negotiations on readmission agreements were conducted by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of FRY. After the State Union of SaM and the Council of Ministers
had been formed in 2002, the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights became
responsible for concluding the readmission agreements. According to the statistics of
the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights, to date SaM has signed and implemented
14 readmission agreements with 16 countries: Germany, Switzerland, Sweden,
Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and France. With the exception of the
agreements signed with BiH Austria and France, all of the mentioned agreements have
been ratified. The process of concluding 11 agreements has been initiated with, among
others, the following countries: Great Britain, Norway, Portugal and Macedonia. All
the agreements are bilateral with countries of Western Europe and the region,
regulating the conditions and instruments of returning persons lacking the legal
grounds for staying, and upon request of the signatory country. The persons
encompassed with the readmission agreements can be the signatory countries
nationals, the third country’s nationals or stateless persons. 
The EU has presented a positive assessment on the realisation of readmission
agreements in the Feasibility Study, Section 3.6.2. dealing with the problems of
asylum, visas and migration. 
Nevertheless, the process of signing further readmission agreements has
slowed down compared with the period before March 2003. No further agreements
have been signed since March 2003 till April 2006 (when the agreement with
France was signed). The positive assessment presented in the Study could easily be
replaced with the negative position of the EU if the process of signing the
readmission agreements does not continue in a more dynamic manner. 
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The Council of Europe estimates that between 50,000 and 100,000 persons will
be returned from Western Europe to SaM (30,000 from Germany, 12,000 from the
Netherlands, 3,000 from Belgium, 3,000 from Switzerland, 3,000 from Luxembourg).
According to the German Government data, SaM nationals lodged 6,000 asylum
applications during 2004, and in the same period only 4,000 persons were returned. 
The conditions under which SaM nationals return to the country they have fled
and where they try to start a new life are more than difficult. There are no protection
measures for the reintegration of returnees, and readmission agreements hold no
guarantees related to their accommodation. These people are not in official statistics,
and specific research conducted by certain nongovernmental organisations reveals
only fragments of the problem. Although the returnees mutually differ– in regards
to their ethnic background, age and education — the thing they have in common is
very often difficult economic and social situation they face after they have returned.
The research shows that there is no difference between the persons who have
forcibly returned and those who have returned “voluntarily”, since they have been
forced to do that in order to avoid great inconvenience resulting from the forced
return with the official escort. 
State institutions facing the return of SaM nationals 
The Ministry of Human and Minority Rights of SaM is a leading state institution
responsible for negotiating and signing the readmission agreements, as well as for
monitoring their implementation. The ministry of Foreign Affairs participates in
negotiations, and the role of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia
and the Republic of Montenegro is to identify SaM nationals. When a relevant organ
of one of the signatory country requires reception of persons to the country of origin,
such a request (petition) is forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior, which is obliged
to establish whether the person in question is SaM national, and if that is the case,
the petition is approved and the person can be deported. Returnees are then waited
for at the airport where their identity and criminal record is checked once more and
after that they have to make it on their own.
Nevertheless, some progress related to the response of the state institutions,
above all the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights occurred in 2005. At the end
of that year the Office for Readmission was opened at the airport followed by the
creation of the Draft Strategy for Integration of Returnees, supported by the
MARRI Initiative. The office at the airport provides important information to
returnees upon their return to the country, comprising of a lawyer and a social
worker who inform returnees on their rights, legal and social system and the way
of their inclusion in the society. According to the Ministry of Human and Minority
Rights data, since January 2006, 375 returnees arrived at the Nikola Tesla Airport,
150 of them in March only. Considerable influx is expected upon the end of the
school year. Interestingly enough, only 30% of the returnees sought the assistance
of the office at the airport, which can be explained by the inconvenient location of
the office which is in the transit zone, and once they pass the passport control the
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returnees cannot go back to the Office for Readmission. The overall majority of
returnees are from Germany, 61% of them originating from Central Serbia, 21%
from Kosovo and Metohija, 18% from Vojvodina. There are more male (71%) than
female returnees (29%). As much as 26% of returnees are children, and according
to the ethnic structure, the majority of returnees are Roma (59%), followed by
Serbs (13%), Albanians (13%), and other nations and national minorities. 
The adoption of the Draft Strategy for Integration of Returnees according to the
readmission agreements, as well as the creation of the action and financial plan
based on the Strategy should ensure more effective and efficient solving of the
problems returnees are facing once they return to the country. The better the
response of the state organs to the problems of returnees is, the greater are
possibilities for efficient conclusion and realisation of the readmission agreements.
Conclusions and recommendations
On February 2006, during quite a dynamic and open discussion, the
participants of the national round table (representatives of the Ministry of Labour,
Employment and Social Policy, the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights of
SaM, the European Commission Delegation to SaM, The EU Integration Office of
SaM and the Republic of Serbia, UNHCR, representatives of international
organisations, civil society organisations and the media) focused primarily on the
institutional shortcomings of the readmission process, on state obligations in
regards to readmission, problems during the reintegration of returnees and the
process of concluding the readmission agreements.
The summarised conclusions emphasised that readmission is a process initiated
more than ten years ago, but it is still not sufficiently known to the wider public.
The return of SaM nationals who have no legal grounds for staying abroad is a
democratic principle and the state obligation, as well as a prerequisite for European
integrations and entering the White Schengen List. Therefore, the relevant state
organs should do everything in their power to ensure the process to proceed
undisturbed, at the same time taking care of the welfare of returnees. Therefore, the
readmission agreements should encompass more guarantees related to their
realisation. The relevant Ministries should be more actively included in the
creation of the programmes for integration of returnees, and cooperation should be
established between state institutions and the civil sector in regards to solving
problems resulting from readmission agreements. International actors should also
take part in the process.
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READMISSION
by
Zoran Martinović1
One of the foreign policy priorities of Serbia and Montenegro is to enter the
so-called ‘white Schengen list’. The imperative for the realisation of this main
objective is preventing illegal migration, particularly from our country to other
countries of the European Union, to the candidate countries, and other Western
countries in general, as well as from other countries through the territory of
Serbia and Montenegro to the afore mentioned countries. Therefore, it is
necessary to sign readmission agreements with these countries, as well as to
introduce a stricter visa regime with all the countries of Afro-Arab and Asian
complex, aiming at hindering entrance to, and illegal transit, and migration
through Serbia and Montenegro to the EU countries and other Western countries.
Since 1996, 15 bilateral readmission agreements have been signed with 17
countries, all of them being ratified, irrespective of France. Out of the mentioned
signed and ratified agreements, 10 agreements have been signed with 12 EU
member countries, with Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and France. The
remaining 5 agreements have been signed with 3 European countries in the
process of the EU accession, with Bulgaria (the EU candidate country), Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet ratified the
agreement), as well as with Switzerland, which is not the EU country and with a
non-European country (Canada).
The first readmission agreement was signed with FR Germany on October
12, 1996. However, in 2002 a new agreement was signed and ratified,
encompassing all three categories of returnees. 
According to the estimations of experts from the signatory countries, all the
ratified agreements (except the one with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has not
1 Secretary, Ministry of Minority and Human Rights, Serbia and Montenegro.
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yet come to power), have been successfully implemented and without any
considerable problems.
Furthermore, the process of harmonising positions and signing readmission
agreements with 11 countries has been initiated, 8 of them being the EU member
countries (Greece, Great Britain, Czech Republic, Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania,
Spain and Poland), one not being the EU member country (Norway), and 2 in the
EU accession process (Romania — the candidate country and Macedonia).
Out of 11 mentioned countries, the conclusion of the agreement with
Norway, Czech Republic and Great Britain is due soon, given that the agreement
texts with these countries have been harmonised and signed, and the
harmonisation of the agreement texts with Greece, Lithuania, Latvia and
Romania is in its final phase.
With the mentioned agreements, both the ones already signed and those in
the process of harmonisation, the conditions are being met for an organised,
reciprocal and institutionalised return of the signatory countries’ nationals, third
country nationals and stateless persons, as well as transiting of the third country
nationals and stateless persons. Having accepted such an approach, our country
has planned a comprehensive approach to preventing illegal migrations within
the signatory countries, as well as in the region, Europe and the world as a whole.
It should be mentioned that the provisions of the signed agreements
encompass and incorporate all the highest EU standards in the field of protection
of basic human rights and the rights of citizens, as well as regulations of other
international conventions, aimed at the protection of human rights and liberties. 
Since the beginning of 2003, the year when the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro had been formed and the signing and implementation of the
readmission agreements was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Human and Minority Rights of Serbia and Montenegro and the republic Ministry
of the Interior, around 1600 persons a year have been returned to Serbia and
Montenegro. Those were the persons who returned accompanied by officials,
while in the same period, including the so-called “escorted return”, around 3.500
persons a year were returned to the country. All ethnic groups were equally
represented, including Serbs, Montenegrins, Muslims, Bosniaks, Albanians and
Roma, but lately the Roma are numerous (the problem of the Roma is the most
recurrent and complex, having in mind their exceptionally difficult socio-
economic situation).
Nevertheless, the process of return was somewhat more intensive in the
period from 1996, the year the first readmission agreement was signed till the
end of 2002. 
In the entire period, the majority of persons have been returned from FR
Germany, followed by Switzerland, Luxembourg and Sweden. 
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Although the number of potential returnees, the persons who are due to return
to Serbia and Montenegro from the European counties in the upcoming period,
is not known, it is estimated that their number is around 100,000.
Regarding the assistance of our country to returnees, the State Union has
prepared the Roma Reintegration Programme in coordination with relevant
republic Ministries and local self-government organs, since Roma make
considerable number of returnees. The most frequent problems are a large
number of Roma returning to the country without almost any property,
accommodation, and employment problems, etc.
As an initial phase of the programme, and assistance to all those who return
to our country according to the readmission agreements, the Ministry of Human
and Minority Rights, being the relevant organ at the State Union level, has
established the Office for Readmission. Its responsibility is to give instruction
and legal advices to all returnees, regardless of their ethnic background, as well
as to provide other assistance within the jurisdiction of the Ministry. 
Besides the Roma Reintegration Programme, the Ministry of Human and
Minority Rights also coordinates the work of a group for the preparation of action
plans and provides new opportunities to the Roma in the fields of employment,
housing, health, social care, education, media, information, culture and political
representation.
Through the Ministry of Human and Minority Right, and in cooperation with
the regional initiative MARRI, having a mandate in the field of migration and
asylum, the State Union is preparing the Strategy for Reintegration of Returnees
from Western Europe, who will return to the county according to readmission
agreements. The Strategy will encompass the following fields: informing
returnees on where and who they can turn to for help; obtaining personal
documents; diploma validations; language classes for returnee children;
accommodation; employment; social and health care. 
When the Strategy is adopted, the state will allocate funds for its realisation
in accordance with its financial capabilities.
However, concerning assistance provided to returnees by the countries they
return from, the majority of signatory countries did not want to undertake the
responsibility of participating in their financial-social reintegration. On the other
hand, few countries have accepted the general obligation of participation in
reintegration, and assistance is reduced to financing certain smaller projects, but
not to direct concrete assistance to returnees themselves.
Having this in mind, any assistance offered by the states these people return
from is more than welcome. Special attention is given to the fact that our country
went through huge problems and difficulties during the nineties, producing a
drastic decrease in economic activities and living standard for the entire
population, and that it will not be able to provide necessary conditions for
successful socio-economic reintegration of returnees.
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Finally, it should be emphasised that with the upcoming EU accession of
some countries in the region (Romania and Bulgaria are due to become rightful
EU members on January 1, 2008), as well as the subsequent accession of other
countries to the European association (Croatia and Macedonia, which have
recently gained the status of candidate countries), Serbia and Montenegro, along
with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania will become a border EU country in
the region. Consequently, its obligations in regards to the prevention of illegal
migrations, as well as to the conclusion and implementation of readmission
agreements will become even more substantial and important.
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EUROPEAN STANDARDS FOR 
THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
by
Žaklina Novičić1
The freedom of movement of persons is, with the freedom of movement of goods,
services and capital, one of the biggest freedoms originally motivating European
integration. The concept of the freedom of movement in European Union (EU) law
has changed and expanded its meaning over time, from the original workers’ right to
freedom of movement, to personal and basic rights of EU citizens. Nowadays, the
right of movement and stay of EU citizens in other member states is unconditional for
three months, but regarding movement and a stay for longer than three months, the
freedom of movement in the EU, is not an unconditional and unlimited right.
Together with the internal aspect, in EU law, under the idea of freedom of
movement, regulations developed regarding crossing external borders, borders that
EU states share with third countries (non EU states). Regulations regarding the
issues of visas, asylum and immigration were also developed. This article will
primarily deal with EU visa policy, especially the conditions and possibilities
liberalizing EU visa policy towards third countries.
Internal aspects of the freedom of movement in the EU law
The content of freedom of movement in EU law grew from economic to
political, according to the functionalist logic of European integration. The freedom
of movement primarily meant the workers’ right of movement and stay in other EU
member states with the aim of doing business, and it evolved into a personal right
of every EU citizen.2 However, there are important differences in terms of duration
of the right of the freedom of movement: movement and stay for up to three months
1 Žaklina Novičić, researcher in the Institute for International Politics and Economy, Belgrade.
2 This part of the paper represents a short and updated version of a previously published article:
Žaklina Novičić, “Freedom of Movement of Persons in the EU Law”, International Issues, Institute
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is unconditioned, while the movement and stay of longer than three months are
subject to certain conditions.
Freedom of movement of persons as a principle of the single market
The freedom of movement of persons, in the first phase of the development of
European integration (1957 to 1980s), was exclusively an economic-legal principle
which had the aim of bringing down obstacles against the movement of persons as
a factor of the production process, and the creation of the common market for
persons, goods, services and capital member states of the European Economic
Community (EEC).
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, or the Treaty of
Rome, from 1957 sets the establishment of the common market as one of the
general goals of European integration. It does not define them, but prescribes that
the “actions of the Community” are realized by “eliminating the obstacles against
the free movement goods, persons, services and capital between member states”.3
A series of provisions in the Treaty of Rome, which mostly remained unchanged
until today, prescribe the elimination of limitations for movement motivated by
economic purposes, i.e. movement of certain economic categories of persons.
Workers i.e. employed persons who perform work for certain compensation — for
or under the supervision of another person (engaged in so-called non-self
employed occupation, regardless whether it is a managerial or a physical work) are
the only category of persons whose freedom of movement is explicitly regulated
by the Treaty of Rome.4 Workers have been given the right to enter and stay in the
receiving member state for employment and work and the right to stay in the
receiving country after their work engagement in it has ceased.
The Council and Commission are, according to the authority given to them by the
Treaty of Rome, by the derivative acts (secondary or derivative law), adopted in the
late 60s and early 70s, concretized the meaning of the freedom of movement of
workers. The most important document is Council Regulation number 1612/68 which
puts into practice the contractual principle of banning any sort of discrimination (the
principle of equal/national treatment) among the workers from member states
according to their citizenship, and in terms of employment, rewards and other working
conditions.5 At the same time, Council Directive 68/360 regulates the regime of entry
for International politics and Economy (“Sloboda kretanja ljudi u pravu EU”, Medjunarodni
problemi, Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu), VOl. LV, no.1, 2003, p. 57-88.
3 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed on March 25th, 1957, came into
power on January 1st, 1958.
4 Treaty Establishing the EC does not define the notion of worker, and this definition of the
category of worker comes from the secondary legislature and interpretation of the Court of
Justice. See: Radovan Vukadinovic, Pravo Evropske Unije, Institut za Medjunarodnu politiku i
privredu, Beograd, p. 133.
5 “Council Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers
within the Community”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 257, 19/10/1968, pp. 2-20.
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and stay, and the conditions and procedures for entry of workers into the territory of
the receiving member state, as well as the employment period. The Commission
supplemented this Directive with Regulation number 1251/70, which regulates
conditions and administrative formalities connected to the extension of workers’ stay
in the receiving member state after the period of employment ended.6
Based on the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, which have remained
unchanged until today, the right of freedom of movement can be enjoyed by the
“persons who perform activities by personal work, or are founding and managing
enterprises, firms and commercial associations”, or so-called self-employed
persons, as well as persons who provide/use services, but their right to freedom of
movement is derived from the freedom to establish one’s own activity, or the so-
called freedom/right of settlement and from the freedom to perform services within
the Community. The jurisdiction in regard to bringing measures, with a goal of
implementing the freedom of establishing one’s own activity and the liberalization
of services, the Council applied in the mid-70s, and brought two directives, 73/148
and 75/34, which specify the difference between two categories of persons:
abolishment of the limitation of movement and stay is applied to the persons who
provide/use services only throughout the period of the duration of that service.7
Together with the specification of the group who has the right to freedom of
movement and abolishing the limitation of their movement, EU bodies prescribed
the conditions under which the freedom of movement can be limited. First, it needs
to be pointed out that the Treaty of Rome itself excludes persons employed in public
administration from the principle of freedom of movement, and accordingly the
principle of equal/national treatment. Also, a similar possibility of limiting the
freedom of movement, i.e. discrimination of citizens of other states is anticipated for
persons who establish their own activities and perform services even only if they are
connected with “performing public duties”.8 Apart from this restriction, the freedom
of movement of employed, self-employed and persons who provide/use services can
6 “Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement
and residence within the Community for workers”, Official Journal of European Communities, L
257, 19/10/1968, pp. 2–12. “Regulation (EEC) 1251/70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the
right of workers to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that
State”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 142, 30/06/1970, p. 24.
7 “Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and
residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the
provision of services”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 172, 28/06/1973, pp. 14–16;
“Council Directive 75/34/EEC of 17 December 1974 concerning the right of nationals of a Member
State to remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a
self-employed capacity”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 014, 20/01/1975, pp. 10–13.
8 This considers the movements with a view to performing activities in public management, i.e.
activities which imply performing public government and providing general interest from the part of
the state or the local authorities. All other activities in the public sector are treated equally. According
to: “Report of the High Level Panel on the free movement of persons, chaired by Mrs Simone Veil”,
presented to the Commission on 18 March 1997, Internet, 01/07/2002, http//europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/en/people/hlp/hlpen.pdf, p. 34.
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be challenged by the reasons of “public policy, public security and public health”.
The content and procedure for the restriction is because the above mentioned
reasons are set by Council Directive number 64/221, 72/194 and 75/35.9
The abolishment, on the EU level, of the restriction of movement which are not
for economic purposes began without formal introduction of the “Union’s
citizenship”, and according to the introduction of more ambitious, political goals of
integration in the mid-80s, after the adoption of the Single European Act. Renamed
the ‘common market’ into the internal market and directly defined as an “area
without internal borders which enables the free movement of persons, goods,
services and capital”, states that view its gradual establishment in the Community
will pass measures before December 31st, 1992.10 Following this decision the
Council at the beginning of the 90s, expanded the right to freedom of movement to
pensioners who did not use that right during their working age (Directive no. 90/365),
students during their studies (Directive no. 93/96), and finally to all other categories
of persons who do not enjoy this right according to the adopted provisions of the
communitarian law (Directive no. 90/364).11 However, even though the stay of these
persons in the receiving country is allowed, it is materially conditioned: the persons
in question must posses material means enough to prevent the overload of the social
security system of the receiving country, as well as health insurance against all risks.
In sum, according to EU law, the right of stay longer than three months in the
member state which is not their country of origin can be enjoyed by persons who: a)
are employed in a lucrative activity as an employee or self-employed person, and so
when traveling to a receiving member state in order to obtain a working engagement,
or when they have ended their working engagement; b) posses enough financial
9 “Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures
concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 56/04/1964,
pp. 850–857. “Council Directive 72/194/EEC of 18 May 1972 extending the scope of Directive
4/221/EEC to workers exercising the right to remain in the territory of a Member State after having
been employed in that State”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 121, 26/05/1972, p. 32.
“Council Directive 75/35/EEC of 17 December 1974 extending the scope of Directive 64/221/EEC
on the coordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals
which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health to include nationals
of a Member State who exercise the right to remain in the territory of another Member State after
having pursued therein an activity in a self-employed capacity”, Official Journal of European
Communities, L 14, 20/01/1975, p. 14.
10 Single European Act, signed on December 3rd, 1985, and came into power on July 1st, 1987.
11 “Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-
employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity”, Official Journal of European
Communities, No L 180, 13/07/1990, pp. 28–29. “Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993
on the right of residence for students”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 180, 18/12/1993,
pp. 59–60. Ruling of the Court of Justice on July 7th, 2002 canceled and replaced the previous
Directive which referring to students — Council Directive no. 90/366 of 28 June, 1990 (ruling in the
case C-295/90). “Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence”, Official
Journal of European Communities, L 180, 13. 07. 1990, pp. 26–27.
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means, as well as health insurance which covers all the risks in the receiving country.12
Based on a document which proves that they meet the prescribed conditions, a
residence permit is issued as proof of the right to stay longer than three months. The
residence permit is valid for five years after which it is renewed automatically, but after
two years persons who are not engaged in a lucrative activity can be subject to the
control and renewal of its validity. The right to a short stay (three months) is not subject
to any special conditions or the possession of a residence permit, only a declaration of
the residence address to the authorities of the receiving member state.
Practical interpretation and implementation of these rules have often been the
case in the EU Court of Justice, which has emphasized that the residence permit only
has a declarative character, it is not an authorization, but a document which notifies
of the previously existing right, the right prescribed by the Treaty or, in certain cases,
acts of secondary legislature, which is, therefore, acquired regardless of whether the
authorities of the receiving country have issued the residence permit. The residence
permit is, however, needed as proof that the person in question has the right to the
freedom of movement and stay longer than three months.
The above described regulation is summa summarum of the communitarian
law in the area of freedom of movement of persons until the introduction of the
Union’s citizenship.13
The right for the freedom of movement of EU citizens
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) has put the idea of freedom of movement into
a new legal and political context.14 This Treaty introduced into the Treaty
establishing the EC provisions titled “Union Citizenship”. “All the citizens of the
Union”: where a citizen of the Union is every person who has citizenship of a
member state, has received “the right to move and stay freely on the territory of the
member states”. The freedom of movement of persons is, in this way, from a
characteristic of the internal market evolved into an individual “right of every
citizen of the Union to freedom of movement and stay within the territory of
member states”. However, the continuation of this provision is a paragraph which
requires the “respect of restrictions and conditions set by this Treaty and measures
for its implementation”, which actually means, “return to the provisions which
existed before the Treaty of Maastricht”, i.e. that the users, contents and limitations
of the freedom of movement were not essentially changed.
12 The amount of the financial means is set (except in the case of students) as an amount higher than the
lowest level of means which the receiving country gives as a social insurance to its citizens, taking
into account the personal circumstances of the persons in question, and if the former is not applicable,
sufficient means is the amount higher than a minimal social pension in the receiving member state.
13 The mentioned 11 instruments of the secondary legislature the Commission identifies as basic
documents in the area of the freedom of movement. “Second report of the European Commission
on Citizenship of the Union”, Internet, 01/07/2002, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_
market/en/update/report/citen.htm.
14 Treaty on European Union, signed on February 7th, 1992, came into force on November 1st, 1993.
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This is confirmed by the European Commission’s Second Report on the Union’s
Citizenship, which states that the provisions on the Union’s citizenship do not form
a comprehensive legal framework from which all of the rights attributed to the
freedom of movement of the Union’s citizen stem, that it cannot replace the existing
legal basis which apply to specific categories of persons, for which the existing
secondary legislature sets differences and restrictions, and that the mentioned
provisions should be revised, which, basically, has not been done to this day.15
By using its right for legal initiative in the area of the freedom of movement, the
Commission recommended in May 2001, the Council and the Parliament should
adopt the directive which would codify the 11 existing instruments of the secondary
legislature on the freedom of movement.16 In addition, the Commission
recommended several new things. Concerning short stays of up to three months, the
Commission recommends that the duration is extended to six months. Concerning
the longer stay, the Commission recommends abolishing the permit for stay longer
than six months too. In that case, only proof of residence is registered with the
authorities, the certificate of registration would be enough.17 The requirement for
employed and self-employed persons would still be current engagement in a
lucrative activity, which would be proven by a simple statement given in good will
— a bona fide declaration. For persons who are not employed the right of residence
would for the first four years continue to be dependant on the possession of enough
financial resources and health insurance, which would also be proven by a simple
bona fide declaration. This request is facilitated by the Directive Recommendation
on the Right of Freedom of Movement in as much as the amount of means is no
longer set by the Directive and that countries cannot have it set.
The Directive Recommendation on the Right to Freedom of Movement
introduces a new concept — the right of permanent stay after four years of
continuous and legal residence in the receiving member state, after which persons in
question are no longer subject to conditioning and restrictions which in fact makes
them equal to citizens of the receiving country. The Commission, as a recommending
body, thinks that four years is a long enough period for the persons in question to
become an integral part of the community in which they live, and because of that, this
right is a key element for the development of “social cohesion” in the Union.
Fostering freedom of movement as a factor of “social cohesion” in the EU is
in conflict with the high level of unemployment in member states. This
15 “Second report of the European Commission on Citizenship of the Union”, cit.Treaty of
Amsterdam, signed on December 2nd, 1997,came into power on May 1st, 1999 and Treaty of
Nice, signed on February 26th, 2001, came into force on February 1st, 2003; only the decision
procedure on these issues changed.
16 COM(2001) 257 final, “Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory
of the Member States”, presented by the Commission of the European Communities, Official
Journal of European Communities, C 270 E, 25/09/2001, pp. 150–160.
17 Residence permit would remain a required document for the Union citizen’s family members
who are not citizens of a member country.
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“paradoxical mission” was pointed out by the Report of the High Level panel,
which served as a basis for Commission’s Directive Recommendation on the
Right of Movement from 2001. The Panel pointed out another crucial problem
related to the freedom of movement in the EU in 1997 — the fact that the total
number of EU citizens living on the territory of a member state other then their
own was 5.5 million, which was only 1.5 percent of the total population of the EU
(370 million).18
External aspects of the freedom of movement in the EU law
Realization of the freedom of movement, regardless whether its purpose is the
functioning of a common market or the guarantee of personal rights, implies a gradual
abolishment of border controls within the integrating area. The logical consequence of
this process is the need to strengthen control on external borders of the entity, and the
need to harmonize policies of member states on issues related to crossing external
borders: visas, asylum and in general issues of migration/immigration.
The creation of jurisdiction of the EC comes with the Single European Act, but
the failure to reach a consensus of all member states on these issues lead to the
development of cooperation among a smaller number of members and on interstate
level, outside the institutional framework of the EC/EU, and concretely in the
framework of the Schengen system in the freedom of movement.19 However, on
the level of the EU, there was a gradual policy development in areas connected to
the external aspect of freedom of movement.
The Treaty of Maastricht, which put the right of freedom of movement within
the EU in a somewhat different legal-political context, and EU bodies were given
certain authorities in visa policy: with the introduction of Article 100c into the
Treaty Establishing the EC, communitarian bodies have received authority to create
common visa lists, as well as jurisdiction over establishing a unique visa format.
According to the legal basis set, the Council adopted the first visa regulation in
1995 — Regulation no. 2317/95, which regulates the obligation to possess visas for
a short term stays of citizens of around 100 third countries.20 More precisely, the
Annex of this regulation enumerates 98 states and three entities (territorial
18 “Report of the High Level Panel on the free movement of persons, chaired by Mrs Simone Veil”, p. 8.
19 Schengen system is a special form of interstate arrangement, without any forms of supra-
nationality which are a characteristic of the legal arrangement of the EU. The system is based on
the Agreement between the governments of Benelux, Federal Republic of Germany and the
French Republic on gradual abolishing of control on common borders (signed on June 14th,
1985) and the Convention on Application of the Schengen Agreement (signed on June 19th,
1990, came into power on March 26th, 1995). More in: Žaklina Novičić, „Sloboda kretanja ljudi
u pravu EU”, op. cit. See also: Žaklina Novičić, „Ugovor Šengen III”, Evropsko zakonodavstvo,
Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2005, no. 13, pp. 75–79.
20 “Council Regulation (EC) No 2317/95 of 25 September 1995 determining the third countries
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the
Member States”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 234, 03. X 1995, pp. 1–3.
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governments that are not recognized as states by all of the EU member states),
where, together with Taiwan and FYR Macedonia, FR Yugoslavia is listed. EU
member states then do not have the obligation to harmonize their visa regimes with
regard to the third countries which are not listed on the “black” visa list of the EU.
The 1995 Regulation was annulled and replaced by Regulation no. 574/1999 due
to breaches of procedure.21 As far as countries on the “black” list are concerned,
the second visa Regulation is not much different than the first one. The novelty is
the “advancement” of FR Yugoslavia and FYR Macedonia from “entities” into
“states” on the “black” visa list.
However, since the beginning of the nineties, with the application of the
Schengen Agreement, there are visa lists (“black”, “white” and “grey”) and they
account for a smaller number of EU countries. On the “black” list there were 30
third countries more than on the “black” list of the Council Regulation. Also,
member states of the Schengen Agreement have harmonized the “white” list with
around 40 third countries of visa free regime. The “gray” Schengen visa list was
made up of the third countries for which only some of the member states of the
Schengen Agreement introduced the visa regime.22 The difference in the Schengen
and the EU list is a result of different membership in these arrangements, i.e. the
special position of Great Britain, which is not a part of the Schengen Agreement,
but have also prevented putting the Commonwealth countries, with which is has
free regime of traveling, on the EU “black” visa list. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) legally clarified the situation and paved the
way for harmonization of the Schengen with the EU visa lists. The first step
forward was made by establishing a legal basis for integrating the Schengen
attainments in the legal system of the EU. Following that, this constitutional
revision legally formalized the opt out position of Great Britain (as well as Ireland
and Denmark) and the possibility of the so-called closer cooperation of smaller
number of member states in the framework of the EU institutional system. Finally,
the Treaty of Amsterdam announces the “gradual creation of the area of freedom,
security and justice”, and for that purpose Article 100c of the ToEC was cancelled,
and the issues of visa, together now with the issues of asylum, crossing of external
borders and immigration in general have been given a whole section in the Treaty
Establishing the EC (Section IV: Visas, Asylum, Immigration, and Other Policies
Related to the Free Movement of Persons). The novelties in the Section IV are,
among other things, the legal framework and the expanded jurisdiction of EU
bodies in visa policy. The Council received the authority to decide (on the
recommendation from the Commission and consultation of the Parliament) not
21 “Council Regulation (EC) No 574/1999 of 12 March 1999 determining the third countries whose
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Member
States”,Official Journal of European Communities, L 72, 18/03/1999, pp. 2–5.
22 For Schengen visa lists see: “Decision of the Executive Committee of 28 April 1999 on the
definitive version of the Common Manual and the Common Consular Instructions”, SCH/Com/ex
(99) 13, Official Journal of European Communities, L 176, 10/07/1999, pp. 344–346.
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only on the “black”, but also on the “white” visa list, which means that there is no
longer a third country in relation to which member states have a sovereign power
of unilateral decision whether to introduce the visa regime or not (unless previously
they do not take up the opt out position, which is still used in the area of freedom
of movement by Great Britain, Ireland, and in certain cases, Denmark). 
After Amsterdam, in March 2001, Council Regulation no. 539/2001 was
adopted.23 Visa lists which it comprised are in most cases the same as the Schengen
“black” and “white” visa list: in Annex I of this Regulation 131 third country and
three entities are listed which are subject to the EU visa regime, while in Annex II
43 third countries and two entities are listed which are in the visa free regime with
the EU. Regulation 539/2001 was amended twice with Council Regulations
2414/2001 and 453/2003.24
In the Proposal for Council Regulation no. 539/2001, the Commission states
that before making a decision whether citizens of the third country are subject to
an EU visa regime or exempt from it, a number of criteria should be taken into
consideration, and the main points are: a) illegal immigration: visa rules represent
the main instrument of control of the migration flow; b) public policy: introduction
of the visa regime can be a response to the serious level and territorial reach of
certain forms of crime; c) international relations: the selection of the visa regime
towards a third country can be a means of emphasizing a certain type of
relationship which the Union intends to establish or keep with that country.25 The
Commission has stated in the same document that, having in mind the differences
in situations in third countries and their relations with the EU and member states,
set criteria cannot be applied automatically, but that they will, as decision making
instruments be used flexibly and pragmatically, based on individual cases. 
The content of visa lists does not allow reliable conclusions on which criteria
was applied to each individual country. An attempt to generalize countries on visa
list might lead to the following conclusion: that almost the whole of Africa is on
the “black” list, that most of the South American countries of the Spanish and
23 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt
from that requirement”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 81, 21. III 2001, pp. 1–7.
24 “Council Regulation (EC) No 2414/2001 of 7 December 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No
539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing
the external borders of Member States and those whose nationals are exempt from that
requirement”, Official Journal of European Communities, L 327, 12/12/2001, pp. 1–2. “Council
Regulation (EC) No 453/2003 of 6 March 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing
the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement”, Official Journal of
European Communities, L 069, 13. III 2003, pp. 10–11.
25 COM(2000) 27 final — 2000/0030 (CNS), “Proposal for a Council Regulation listing the third
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and
those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement”, Official Journal of European
Communities, C 177 E, 26. VI 2000, pp. 1–5.
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Portuguese speaking areas are on the “white list” (with the exception of Columbia
and Peru), that none of the countries with a primarily Muslim population are not
on the “white” visa list (with the exception of Brunei), and that all of the Pacific
island countries are on the “black” visa list.26 Therefore, the author of this
generalization warns that visa lists might suggest that in their formation the first
“level of privileges or discrimination” are race and religion, and the second level
of privilege is wealth. A number of groups for the protection of human rights, as
well as the UNHCR criticized the approach and the principle as well as the creation
of ‘Fortress Europe’. Also, the lack of transparency in creating lists, i.e. the lack of
official reports which would explain the position of every individual country, is
worth of criticism. Only in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania there are reports, and
they are taken as basis for analysis of the criteria for the liberalization of the EU
visa regime.
It must be pointed out that the abolishment of the EU visa regime towards third
countries is based on the estimation of each state of in three key areas — opinions
given by EU bodies: the Commission puts forward the proposition, the Parliament
gives its opinion, the Council for Justice and Internal Affairs reaches the political
agreement, and the formal decision is brought by the EU Council for General Affairs.
Liberalization of the EU visa regime towards third countries: 
the cases of Bulgaria and Romania27
The compulsory EU visa regime for Romania and Bulgaria was introduced in
1995 with Council Regulation 2317/95. According to current visa Regulation from
2001 (539/2001) Bulgaria and Romania are “taken off” the “black”, i.e. listed on
the “white” visa list. The Commission, which recommended the abolishment of the
visa regime for Bulgarians and Romanians, stated that it reached the final
conclusion upon the considerable progress of these two countries in fulfilling
prescribed EU conditions on the basis of two reports.28 These reports provide an
overview of legal, financial and operative instruments in which these two countries
have in terms of border control, combating illegal migration and repatriation of
their citizens illegally settled in EU member countries. The Commission pointed
26 Elspeth Guild, Moving the Borders of Europe, Publicaties Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid,
University of Nijmegen, Internet, 01/04/2003, http://www.jur.kun.nl/cmr/articles/oratieEG.pdf.
27 This part of the article is a short version of an already published article: Zaklina Novicic,
“Liberalizacija rezima viza Evropske Unije prema trecim zemljama: slucaj Rumunije i
Bugarske”, Evropsko zakonodavstvo, Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beldrade,
2003, no. 6, pp. 80–84.
28 COM(2001) 61 final, Volume I: “Report from the Commission to the Council regarding Bulgaria
in the perspective of the adoption of the Regulation determining the list of third countries whose
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose
nationals are exempt of that requirement”, Volume II “Intermediate Report on Visa Issues —
Romania”, Brussels, 02. 02. 2001. Internet, 01/03/2003, http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/
com/rpt/2001/com2001_0061en02-01.pdf.
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out also that the other reason for its recommendation that the process of enlarging
the EU has reached it final stages, and that negotiations were opened with both
Romania and Bulgaria. 
The abolishment of the visa regime for Bulgarian citizens fully began when the
regulations of 2001 came into effect (April 2001). Romania, however, although it
was formally on the “white” visa list, was conditioned by one more Commission
Report, one more Commission Recommendation for the revision of the 2001
Regulation, and a decision form the Council Regulation (Council regulation no.
2414/2001). So the abolishment of the visa regime for Romania finally came about
more than half a year after Bulgaria — in the beginning of 2002.29
Generally speaking, the primary goal of the EU was to, before it opens its
borders for the free entrance of Romanians and Bulgarians, protect itself from the
illegal immigration of which Bulgaria and Romania would be either countries of
origin or countries of transit. In short, the EU asked these countries: to regulate the
problem of illegal immigration (through readmission contracts), and to secure
themselves from future illegal migrations (by efficient border control, reliable
traveling documents, harmonizing the visa regime towards third countries with the
European visa regime). As candidates for the liberalized EU visa regime, Bulgaria
and Romania carried out a number of concrete measures. 
a) Repatriation
In both countries, a series of readmission repatriation (return to citizenship)
agreements were in force (or in process of ratification). Those are bilateral
agreements which regulate the return of the illegal immigrants to the country of
origin. The two countries signed contracts with almost all EU countries, a few of
the candidate countries, and other third countries (especially ones with high
migration potential), as well as among each other. 
The obligation to return to the country of origin is usually applied to the
citizens of the signatory countries. However, Romania has taken on additional
commitments in agreements with a certain number of countries. It undertook the
obligation to receive back illegal immigrants who do not posses valid documents
if it is assumed that they are Romanian nationals, as well as citizens of third
countries in case the authorities of the interested state prove that the person came
from Romanian territory. 
The Commission warned Romania that the simplified procedure of
renouncement of Romanian citizenship, used by Romanian citizens in EU
29 COM(2001) 361 final, “Report from the Commission to the Council — Exemption of Romanian
citizens from visa requirement”, Brussels, 29/06/2001. Internet: 01/03/2003, http://europa.eu.
int/ eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2001/com2001_0361en01.pdf. COM(2001) 570 final — 2001/0231
(CNS), “Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the
third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders
and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement”, Official Journal of European
Communities, C 25 E, 29. I 2002, p. 495.
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countries as an opportunity to come back to the country of one’s origin was
unsustainable. Romania assumed the obligation to deny their citizens the
possibility of renouncing their citizenship, except in cases when they have already
acquired another citizenship, etc.
With a view to implement the readmission agreements and international
cooperation on combating illegal immigration, Romania signed bilateral
agreements with a number of EU member states on appointing a `home affairs`
attaché or police liaison officers. These persons are sent by Romania to its
diplomatic departments in EU member states for a limited period of time (1–3
months) with a status of military attaché.
b) Visa policy
Both countries were in the process of harmonizing their visa policies with EU
policy simultaneously with the decision to abolish the visa regime. Bulgaria
introduced a visa regime for citizens of a number of countries (e.g. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Ukraine, Russia), while it kept the visa free regime for the citizens of
FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and FYR Macedonia. The Romanian
government agreed to introduce a visa regime for Russians and Ukrainians before
the end of 2001 (unilaterally, unless a bilateral agreement is not reached before this
time), to require the Moldavians to posses a passport on entering Romania (on the
basis of the bilateral agreement between Romania and Moldavia, the citizens of
these two countries crossed the common border only with an identity document),
and that it will discuss introducing the visa regime for them, as well as for the
citizens of BiH, FR Yugoslavia, (SCG), FYR Macedonia and Turkey according to
further development of relations of the EU towards these countries.
In terms of procedures for issuing visas, Bulgaria set up a computerized Center
for Visas within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (connected also with the Ministry
of Interior) which collects data on visa applications from all Bulgarian diplomatic
and consular departments in the world, and which is connected with all the
Bulgarian border crosses. Romania was beginning to create a similar on-line
communication system which was in part financed by the PHARE program.
Both countries introduced legal measures (e.g. the Law on Foreigners)
canceling the option of issuing visas at the border except in extraordinary
circumstances.
c) Security of documents
Security and reliability of documents (identity documents and passports) is an
EU requirement. In order to satisfy the EU standards regarding the security
measures against forging of documents, Bulgaria first adopted a new Law on
Personal Documents in April 1999, which introduced a new type of passport for its
citizens with numerous characteristics which prevent forging, and until December
2002 finished exchanging old passports for new passports. Bulgaria improved the
security of personal documents of foreigners, refugees and eupatrids (persons with
79
no country affiliation). Besides that, Bulgaria prescribed a more rigorous procedure
in the case of lost or stolen passports, and instituted a computerized Information
System for the issue of personal documents which collects data on non-valid
documents and which is connected (on-line) with all border crossings.
As far as Romania is concerned, the Commission in its first report judged that
the Romanian national data base on issued passports and identity documents is not
centralized, that the Romanian passport is still not harmonized with EU standards,
and that the procedure of replacing it with a more secure document must be
finished by May 2004. In its second report the Commission welcomed the
Regulation passed by the Romanian government on the replacement of existing
passports of citizens, refugees and eupatrids with a new type of passport which has
additional security characteristics. 
Bulgaria introduced provisions for harsher punishment of forgers and abuse of
personal documents in its criminal law, while Romania committed itself to doing so.
d) Control and supervision of border crossing
During the Commission’s report on Bulgaria, it was in the middle of replacing
a conscripted border service with a professional border police (National Border
Police) for which it established a Center for Specialization and Professional
Training. Bulgaria, partly with the funds from the PHARE program, introduced a
computerized system for monitoring border crossings. Also, Bulgaria adapted
border crossing at the request that the Ministry of Interior, through an appropriate
information system, is consulted on potential limitations upon entering the country,
and that visa validity is checked via the on-line connection with the Center for
Visas of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Commission positively assessed that
Bulgaria maintains satisfactory border cooperation based on bilateral agreements
with Greece, Romania, Turkey, FR Yugoslavia (SCG) and FYR Macedonia. 
In the case of Romania, the Commission in its first report, identified that the
implementation of investment programs connected to border control were delayed,
that there is a lack of technical equipment to monitor border crossings, and that it
is a consequence of a lack of financial resources. In the second report the
Commission welcomed the passing of the Special Order on Romanian Border and
the Special Order on the Organization and Functioning of the Border Police, which
started the process of modernizing the Romanian Border Police, modeled after EU
member states. The Commission noticed that the government made significant
progress in terms of investing in the equipment, which increased operational
capacity and was confirmed by statistical data. The Romanian government agreed
to draw to a close in the shortest possible period the obligation of forming a
strategy for integrated border management, and consider adopting the agreement
on cooperation of border management with EU member states as well as other
neighboring countries.
An important question to which the Commission pays attention to is the issue
of corruption on border crossings. The Commission welcomed the introduction of
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disciplinary measures by Bulgaria which resolved a number of corruption cases at
the border. Simultaneously, the Commission pointed to a big problem at Romanian
border crossings, the importance of combating it, and the need for cooperation with
neighboring countries. In the second report on Romania, the Commission
“expressed hope” that actions taken regarding the fight against corruption will
yield results. Romania agreed to adopt a comprehensive plan for combating
corruption. 
e) Other measures of migration policy
Although everything above indirectly relates to migration policy, we will state
several measures which are directly dealing with it. Bulgaria introduced more
rigorous sanctions for illegal immigration regarding those committing the crime as
well as accomplices (e.g. transporters, tourist agencies, etc.). Romania committed
itself to raising punishments for illegal immigrants of Romanian origin whose
destination is one of the EU countries and increase control of activities oriented
towards potential migrations (e.g. international tourism).
In the interim between the first and second reports, Romania passed the Law
on Foreigners (May 2001), because the Commission in its first report warned of
that legal framework regarding illegal immigration was non-existent and that
existing laws were outdated. The Commission pointed out that compared to the
other candidates for EU membership, there is a high level of asylum demand from
Romanian citizens in the EU. 
Among several additional measures recommended by the Commission to the
authorities of these two countries, is that there is a necessity to inform their citizens
on the precise content of the liberalized EU visa regime. The Commission finds it
very important that there be an understanding of what the liberalized EU visa
regime is, and in particular what it is not. This applies to the liberalized visa regime
towards a third country for a stay of up to three months (exceptionally for longer
periods), and that longer stay visas are still in jurisdiction for national bodies of
member states. In sum, it could be said that Romania met the EU standards to a
lesser degree than Bulgaria. Most of the activities that Bulgaria has completed in
this regard, were in Romania, at the moment of writing the Commission’s Report,
either at the beginning or on going. By suggesting that the visa regime is abolished
for Romanians, the Commission had in mind that it might encourage Romanian
citizens to “take advantage of the new situation”, but it concluded that it does not
expect an enormous increase in the number of illegal residents from Romania.
Finally, the Commission perceived the situation in a wider context — in the context
of EU enlargement, the future accession of Romania, the political importance of
this issue in Romania, as well as pressures of public opinion which saw keeping
the visa regime for the Romanians and abolishing it for Bulgarians as
discrimination and humiliation.
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SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO — CONDITIONS FOR 
THE “WHITE SCHENGEN LIST”
by
Milorad Ivanović1
Negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the
European Union will include the issues for which successful solutions depend on
the EU’s decision to abolish visas for the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro. The
European Union classifies these issues in the group titled “Justice, Freedom and
Security”. The essence of this group, from the point of abolishing visas, contains
four areas, which together are called: “control and prevention of illegal migration”.
These four areas are: visas, migration, asylum and border control. 
If Serbia and Montenegro accomplishes significant success in reforms in these
four areas, i.e. if the effect of reforms is the efficient combating of illegal
migrations of the citizens of SCG, as well as foreigners, crossing its territory
illegally towards the EU member states, then it can be expected for our country to
be placed on the positive list of the EU’s visa regime. In other words, its citizens
will be exempt from visa requirements for a stay on the territory of Schengen
Agreement member countries, for up to three months. The reforms practically
mean: the harmonization of existing standards of SCG (regulations, institutions and
their practices) with European Union standards in the aforementioned four areas.
The reform process until now was not suitably coordinated and much slower
than the country’s existing potential allows (we have experts in all of these areas,
capable of offering solutions according to the highest standards). Negotiations for
the Stabilization and Association Agreement represent a chance to begin serious,
well-coordinated and, therefore faster work on reforms in all of the aforementioned
areas. The negotiations and the reforms will create a harmonized dynamic of
change, which must lead to positive results. In doing so SCG can count on the full
1 Consultant of the Group 484.
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support of the European Union and other European organizations of both a wider
and narrower regional character. 
For several years now, the international community and especially the
European Union, have undertaken concrete measures and have invested
considerable financial means in order to create better conditions for the reform
process in in Serbia and Montenegro. This is manifested through a series of EU
projects for training, i.e. introducing the representatives of the authoritative bodies
and institutions, but also the general public with the standards of the European
Union. The CARDS regional program whose aim is to provide education on EU
standards in the areas of visas, asylum and migrations is in its final stage, and a
similar CARDS project in the area of integrated border management is the
beginning of its realization. 
Serbia and Montenegro could significantly improve its position with respect to
relations with the European Union, when it comes to prospects for abolishing visas
for its citizens to travel to the territory of the Union, if the reforms in the following
areas were successful: 
In the area of visas:
It is necessary to adopt new laws and acts which, according to EU standards,
regulate conditions for the entrance and stay of foreigners, including the issuing of
visas to foreigners;
On the basis of these regulations, to establish an efficient and functional
mechanism for issuing visas which secures the connection between all governing
bodies involved in the process of issuing visas; 
These regulations and mechanisms should provide the issuing of a secure visa
which would meet the highest standards against forgery;
The visa regime of Serbia and Montenegro toward other countries should be
fully harmonized within the country (the existing differences in Montenegro and
Serbia should be resolved). 
The visa regime of Serbia and Montenegro should have a constant tendency of
harmonizing with the visa regime of the European Union (it should be careful that
premature harmonization does not jeopardize the country’s interest in bilateral
relations with other third countries). 
In the area of asylum:
It is necessary to complete the process of adopting new regulations (together
with the framework law on asylum of Serbia and Montenegro, which was put into
power in March 2005, it is necessary to pass laws on asylum on republican levels
in Serbia and Montenegro, as well as in series of sub-legal acts;
On the basis of these regulations it is necessary to establish a new (nonexistent
in SCG now) asylum system, which would ensure efficient protection of all those
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foreigners who, according to all international regulations, fulfill the conditions for
negotiation of refugee status. 
In the area of migration:
Adopt regulations regardine the movement and stay of foreigners in
accordance with EU standards;
Establish a mechanism for migration control (both for its own citizens and
foreigners) which would, as a consequence, significantly decrease the presence of
illegal migrants on the territory of the European Union, originating from SCG, and
those who reach the EU through or over its territory;
Continue with signing, and efficient enforcement of readmission agreements
with EU member countries (on admission of its own citizens and foreigners who
reached the territory of the EU, and illegally stay there, from the territory of SCG);
SCG needs to bring new regulations on issuing travel documents of its own
citizens and on the basis of them, begin issuing new secure passports, protected
from forgery according to the highest standards. 
In the area of border control:
It is necessary to adopt regulations which would, on the basis of European
Union standards, create conditions for establishing a system of integrated border
management. This means that border control will be secured through the
coordination of all bodies participating in controlling the movement of people and
goods across the border. The aim is for the border to be open for all who meet the
conditions for crossing it and closed for all unwanted persons and goods which do
not meet the criteria for import or export. 
All the aforementioned conditions are the minimum for what must be met in
order to create the conditions necessary for a positive decision from the EU on
abolishing visas. However, it is most important that all measures applied in practice
be efficient and should guarantee the combat of illegal migrations towards the
European Union. When a country does not represent a risk for the European Union
from the point of illegal migrations, then it has good chances for its citizens to
travel free on the Union’s territory.
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CURRENT ISSUES IN REFORMING THE VISA SYSTEM IN
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
by
Vlado Ljubojević1
It is undeniable that the full liberalization of the visa regime with other states
is a priority of all Western Balkan countries because the restrictive visa regime
affects all categories of citizens by limiting one of the basic attainments of the
modern democratic society — the freedom of movement. National strategies of a
Western Balkans for liberalizing the visa regime with the European Union (EU)
and neighboring countries are similar in the area which regards the procedure of
harmonization of national rules and practice of EU standards, but different in terms
of ways, quality and deadlines met in reaching those standards.
Intensive preparation for establishing a more suitable political and legislative
framework for the liberalization of the visa regime and further reforms in that area
in Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) started during 2002 and 2003. The SCG Council
of Ministers brought a decision on the unilateral abolishment of visas for the
citizens of the 40 most developed countries in the world, including all EU member
states and then candidate countries. In that way the proclaimed visa regime became
a clear signal and expression of the international position and orientation of SCG.
On the other hand, that decision was an important step towards the harmonization
of the visa regime in SCG where objectively, there are certain differences in
regarding the entry and stay of foreigners (the citizens of Russia, Ukraine and
Albania enter Montenegro without visas and Serbia with visas, and the citizens of
the EU member states and former Yugoslav republics, except BiH can enter
Montenegro with their identity documents and Serbia with a passport).
In the aim of further harmonization, a procedure was started on the level of the
state union for signing agreements with Russia and Ukraine on the mutual traveling
of their citizens. From our side there is a proposal to simultaneously sign bilateral
agreements readmission on which Russia and Ukraine are still in consultation with
1 Minister plenipotentiary, Serbia and Montenegro Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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their authorities. Harmonization of the visa regime is very important for SCG, and
the EU consistently insists on it because existing differences create problems in
practice. For example, when a foreigner enters Montenegro without a visa and
continues to Serbia where he needs a visa which he does not have.
Having in mind the importance of the regional aspect of the policy of abolishing
visas for the facilitation of the flow of goods, people and services, a faster process of
European integration and convergence of the countries of the region to the EU, SCG
has liberalized the visa regime with neighboring countries except with Albania which
has a free visa regime with Montenegro but not with Serbia.
In order to improve the control of illegal migration, which goes through SCG
to EU countries. Agreements with many African and Asian countries, where
traditionally the biggest number of migrants originated, were revoked.
As a reaction to the decision of SCG on the unilateral abolishment of visas for
the citizens of 40 countries, some EU member states relaxed visa requirements to
citizens of SCG. An Agreement on Terms of Traveling was signed with Hungary
and it came into power on October 22, 2004. based on this agreement, SCG citizens
get visas through a simplified procedure for a longer period of time without taxes,
and transit through Hungarian territory is done without a Hungarian national visa,
in case they have a valid Schengen visa or a residence permit in some of the
countries of the Schengen agreement. 
According to the conclusion of the Slovenian government on June 9, 2003 the
citizens of SCG are allowed transit and short stays to 90 days on the territory of the
Republic of Slovenia, without the obligation of having a Slovenian visa, in the case
they have a valid Schengen visa or a residence permit in some of the countries of
the Schengen agreement. 
Through government regulations and decisions, Poland, Slovakia and the
Czech Republic, in the period of 2004–2006, have cancelled visa taxes for the
citizens of SCG.
Based on the Regulation of the SCG Council of Ministers on Issuing
Diplomatic and Official Passports from 2003, which considerably decreased the
number of users of those passports because it ascribed a more restrictive procedure
for their issuing, SCG has until now signed 8 bilateral agreements with EU
countries on canceling visas for SCG diplomatic and official passports (Austria,
Greece, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Cyprus) and, with the other
8 countries the negotiations for signing the agreement are in progress.
The primary orientation of SCG state bodies and the non-governmental sector
is the full liberalization of the visa regime with the EU for all categories of citizens
of SCG, i.e. entering the “positive” Schengen list. Thanks to information campaigns
on this issue, our citizens are mostly familiar with the fact that for moving towards
this list certain conditions need to be met and European standards reached in many
areas which are relevant for control and combating illegal migrations. It is a long
term process which will be done by experts in different areas. For now, modest
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results are achieved but they will in a short time, when the ongoing projects are
completed, be more positive. What is encouraging is that from the Ministry of
Interior (MUP) of Serbia positive signs come in terms of institutionalizing European
integration, bilateral cooperation with certain countries of the EU and establishing a
more functional coordination with other ministries and institutions in SCG.
In short, in the area of visa regime, the following has been done. Inter-
department task force coordinated the Draft of the Law on Foreigners on the level
of state union which regulates the subjects of issuing visas and stay of foreigners
on the territory of SCG. The Draft includes all relevant EU standards in the area of
visas. The work should have been completed several months ago, but it was not for
reasons other than expert characteristics. Now the faith of that Draft depends on the
outcome of the referendum in Montenegro, when it will be seen whether there is a
need for the Law on Foreigners on the level of the state union or the Draft will,
with certain corrections, become the Law on Foreigners of the Republic of Serbia.
The main provisions which regulate the matters of issuing visas in diplomatic
consular departments (DCD) of SCG are prepared in the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs (MFA) in the form of a draft, as well as the complete material of the general
solution for information-technical system in the area of visas, which was done by
MUP of the Republic of Serbia and SCG MFA and it entails the latest and standards
of the EU. The normative part of adjusting the visa system to the EU’s standards
can be finished relatively fast. The financial support for the development of the
information-technical system and training of officers for the new approach to
issuing visas, before all in the SCG DCDs, remains a priority.
According to EU policy towards the Western Balkans, and after an objective
evaluation of what was done in the control of illegal migrations, the European
Commission initiated preliminary talks on the Common Agreement on
Readmission and Agreement on Visa Flexibilities for the citizens of SCG, which
were held in Brussels on May 25–26, 2006.
Due to a comprehensive information exchange, the delegations of the
European Commission and SCG harmonized positions during the talks on all basic
principles and important demands for closing the agreements. The representatives
of the European Commission judged the demands of SCG as realistic and
acceptable. Our side suggested a wider category of citizens, from students,
scientific and cultural workers, athletes, journalists, state officials, persons
traveling to visit close relatives, to business people and drivers in transport
companies, which can count on the following visa flexibilities: decrease in the
number of documents which are submitted with the application, issuing visas for a
longer period of time, including multiple visas for the duration of 1 to 5 years, and
a shorter period of data processing and cheaper or free visas.
The European Commission already notified the EU Council with a positive
recommendation. It is expected that the EU Council, at the latest in July, will issue
a mandate for negotiations in signing the agreement. The negotiations could start
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in the second half of this year. They will be only technical in nature because
agreements have already been reached on all key issues.
Recently, the EU Council allowed the increase of the costs for processing
applications for issuing the Schengen visa from 35 to 60 euro. The decision comes
into force on January 1, 2007, but its application is postponed for a year for
countries which by the end of 2006, receive the mandate from the EU Council to
start negotiations on Agreement on Visa Flexibilities with the EU, and after signing
the agreement the prices stipulated in the agreement will apply.
EU visa relaxations for citizens of SCG are a realistic result of what has been
done in SCG so far, and what could be achieved. A lot of effort and coordinated
political, diplomatic and expert authorities expect us to be on the way to the
“positive” Schengen list.
In February 2005, the SCG Council of Ministers instructed the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the State union (MFA) to, in cooperation with the authorized bodies
of member states, take necessary measures for harmonization of the visa system of
SCG with Schengen standards. Undertaken activities included these measures:
— on the normative plan, harmonization of legal acts of SCG in the area of visas
with EU standards,
— harmonization of the SCG visa system,
— defining the model for information systems and creating technical conditions
for its applications,
— signing the agreement on the abolishment of visas with the countries of the EU
for holders of diplomatic and official SCG passports, and
— relaxation of the EU visa regime for certain categories of SCG citizens.
Normative activities — a Draft of the Law on Visa Systems of the SCG is made
in the MFA which includes all relevant Schengen standards and handed to the MUPs
of Serbia and Montenegro for further synchronization. Schengen standards are a part
of the Draft of the new Law on Visa Systems and the Law on Foreigners.
Harmonization of the SCG visa system — Following the principles from the
European Partnership and the Feasibility Study, the EU in the area of visas,
migrations, asylum and integrated border management, negotiates with SCG
according to the one track principle, which means that Serbia and Montenegro has a
unified position on every question which is being negotiated. In past negotiations, the
harmonization of the visa system in SCG was the problem up on which the EU
insisted the most. Some differences have been removed and the following needs to
be done — establish a visa regime towards Russia, Ukraine, Albania (with
Montenegro visa free, with Serbia visa regime) and citizens of the former Yugoslav
republics, except BiH (for entering Montenegro they need only the identity card or
Serbia passport). With Russia and Ukraine the texts of the agreement on the mutual
travel of citizens have been exchanged, with which in the case of Serbia, a visa free
regime will be established with these two countries. For final harmonization it is
needed to remove differences with Albania and former Yugoslav republics.
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Defining the model of information systems and creating technical conditions for
its application — Based on the experiences of some European countries (Hungary,
Austria, FR Germany), MFA and MUP of RS created joint material on structure of
the IT system in SCG. The talks with the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR)
are initiated for financing this project, but for its realization it is necessary to assure
certain conditions, before all the legal framework (adopting the Law on Visa Systems
or Foreigners which includes provisions on IT system), as well as the unique position
of Serbia and Montenegro regarding the IT system.
Signing the agreement on the abolishment of visas with the countries of the EU
for the holders of diplomatic and official SCG passports — The Regulation of
MFA on Issuing Diplomatic and Official Passports from 2003, the number of
holders of diplomatic and official passports of SCG is limited in relation to
previous practice which enabled the start of negotiations with the EU countries on
the agreement on abolishment of visas for this type of passport.
Relaxation of the EU visa regime for certain categories of SCG citizens — The
EU Commission Communication from January 27th, 2006, announced separate
negotiations with the countries of the Western Balkans on visa relaxation for certain
categories of citizens. As primary conditions for the successful completion of
negotiations, the EU Commission has stated in the agreements on readmission, the
issue of efficient border management, police training and the protection of
documents. It is planned that together with the agreement on visa relaxation, the
common agreement with the EU on readmission is signed.
The Commission Communication from January 27, 2006 brings the proposal
for establishing a visa free regime for small border traffic on external borders of
the EU, including the borders with the countries of the Western Balkans. According
to that proposal, the inhabitants of the border areas could cross the border using
permits for small border traffic. This proposal, for SCG, for now applies only to the
border with Hungary, for persons who have a legitimate need to cross the border
often for social, cultural and economic reasons. With regard to this, SCG must
ensure strong guarantees that this relaxation will not be abused for the purpose of
illegal migration and organized crime, which will be a sort of test of our readiness
and abilities.
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THE VISA REGIME IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:
DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STANDARDS 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
by
Zoran Perković1
Introduction
Support through intensifying the relations between the European Union and the
Western Balkan countries is built on experiences used in the process of the EU
enlargement, like the introduction of the European partnership. European partnership
stipulates long and short term priorities in activities which will support the
convergence toward the European Union.
Short term priorities for Bosnia and Herzegovina concern 16 areas, i.e.
conditions listed in the Feasibility Study published on November 18th, 2003. These
are related to the political situation in BiH, economy, security and progress in the
realization of technical conditions in the Stabilization and Association Agreement.
Among the short term priorities of the European Partnership and the
recommendations of the Feasibility Study is the establishment of an appropriate
structure for migration and asylum. The New Law on the Movement and Stay of
Foreigners and Asylum, as well as the efficient asylum and migration state policy is
seen as a mid-term priority. Also, improvement of administrative capacities of the
visa regime with an emphasis on checking visa applications is another mid-term
priority.
Liberalization of the visa regime with countries of the European Union is one of
the strategic priorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. BiH citizens are required to hold
a visa for EU countries. This situation is a consequence of the risk of migration due
to a high number of refugees and displaced people, and high unemployment rate
1 Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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caused by poor economic performance in post-war BiH. In the past few years,
pressure for abolishing or alleviating the visa regime is increasing. According to the
official data, in 2004 47 million people are registered to have entered or left the
territory of BiH. 10,469 people were denied entry in BiH because they did not meet
the required criteria for entry. 
“Liberalizing the visa regime of the EU is a long term goal for Brussels, but the
countries of the Western Balkans cannot expect that it will happen before they
reach the later stages in negotiations for full membership in the EU, i.e. before they
submit their candidacy”, Franco Frattini, vice-president of the European
Commission stated in an interview on November 30th, 2005.
Today in BiH, there is an awareness of the need for development of
administrative capacities as well as the realization the advance in negotiations
towards the liberalization of the visa regime will depend on each country
individually following their reforms in the administration of justice and the fight
against illegal immigration, human trafficking and organized crime.
Institutional framework
Institutions directly involved in carrying out the activities related to the visa
regime in BiH are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, State Border
Service as well as the administration within the Ministry of Interior.
The BiH Council of Ministers is in charge of making decisions on countries
whose citizens are exempt from the visa regime up on entering, leaving and transiting
through BiH. At the BiH level a central data base (CIPS) on issued identity
documents for citizens of BiH (identity card, passport, driver’s license, etc.) was set
up. These documents are issued in accordance to the ICAO standard, based on
ascribed procedure and identification control. Bosnia and Herzegovina issues
personal documents complying with the highest standards of protection. In this way
full control is maintained over the issued documents, and the data are centralized and
available only to bodies and institutions directly involved in their issuing and control.
The BiH Ministry for Foreign Affairs has 44 diplomatic-consular departments
abroad authorized to issue visas. BiH DCDs forward all the visa applications,
including the accompanying documents to the Ministry of Interior for inspection.
Since November 1, 2004 visas are electronically processed when a DCD sends the
data directly to the BiH Ministry of Interior for inspection. In this stage of system
development, the inspection consists of controlling whether the person is
prohibited to enter BiH, if there is a court ruling that found that person guilty of a
crime committed in BiH, and if Interpol has issued a warrant for that person’s
arrest. Strengthening the position of the Ministry of Interior creates a base for the
future improvement in the areas of migrations and visas.
The Consular department of the BiH MFA does not have access to the system,
but receives the information only when the visa is printed. The consular staff of the
BiH MFA usually issues visas without additional checks unless there are
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complaints in the process of consultation. In this way, there is no element of
evaluation in the veracity of the statement according to personal judgment.
The State Border Service in BiH was established in 2000. The establishment of
this Service led to the decrease in the number of the illegal migrants in the period
between 2003 and 2004. In 2002, the year that preceded the Law on the Movement
and Stay of Foreigners and Asylum (“Službeni glasnik”, no. 29/03 and 4/04); the
number of apprehended illegal migrants was around 2,500. With the introduction
of the new measures, the number of illegal migrants declined sharply so in the first
half of 2004 only 133 persons were arrested for crossing the border with an aim of
illegal migration. In 2004, a total of 446 persons were expelled from BiH. 
The State Border Service is in charge of issuing visas at the border. Visas are
issued on the 14 bigger border crosses which are connected with the electronic visa
system (CIPS). In 2004, 6,000 visas were issued at the border and half were issued
to officials of new EU member states. In 2005, around 2,800 visas were issued at
the border, while in the first quarter of 2006 (1/1 to 31/4) a total of 226 visas were
issued. This drastic decrease in the number of visas issued at the border was mainly
due to stricter requirements for visa issuing at the border, the one-sided
abolishment of visas towards the 10 new EU member states and the expansion of
the diplomatic-consular network of BiH. Following the recommendation of the
BiH MFA, on the border crossing a single entry visa can be issued and the duration
of stay cannot exceed 15 days. 
Cooperation between all governmental bodies involved in the process of
issuing visas is a precondition for the efficient fulfillment of obligations set by
current regulations. So, cooperation between the MFA and Ministry of Interior is
of the utmost importance. Especially when the Ministry of Interior assumes the
responsibilities which now lie in the offices for foreigners and in canton ministries
of internal affairs in the BiH Federation and centers for public security in
Republika Srpska.
In order for the bodies in charge of visas to work efficiently and in a way for
the country to have reliable visa regime, departments and institutions are equipped,
both with personnel and technology, to provide quality services related to the BiH
visa regime. BiH State Border Service is considered to be among of the better ones
in South-East Europe.
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has, together with the CIPS, created a
temporary data base of issued visas. This program includes the entry of applications
for visas, control in the foreigner register and the electronic printing of the stickers.
It has already showed very positive results. The regular training of staff employed
in issuing visas is performed in cooperation with the IOM. 
Legal framework
The visa regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina is arranged according to the Law
on the Movement and Stay of Foreigners and Asylum which was enacted by the
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BiH Parliament in October 2003. This law replaced the Law on Immigration and
Asylum from 1999.
Law on the Movement and Stay of Foreigners and Asylum (here after: Law on
Foreigners) regulates conditions and procedures for the entry and stay of foreigners
in BiH, reasons for declining the permission of entry and stay, reasons for canceling
the residence permit, expulsion from BiH, the procedure for applying for asylum,
granting of asylum, the seizure of it, the jurisdiction of governmental bodies
important for the implementation of this law, and other issues connected to the
asylum, stay and movement of foreigners.
Article 23 of the Law on Foreigners states that a visa is a permit which allows
entry and stay on the territory of BiH, as well as transit through the territory of BiH
during a time period. A foreigner can obtain a visa if they comply with the general
conditions of entry, unless he/she is not registered as an international lawbreaker
with the authorities. 
Conditions and procedures for entering BiH , as well as other issues concerning
the entry of foreigners, issuing visas on the borders, form and content of the
guarantees for entering BiH are further regulated by the Code on Conditions and
Procedures for the Entry and Stay of Foreigners (“Sluzbeni glasnik BiH”, no. 4/05).
The Code on Conditions and Procedures for Issuing Visas to Foreigners,
Extension and Annulment of Visas, Types of Visas and Records of Visas Issued from
November 8th, 2004 regulates in more detail the questions of issuing (extending)
visas, types of visas, form and content of the visa sticker, as well as other issues
important for issuing visas. On November 9th, 2004, the Instruction for the
Procedure of Issuing Visas in the Diplomatic-Consular Departments of BiH was
adopted. The aim of regulating the procedure of processing visa applications in the
above-mentioned way was the establishment of a stricter criteria for entering BiH
for citizens of countries with high migration, as wellas prevention of illegal
immigration and harmonization of the way these areas are approached with
countries of the Schengen Agreement.
Foreigners entering BiH must hold a valid passport and visa, unless it is not
otherwise stipulated by the international agreement or the decision of the Council
of Ministers of BiH. Also, foreigners must hold documents which are related to the
reasons and conditions of their stay and be able to provide evidence of means of
supporting themselves and a guarantee for repatriation. 
Following the suggestion of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the Council of
Ministers brings the decision on states whose citizens are exempted from the
obligation of having a visa on entering BiH. They can stay in BiH up to 90 days.
The Council of Ministers is also responsible for exempting individuals from the
obligation of having visas whose refugee status has been recognized by other
countries.
BiH is still in the process of harmonizing its policy with the visa policy of the
European Union. Concerning the visa applications, BiH visa policy has classified
it in three parts, from A to C. Group A comprises the countries with which BiH has
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the most liberal visa policy, and group C comprises countries with a high migration
risk (mostly African and Asian countries). With the latter, a strict visa regime is
instituted.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has started the process of full harmonization of its
own visa policy with the policy of the EU. This harmonization is in part
conditioned and limited by BiH’s own national interests, which means that BiH
does not necessarily have to reach complete harmonization with the EU’s visa
policy before it starts accession negotiations.
a) Types of visas
An important step on the road to the harmonization of BiH legislature with EU
legislature in visa policy is the preparation of the new Law on Changes and
Supplements to the Law on the Movement and Stay of Foreigners and Asylum. The
new law stipulates the introduction of Schengen visas with the use of letters: A
(airport transit visa), B (transit visa), C (short stay visa) and D (country visa for
long stays). In this way the types and categories of visas would fully comply with
the EU’s acquis. 
An airport transit visa (visa A) will be issued to foreigners who during their
uninterrupted flight do not leave the transit area of the airport, in cases when the
Council of Ministers of BiH exclusively decides that citizens of certain countries
need to hold airport transit visas. 
Transit visa (visa B) will be issued for one, two or in exceptional cases, more
transits. The total time of stay on the territory of BiH during one transit journey
cannot be more than five days, and transit visa will be issued only in case the
foreigner gives the evidence that he/she will be admitted in the country he/she is
entering from BiH.
Short stay visa (visa C) will be issued for one or more entries into the country
proviso that none of the uninterrupted stays or the total of several consecutive stays
in BiH exceeds 90 days in the period of six months starting from the first day. Short
term visas are issued for tourist, business, personal and other types of traveling.
Country visa for long stay (visa D) is issued for one or more entries and enables
the foreigner an uninterrupted stay on the territory of BiH for six months within the
period of one year, starting from the date of the first entry. A long stay visa is issued
for a period that does not exceed one year. The special legal act plans in greater
detail the criteria for issuing long term visas. 
b) The procedure for issuing visas 
Visas for entering BiH are issued by BiH DCD abroad for one or more entries
in BiH and in exceptional circumstances visas can be issued by the BiH State
Border Service (on the recommendation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of
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BiH). Visas that allow multiple entries in BiH are not to exceed one year, and the
single stay cannot be longer than 90 days. 
Before issuing the visa, an inspection is performed by the BiH Ministry of
Interior whether the applicant is on the list of individuals who are expelled from
BiH, whose stay has been terminated or denied entrance in BiH. The introduction
of electronic data analysis has shortened the procedure of issuing visas to two days.
The system is installed in DCD and the stickers are printed. The data is submitted
to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for control. DCDs are informed of the procedure
and can supervise this activity. Also, certain bodies within the BiH State Border
Service have access to the data base of issued visas. Issued visas have an area
which can be read manually.
Addendums further clarify the conditions and procedures for issuing
(extending) visas, types of visas, form and content of the visa sticker, as well as
other issues relevant for the issuing of the visas. 
The Directions for procedure of issuing visas in the BiH diplomatic-consular
departments regulate the procedure of processing visa applications and the way
applications are processed in BiH diplomatic-consular departments. 
Foreign citizens applying for visas need to fill in the form “Application for
issuing visas to foreign citizens”. The application is submitted in person and in
advance to BiH DCD. The applicant should provide a photo, passport, and proof of
a paid fee together with the documentation required for a certain type of visa. 
The authorized person at the DCD, according to the rules of BiH MFA and
international practice, checks whether the passport for which the visa is requested
is regular and valid, if the required documents are submitted and appropriate and if
there exists any legal impediment for issuing visas. “Regular passports” mean that
they are not damaged, contains all the numbered pages, that data and information
are clear, without smudges or traces of erased data, that the photograph is clearly
of the person holding the passport, and if there were any changes in the passport
which confirms that the corrections were done by the authorities and that they are
regularly stamped and signed. When a “valid passport” is in question it means that
it has been issued by the official body, that it allows the person to return to the
country that issued it or allows the person to enter the third country, and the validity
period is at least 90 days longer than the visa validity period.
The letter of guarantee which was sent by the BiH citizen or a foreigner that
has a granted permanent or temporary stay in BiH must be verified by the
organizational unit of the Ministry of Interior, or an authorized body. Business
invitation has to be verified by the organizational unit of the Ministry of Interior or
the authorized chamber of commerce according to the seat of the invitee. 
General medical insurance does not exist for foreigners. A foreigner can be
insured only against accidents. BiH does not issue health travel insurance. Instead
of that, evidence is needed for having 150.000 a day which is considered enough
for covering possible medical costs. There is no insurance company which deals
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with medical insurance on the state level, since the medical system is on the level
of entities. 
Article 7, Directions for procedures of issuing visas, stipulates that when the
application is submitted an interview must be conducted with the applicant. It
further states that the primary goal of conducting the interview with the applicant
is the fight against illegal migrations. Diplomatic-consular departments bear the
full responsibility in judging whether there is a risk of immigration. Detail
assessment of the validity of the submitted documentation and responses given
during the interview serve to discover those applicants who want to immigrate to
the country using a tourist visit, study, business or family visit as a reason.
If there is a doubt in the authenticity of the submitted documents, i.e. if the
applicant did not submit strong enough evidence that he/she will return to the
country of residence, and the diplomatic-consular department can deny him/her a
visa. 
Rejected applications are kept separately because they can be used as a basis
for an interview if the same person applied again but with an invitation from a
different person or company. It would be useful to keep a separate file of the
persons or companies which appear more often on guarantees and invitations; and
in case of suspicion notify the headquarters.  
c) Denial of visa application
According to the Article 10, procedures for issuing visas, a foreign citizen will
not be granted a visa:
— if he/she in his application did not submit documentation required for the type
of visa being asked;
— if he/she, according to the information submitted to the DCD, has been
convicted of a felony;
— if there is a decision of expelling or banning a person from entering BiH,
through the duration of that decision;
— if he/she asks for a transit visa and does not have entry visa for the neighboring
country when it is needed;
— if he/she does not have the proof of inoculation and comes from a territory
where there is an epidemic of a contagious disease and for which, according to
the decision of the authorities, proof of inoculation is needed for travel; 
— to the person which has been convicted of a war crime or other crimes against
humanity and international law;
— if it is in the security interests of BiH;
— if an authorized person in BiH DCD after the interview and controls
determines that there are no justifiable reasons for issuing a visa.
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The decision to decline the visa application is conveyed to the applicant
verbally. The decision is not explained and is not subject to a law suit. 
d) Annulment, canceling and shortening of the visa validity period
A visa is annulled if it is established that the visa was not issued according to
the current law. A visa is annulled by the authorized Board by stamping the
passport with “annulled” on the visa sticker. If the State Border Service finds,
during the checking procedure, that the visa is falsified, they are obliged to annul
the visa momentarily. The decision to annul the visa is not subject to law suit.
A visa is canceled:
— when a foreigner does not respect the constitutional order and regulations of
BiH, its entities and Brcko District, or engages in action which threatens the
constitutional system and security in BiH, or when the foreigner is a member
of an organization which is involved in such activities;
— when a foreigner threatens the state interests of BiH with criminal actions; 
— when a foreigner organizes illegal entry, stay and leaving of BiH for
individuals or groups, or participates in human trafficking;
— when a foreigner breaks or attempts to break the rules of crossing the BiH state
border;
— when the circumstances under which a visa was issued have changed to the
extent that it denies any possibility for the issue of the visa;
— when a foreigner intentionally provides false data important in order to obtain
a visa;
— when a foreigner performs activities which require a work permit and he/she
does not have one;
— when the presence of a foreigner presents a danger for public peace and the
national security of BiH.
The State Border Service is authorized to cancel a visa on the border crossing
only in case it has been proven that the visa has been falsified. In other cases, even
when the officer of DCD suspects the person carrying the visa has other motives
for entering countries apart from the ones stated on the visa, DCD is not authorized
to cancel the visa on the border crossing but it can start the procedure for canceling
the visa in the BiH MFA.
Systems 
CIPS (Citizen Identification and Protection System) is a computer program
which was initiated by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in BiH. It
relies on a network of data transmission covering the territory of the country and
consisting of central data bases of administrative and civilian nature.
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This modern, highly efficient network is organized on a three-level structure
(local-entity, Brcko District-state, level) and on the principle of distribution is
controlled from the Network Operation Center (NOC) established on the level of
the Ministry in Sarajevo, where the data is gathered. 
The central component — a visa electronic system server, is in the Ministry of
Civil Affairs. CIPS is an independent administrative organization within the Ministry
of Civil Affairs. The server is physically situated in CIPS, although all inspections are
performed by the Ministry of Interior. In the server are located both the central data
base of visas and visa applications. Within CIPS there is a back up system.
The system can be browsed using the name, surname, passport number and the
number on the visa sticker. Stickers are printed and have a zone which can be read
auto-matically. It is technically impossible to print a visa before authorization is
received, following consultations with the Ministry of Interior. All information
about declined visa applications are also entered in the system. Personal data of an
individual are available to all DCDs. For the time being, the system of electronic
issuing of visas can be used only until 17h CET. The intention is to develop a
system that can be operational in the evening and over the weekend. 
Within CIPS there is a possibility of introducing the Central Register of
Foreigners and biometric data base. Regarding the access to the data bases and
entering the data, the procedure of issuing visas regulates that the system of the
electronic issue of visas can be operated only by persons for which DCD has
secured a filled SGT form. 
The operation system works in the way that one person (the consular official)
has the right to enter data on visa applications in the system, inspect submitted visa
applications and print visa stickers. The chief of the consular department has access
to processed visas and approves the issue of each individual visa application
(“Decision”), and has the access to issued visas. 
In order to access the system the authorized officer has a password and he/she is
obliged to make sure that no one comes into possession of it, because only that person
is responsible for entering data under that password. In case that the incorrect
password is typed in three times, the system shuts down automatically.
After data entry is finished, pressing the command “Record” automatically
forward the application to the Ministry of Interior for inspection.
Strategy/priorities of BiH
Within the project “establishment of legal, regulatory and institutional
frameworks in areas of asylum, migration and visa issues matching the EU norms”
in the CARDS Regional Program 2002/2003, which was implemented under the
general coordination of the Swedish Migration Board (SMB), a Visa Module —
Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina was done.
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The Report contains recommendations, strategies and plans of implementation.
As a working document, the Report is a means and instruction for improving the
visa system in BiH according to the EU — Schengen standards.
Starting from the recommendations, strategies and plans of the implementation
specified in the Report and in cooperation with the experts from BiH and the
International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the following
priorities were set up:
— establishment of a legal and institutional framework, and technical and
administrative capacity building services and persons within the ministries
which participate in carrying out the visa regime;
— signing the agreement on readmission between BiH and countries of the EU,
as well as other countries;
— further strengthening and empowering of the State Border Service with a goal
of more efficient state control in carrying out the visa regime;
— harmonization of procedures of issuing visas with EU regulations;
— synchronization of the visa regime with the visa regime of EU member states
and signatories of the Schengen Agreement;
— participation in expert teams for the development of the Information System on
Migrations (ISM);
— training of officers in cooperation with the IOM on the basis of the CARDS
program.
Intensifying cooperation with neighboring countries and countries in the
region, coordinating the activities on liberalizing the visa regime towards the
countries of the Western Balkans and establishing a joint approach towards the EU
and member states on issues of common interest in the areas of visa policy remains
a firm commitment of BiH.
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VISA POLICY OR VISA POLITICS?
by
Julie Woloshin1
Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari argued in the run-up to the 2003
Thessaloniki Summit that a clear “signal of Europe’s commitment to the [Western
Balkans] would be if the European Union would ease and then lift the visa regime,
as it did with Croatia.”2 At the time, the EU had a policy to fully engage in the
region, and secure stability by offering EU perspective. The liberalizing of the visa
regime was presented as a prize to be won, if continued stability and reforms were
made to bring Justice and Home Affairs standards in line with those of the EU.
Using its stick — carrot policy, the EU reaffirmed at Thessaloniki the long
term goal of EU perspective, and when ready, promised visa liberalization, in
return for stability and a step closer towards European standards. However
security threats rocked two of Europe’s capitals, London and later Paris, in 2005,
and now Europe’s Ministers of Interiors are promoting their agendas and moving
away from the EU’s policy towards ensuring stability within the region through
sustained reforms. 
The visa policy towards the Western Balkans is increasingly becoming a
means for politicians to guard the internal security of their own countries, while
endangering the progress made and their past investments in the region. If the
politicians of the EU shift from using the visa policy for its intended purposes,
and rather to a game of ‘visa politics’ to suppress the fears of instability within
their own frontiers, the move towards a restrictive ‘Fortress Europe’, will
jeopardize the continuation of the reform path by countries whose legitimacies
will be questioned. 
1 The author is Foreign Policy Analyst/ Foreign Consultant to the Secretariat for European Affairs,
Government of the Republic of Macedonia.
2 Comment by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari (Crisis Group) “Give Balkan nations their
proper place in Europe”, International Herald Tribune, 21 June 2003. Available at http://www.
crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2236&l=1.
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Visa Free to Visa Fee
Through the implementation of the Schengen Treaty in 1995 and the creation
of a common visa policy3 the EU shifted its borders eastward and redefined its list
of friends by introducing the Schengen Black List.4 Although socialist Yugoslavia
had profited from a visa free regime with Europe, many of its newly-independent
democratic states were not so fortunate. Listed among the ‘condemned,’ were the
ex-Yugoslav republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro), and the Republic of Macedonia, alongside an
Albania that had since broken free from its Communist isolation under Enver
Hoxha. Croatia and Slovenia continued to travel visa-free to the EU. At a period
when the political systems were deteriorating, the countries of the EU modified
their visa policy towards the region to shelter their countries from the potential
flood of illegal immigration and criminals seeking to profit from the weak
structures. By 1995, with the Schengen treaty implemented, the member states
reaffirmed their common position.
The visa serves as a screen, through which consular staff can identify potential
immigration risks to member states, either as criminals or illegal immigrants. The
2001 “Schengen Visa Black list” defined the criteria for determining which
countries whose nationals would require a visa to enter the EU as “illegal
immigration, public policy and security, and the EU’s external relations with third
countries, with consideration also being given to the implications of regional
coherence and reciprocity.5” However, the visa requirement makes a clear
statement to the political relations between countries: the visa is the dividing line
between being a friend and an enemy.6
After the events of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004, the EU addressed the
growing need for security by developing its Hague Programme7 in late 2004, aimed
at bringing a closer co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs between member
states.8 The existing visa policy has been developed under Hague, and involves all
stages of immigration, with respect to the root causes of migration, entry and
admission policies and integration and return policies.”9 Its corresponding Action
plan lays out the priorities the EU has placed on these issues: security — the fight
3 See Common Visa Policy, http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/libe/elsj/zoom_in/11_en.htm.
4 Council Decision 2317/95 of 25 September 1995.
5 Council (EC) no. 539/2001, Schengen Visa Black list.
6 Interview with Sergio Carrera, Brussels, 6 July 2005.
7 The Hague Programme is a combination of the conclusions of the previous Tampere programme
with similar objectives, ambitions of the European Constitution, and public concerns.
8 The European Commission consulted the public on future guidelines for the new programme on the
establishment of an area for freedom, security, and justice, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/
news/consulting_public/tampere_ii/news_tampereii_en.htm
9 See Annex I, the Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European
Union, point 1.5 of the Presidency Conclusion of the Brussels European Council.
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against terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration.10 With a visa policy
deeply set in restrictive security measures, the EU led by its national politicians are
exchanging a realistic visa policy with that of a populist one.
The JHA Council resolutions11 of 27–28 April 2006 reinforced the EU’s focus
given to security within the Schengen-zone. The vote to increase the visa fee, from
35 to 60 euros, was “a consequence of the implementation of the Visa Information
System and the collection of biometric data from visa applicants.”12 Few groups will
receive visa fee waivers,13 and if the Council opens negotiations on visa facilitation
with a country will the increase be delayed for only a year.14 Although promising, the
process until the facilitated visa regime goes into effect, if passed, will be measured.
The EU’s Insecurities
After the tragedies of the July London bombings and the riots outside of Paris
in late 2005, coupled with the disasters of 11 September and 11 March, politicians
are compelled to address public fears of insecurity. Preservation of security has
topped national agendas as member states have experienced instability within their
frontiers, further endorsing their leaders’ commitment towards restrictive measures,
including a tightening visa policy. “If fears are fostered by politicians, this stresses
the need to have a frontier and justifies the use of visa,” to serve as a method to
enhance security.15 Increased document security with biometric identifiers and
information databases are exchanging fears for a false sense of security. Such
measures towards protection give the impression that if the normal flow of people
10 The Action plan includes: fundamental rights and citizenship — creating fully-fledged policies; the
fight against terrorism-working towards a global response; a common asylum area — establishing
an effective harmonised procedure in accordance with the Union’s values and humanitarian
tradition; migration management — defining a balanced approach; integration-maximising the
positive impact of migration on our society and economy; internal borders, external borders and
visas- developing an integrated management of external borders for a safer Union; privacy and
security in sharing information — striking the right balance; organised crime — developing a
strategic concept. Balzacq, Thierry and Sergio Carrera, Migration, Borders and Asylum: Trends
and Vulnerabilities in EU Policy, CEPS 2005 p. 6.
11 Council (EC) 8402/06 (Presse 106) Available at: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/newsWord/en/jha/89 81.doc.
12 The use of biometric identifiers in the Schengen visa and the development of Visa Information System
and Schengen Information System II are methods in which the EU is trying to prevent the unwanted
entry of criminals and other illegal immigrants.
13 The following groups will benefit from a visa fee waiver: children under 6 years old; school pupils,
students, post-graduate students and accompanying teachers who undertake trips for the purpose of
study or educational training; and researchers from third countries travelling within the Community
for the purpose of carrying out scientific research as defined in the Recommendation (No.
2005/761/EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005. 
14 Until 1st January 2008, this Decision will not affect the visa fees for third countries in respect of
which the Council has given the Commission, by 1st January 2007, a mandate to negotiate a visa
facilitation agreement.
15 Interview with Sergio Carrera, Brussels, 6 July 2005.
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is denied entry to the EU due to a tightened visa policy, then criminals, illegal
immigrants, and drugs will equally be averted. 
“‘Over-securitarianism’ does not guarantee safety, but does it block normal
people?”16 Visas are increasingly used to address security fears about organized
criminals and terrorists by blocking virtually all, including legitimate, entry.17
Those who believe that a restrictive visa regime ensures the systematic control and
regulation of entry by citizens of countries known to violate immigration laws
ignore the side effects of restrictive visa policies that include illegal immigration
and corruption.18 Therefore, the visa used for its intended purpose, to evaluate
potential immigration risks is effective; a visa intended to eliminate all illegal
entryway into the Schengen-zone will not prevent serious offenders, the real
security threats, from entering, but only manage to further isolate those who apply
for legitimate entry into the EU. 
Organised criminal networks are not suppressed by strict visa regimes, but in
fact profit from their complexity. It is not logical for sophisticated criminal
networks and individuals whose direct objective is to violate immigration laws to
apply for visas; instead they bypass the visa process, using pre-existing channels
into their country of destination. If the difficulty of legal entry into the EU increases
for the average citizen (complexity of visa application process, increased visa fees,
stricter criteria), so do the opportunities and returns for those who profit from
counterfeiting. 
Instead, clear benchmarks towards a liberalised visa regime would promote
legitimate travel to the EU, as the citizens would have something to lose from
illegal immigration — their right to travel visa-free to the EU; the status quo
permits those who benefit from illegitimate travel to further profit. The measured
liberalization of the visa regime with a country striving to achieve EU standards,
would not lead to a flood of its citizens illegally residing within the EU, but instead
would promote the legitimacy of the country’s own passports, border control, etc,
by squeezing out those who benefit from its black list status. 
With security high on the agenda in the EU, discussion on the Commission’s
proposed visa facilitation rests on the mercy of those member states whose
politicians preach restriction. The EU institutions in Brussels are currently driving
hard to keep the issues on the table, but its member states see a different picture of
the visa issue, raising unfounded fears of mass illegal immigration that further
destabilise member states. If member states’ own internal security situations are
intertwined with false ideals of protection by biometric identifiers, high-tech
16 Interview with Joanna Apap, Brussels, 23 July 2005.
17 Crisis Group, EU Visas and the Western Balkans, p. 2.
18 The Stefan Batory foundation conducted anonymous surveys in March 2004 among visa applicants
in Polish consulates in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine and drafted this report from their findings.
Monitoring of Polish Visa Policy Report, Stefan Batory Foundation, November 2004, p. 10.
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databases, increased security, their attention may be diverted from where it should
be. After all, even the walled fortress around the ancient city of Troy was breached. 
The EU’s Visa Liberalisation Experience
The EU stated its awareness of the importance the people and governments in
the Western Balkans attach to the perspective of liberalisation of the visa regime,
but any progress in that direction depends on the implementation by those
countries of major reforms in areas of rule of law, combating organised crime,
strengthening of administrative capacity in border control and security of
documents.
The Commission’s second visa black list, released in 2001, transferred
Bulgaria and Romania from the visa requirement to the visa-free list after the
assessment of their progress of reforms.19 At the time, both countries had already
been negotiating chapters of the Accession negotiations, but more importantly, the
political climate within the EU was on a drive for expansion and 11 September had
not yet taken place. As the Commission screened the two countries, the following
measures were influential to the removal of the visa regime: 
— The introduction of sophisticated, biometrically secure passports, national
ids, And resident cards which were difficult to forge; 
— The introduction of criminal sanctions and fines for irregular border crossing
And forged documents, along with legislation making it a criminal offence to
Violate the immigration law of any EU member state; 
— Alignment of the visa policy with that of the EU; 
— Deployment of more staff and equipment at the borders
— Conclusion of agreements for the repatriation of illegal residents in the EU.20
The Macedonian Perspective
The January 2006 Commission’s Communication, “The Western Balkans on
the Road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity,”21 opened the
doors on visa facilitation to the region after nearly three years past since the
commitments at Thessaloniki and a failed attempt on regional visa facilitation
under the Luxembourg Presidency in 2005. Fresh from the successful candidacy
bid to EU membership in December 2005, Macedonia was the first country in the
region to begin such talks on 28 March 2006. While Macedonia welcomed this and
every step closer to the EU, negotiators maintained a firm position that would
strive for visa facilitation negotiations alongside parallel visa liberalisation
negotiations; an attempt to ensure that the facilitation would not serve as a
19 Council (EC) 539/2001 of 15 March 2001.
20 COM(2001), 61 final; Brussels 02. 02. 2001; COM(2001)261 final; 29. 06. 2001.
21 COM(2006), 26 final; Brussels 27. 01. 2006.
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substitute to previously made commitments for a future visa liberalisation. On 4
May 2006, the Commission agreed to propose a draft negotiating mandate to the
Council to begin negotiations on visa facilitation with Macedonia, along side
negotiations for a Community readmission agreement. Although the atmosphere in
member states across Europe is not yet ripe for visa liberalisation, the
Commission’s statement on Macedonia specified that “visa facilitation is a first,
transitional step on towards visa liberalisation,”22 the first mention of visa
liberalisation in Brussels since 2004.
Understanding the delicacy of the EU’s security concerns, but also driven to
achieving the goal of visa free travel to the EU for its citizens, Macedonia has
remained committed to its reform process. Experts from the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Interior and the Secretariat for European Affairs met with their
Bulgarian counterparts to fully learn from Bulgarians’ move off the “Schengen
black list.” The citizens of Macedonia themselves are no security threat to the EU
Member States,23 but the government is working to prevent illegal immigration
through improving the control of its borders, detection of criminals, and overall
security. By the end of June 2006, Macedonia will have concluded bilateral
readmission agreements with 18 of 25 EU MS.24
Reforms are underway in the field of JHA to meet Schengen acquis and
Macedonia is actively working to implement the latest technologies in integrated
border management, working closely with experts from the Stability Pact. New
biometric passports will be issued later this year, as will the improvement of the
visa sticker for foreigners. The government has prepared a plan for harmonisation
of the visa regime, and currently the visa regime has been temporarily lifted for the
new member states until June 2006, with the exception of Poland, Estonia and
Czech Republic, for which the Republic of Macedonia has permanently abolished
the visa regime.25
As security issues top national agendas throughout Europe, its leaders should
tread carefully while developing a policy prescription to remedy their internal
security issues. A restrictive visa regime as a solution for fears of insecurity will not
only serve as a bandage on a broken bone, but will easily reignite past fears if not
successful. A symbol of assured commitment in the region that would recognise
22 “The Commission Recommends to Negotiate Visa Facilitation Agreement with FYROM” 4 May
2006, Available at: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/570&
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
23 The country’s 2 million population makes up 0,22% of that of the EU’s 462 million. The latest
statistics on deportees show that only a fraction of a percent of the population have been deported
from EU MS for in 2005 (0,03% or 577 people).
24 As of 10 May 2006 Macedonia has signed bilateral readmission agreements with Austria,
Germany, Hungary, France, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Spain. Readmission agreements
with Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands will be concluded by the end of May 2006, while
agreements with Denmark and Sweden will be concluded by the end of June 2006. Estonia, Ireland,
Lithuania, and the UK expressed that the agreements were not necessary with Macedonia.
25 These countries have waived the visa fees for holders of Macedonian passports.
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reforms in JHA with clear benchmark towards the liberalization of the visa regime
would reconfirm the EU’s priority in the region as well as the region’s future in the
EU, while promoting legitimate, but accessible, travel to the EU. 
To support such efforts, Macedonia and the other countries of the Western
Balkans must stay dedicated to achieving the reforms achieved by Bulgaria and
Romania, to ease the EU’s reservations over the facilitation and liberalization of
the visa regime, which to the detriment of their citizens, has been deemed the filter
of instability to their own countries.
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INITIATIVE FOR THE FACILITATION OF
THE VISA REGIME FOR STUDENTS
by
Mihajlo Babin1
The Student Union of Serbia (SUS), as a single student organization operating
at the national level, has been continually dedicated to involving Serbian students
in higher education reform within Europe. Also, the SUS has contributed plenty to
the initiation of higher education reforms in Serbia while entering the ESIB, an
umbrella organization for national student unions in Europe. Apart from
educational reform, the SUS has participated in numerous activities and has
conducted surveys of the student population. Of particular importance was a survey
conducted in 2004 among the students of four universities in Belgrade, Novi Sad,
Kragujevac and Niš. 
The overall results of this survey revealed considerable amounts of
xenophobia, and national and religious intolerance. The most compelling result
was that over 70% of students have never left Serbia proper. Of note is that these
results are yielded only from the student population, the segment of society that
ought to travel the most. If the national population of young people were to be
surveyed the results would be even more dismal, although they are already very
discouraging. Logically, the complicated application procedure, inhuman queuing,
and frustrations that accompany obtaining a visa are the foremost factors
contributing to the low amount of students who have traveled. Today’s generation
has come of age during the introduction of visas, and consequently travel
possibilities have been extremely limited.
What is necessary to do in order to get visa? We must:
— Supply numerous documents and certificates,
— Wait in queues to deliver the documents,
1 The author is member of the Student Union of Serbia.
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— Translate documents and pay the accompanying fees,
— Pay the fee for the visa itself,
— Wait for the embassy to grant or refuse the visa application. It is therefore
necessary to plan the trip far in advance.
It must be emphasized that the number of required documents varies from
embassy to embassy, and that the approach of embassies changes with alternation
of ambassadors. This inconsistency means that among potential travelers, it is
widely regarded that one country’s embassy will issue a visa easily while it is
impossible in another. 
The SUS formed a team of seven students, in cooperation with Balkan Trust
for Democracy, responsible for the practical elements of the visa regime
facilitation. In September 2004, the team visited European institutions in Brussels
and was hosted by the European Commissioner Mr. Janez Poto?nik. Many of our
interlocutors expressed their support for the initiative, but the prevalent position
was that the conditions for the ‘white Schengen list’ are very strict and that
individual initiative counted for little. One of the points we emphasized was that
young people have become frustrated by the memories of their parents, who could
freely travel virtually anywhere and for any length of time. At the beginning of the
21st century it is difficult to understand and accept that parents have had better
living conditions then their children. It is important to remember that the former
Yugoslavia was a communist and not a democratic country, however its citizens
could travel without limitation.
In Brussels, delegates also stressed that visas are not the primary obstacle
working against young travelers, but the poor material situation in Serbia is largely
to blame. Our team presented a number of arguments that refuted these statements,
particularly since many young people and their parents would set aside the
necessary funds if they were entitled to travel freely. 
Especially important was the visit to the European Commissioner Mr. Olli
Rehn who was impressed. This positive impression was mentioned again during
his visit to the University of Novi Sad in October 2005.
It is contradictory that the visa situation was much more favourable during the
1990’s then after the democratic changes in 2000. Of course, this fact is an
excellent argument for those detractors who proclaim that Serbia is globally
despised and that we cannot determine our own political reality. 
One of the biggest hindrances to reform in Serbia is raising apathy among
youth, best reflected by the low turnout during elections. If we think a little bit
further, why would young men and women fight for change if they have not had a
chance to experience the contrast of another country’s system? Many young people
believe nothing can be done and if something could be accomplished, it wouldn’t
bring drastic improvement to their lives.
My friends who have had the possibility to travel return each time with
renewed energy, an appetite for change, and the desire for a better quality of life in
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Serbia. My high school friend who, during the 1990’s believed in the official stance
of our statesmen, is a very good example. A few years ago, after a short visit to
Sarajevo where he witnessed the consequences of the war, he revised his dogmatic
attitude, became more objective, and understood that there is always another side
to the story. 
If young people could travel they would see that a popular brand-name pair of
sneakers is twice as expensive in Serbia than in London. This is not unusual. One of
the few means for a young person to feel connected to Europe and the world is to buy
brand-name clothes. This reflex is partially a response to the isolation of the 1990s,
but it is very well employed by salespeople in Serbia to boost their bottom line.
During the 1990’s many Serbian citizens who went abroad never returned.
Those who remained expected that democratic changes would mean that they
would be able to freely travel in and out of the country. Visa queues would be a
thing of the past. However, little has changed in the way that visas are applied for
and issued. Without a doubt our administration is responsible for their inaction
regarding legal reforms and the implementation of conditions necessary for Serbia
to achieve ‘white Schengen list’ status. Ending the fifteen-year long isolation
should be a priority, and the one that is discussed much more. 
Rightfully we ask: are the students at fault for their prejudice, or is it the system
that is changing slowly and reluctantly? It is also important to question how
students, as the most prospective stratum of society, would be able to understand
European integration and implement European Union standards if they never
experienced of these first-hand?
Currently, obtaining visas for students is easier since fewer documents are
requested, and the most important one is the Certificate of Student Status. Still,
genuine visa facilitation does not exist and traveling is impossible for a majority of
students. The key problem is the lack of freedom of movement: the spontaneity of
attending a concert, festival or event in Vienna, Prague, or Budapest is not an
experience afforded to Serbian students. It is not paramount to actively practice
freedom, sometimes mere possession of it is enough.
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SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WESTERN BALKAN
COUNTRIES: THE BULGARIAN EXPERIENCE IN VISA
POLICY AND BORDER CONTROL
by
Nadya Dimitrova1
In early 1997 Bulgaria was on the verge of bankruptcy and in a deep political
crisis. The country was as far away as possible from being given the status of a
candidate for membership in the EU and had been on the EU/and at that time
Schengen/ Negative Visa List since 1995. In May 1997 a new UDF Government
headed by Ivan Kostov came to power. Two and a half years later/December 1999/
Bulgaria was given the status of a candidate country and in yet another year on 1
December 2000 Justice and Home Affairs Council reached a political agreement on
the Commission’s proposal for a regulation determining the list of third countries
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders
and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement. According to this
agreement, which confirmed the Commission’s proposal, Bulgaria was placed in
the positive list and Bulgarian nationals benefited from the visa exemption from the
date of entry into force of the regulation. 
Two months later the Commission submitted a report to the JHA Council,
describing the measures taken by Bulgaria to curb illegal migration and illegal
residence by persons from the country in the member States and for repatriation of
those persons.
The measures taken by Bulgaria within the period 1997–2000 comprised
legislative and institutional changes, which had the aim to convince the EU
Member States that the country no longer produced illegal migration and had
established efficient border control based on the European standards.
1 Author works with the European Institute, Sofija, and Representative the ICMPD to Bulgaria.
IV — INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AND 
EU STANDARDS
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Border control
Legislative measures and administrative practice
• The Ministry of Interior Act and the Regulation on its implementation, describing
and regulating the functions, structure and authority of the Border Police within
the Ministry of Interior;
The institutional development and structural reform of the National border Police
Service (NBPS) began with the adoption of the Ministry of the Interior Act (MIA) on
December 9th, 1997. Despite its subordination to the Ministry of Interior, the Border
police/troops/ at that time had a Soviet type military organisation which could not cope
with newly arising problems like trans-border crime and increasing migration-
pressure. Within a little more than two years the NSBP established itself as a
specialised Police Border Guard and search unit within the Ministry of the Interior.
By virtue of the Ministry of Interior Act and the Regulation on its
implementation, the National Border Police Service took the responsibility for the
surveillance of the “green” and “blue” borders. 
• The Penal Code defining as criminal offences the illegal crossing of borders,
trafficking in humans, document-related crimes, and other related offences;
• The Foreign Nationals Act establishing the terms and conditions, and the
procedure, under which aliens may enter, stay, and leave the Republic of
Bulgaria, as well as their rights and obligations.
Under the Act a foreign national could enter Bulgaria legally only at the
determined border checkpoints (Article 17) and on condition that he had a valid
travel document and, if necessary, a visa (Article 8). The issuance of visas at the
border was no longer possible.
Under Article 10 Par. 1, the issuing of visa and entering the country was
refused to a foreigner when he was known to be involved in trafficking in human
beings and bringing illegally persons into and from the country.
• The Regulation on the Implementation of The Foreign Nationals Act providing
detailed terms, conditions, and procedures, under which aliens may enter, stay,
and leave the Republic of Bulgaria; 
Under the Foreign Nationals Act and the Regulation of Border Checkpoints,
only individuals who were in possession of valid foreign travel document and were
not subject to lawfully imposed restrictions or prohibitions could cross the
country’s borders and only at the border checkpoints that had been established
expressly for that purpose. 
• The Bulgarian Identity Documents Act, providing the terms, conditions, and
procedure for the issue and use of Bulgarian identity documents by Bulgarian
citizens and foreign nationals. 
The Act defined the reasons that served as legal grounds to prohibit travel
outside the country of individuals who had committed criminal offences and of
persons who were considered a threat to national security. The law also provided
for the imposition of a restrictive measure whereby Bulgarian nationals who had
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violated the law of a foreign country, or had been expelled from such a country,
might have been prohibited to travel outside of Bulgaria for a period of one year. 
Security of documents for Bulgarian nationals
The Law introduced, as of 1 April 1999, new types of ordinary passports,
diplomatic passports and seaman’s passports. These three types of passports
incorporated a number of security features against counterfeiting and forgery (e.g.: the
personal data, the digital colour photograph and the digital holder’s signature are laser
printed in the Visual Inspection Zone of the personalised page; the personalised page
is laminated with thin transparent overlay incorporating Optically Variable Devices).
According to the law, the deadline for the passport replacement was 31
December 2000. From that date on, Bulgarian nationals would be allowed to travel
abroad only if they were in possession of the new type of passports.
Bulgarian diplomatic and consular missions could only issue temporary
passports to Bulgarian nationals abroad who were not in possession of a valid
passport (e. g. were not yet in possession of the new passport or had a passport which
had expired). Applications for new passports were forwarded via the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to the National Police Service in Sofia. 
In the case of loss or theft of a passport, the holder had to submit a written
declaration to the nearest District Police Office (or to the respective diplomatic or
consular mission).
The new types of passport were issued by the National Police Service (Identity
Documents Department in Sofia or regional offices). The Ministry of the Interior
developed strict rules and procedures for the handling of blank passports and forms
used in the process of issuing new passports. A specially designed Information
System permited tracking the flow of documents and consumables from the point
of production (supply) to the final product (new document). 
Those passports for which a written declaration of loss or theft had been
submitted to the responsible authority were declared invalid via the Bulgarian
Identity Document Issuance Information System. The data concerning invalidated
passports was made available on-line at every border checkpoint. The system also
stored information on previous losses so it was possible to see if ‘regular’ losses
were made thus detecting suspicious incidents.
Security of documents for non-Bulgarians
Travel documents for refugees and stateless persons incorporated the same
security features as the passport for Bulgarian nationals.
• The Council of Ministers Decree? 213/15. 05. 1997 on the adoption of the
Regulation of Border Checkpoints defining the organisation, operation, and
management of the border checkpoints and the interaction between the
authorities who perform controlling functions at such checkpoints. 
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The Regulation also provided for an Interdepartmental Council on Border
Checkpoints;
In February 1998, the Bulgarian Government adopted a Programme for
Combating Illegal Migration and Illegal Residence by Foreign Nationals which
provided the framework for action in this area. Nine ministries were involved in
the implementation of this programme. An Interdepartmental Council on the
Border Checkpoints was established. The Council was chaired by the Chief
Secretary of the Ministry of Interior. This Government Program was based on the
main provisions of the Council Recommendation of 22 December 1995 on
harmonising means of combating illegal immigration and illegal employment and
improving the relevant means of control.
The following controls were introduced by the competent authorities at border
checkpoints: passport, motor vehicle, customs, sanitary, veterinary, and
phytosanitary.
Ever since the Border Police authorities have been exercising mandatory
passport and visa control at the border of all individuals who enter, leave or transit
through the country. The border control system registers all crossings of
individuals and vehicles. The Ministry of Interior has established an automated
border control information system. This system contains data about wanted
persons, vehicles, and objects, about individuals who are banned from entering or
leaving the country, as well as other categories of information similar to the
information stored in the Schengen Information System. Automated workstations
with direct access to the information system databases were set up at all the border
checkpoints. The Visa Centre with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends the
information about all issued visas and rejected visa applications to all border
checkpoints. This information is used to check the validity of the visas of all
individuals who cross the borders. Additional controls were in place for the citizens
of high-risk countries. 
The Civil Registration Act entered into force on July 31, 1999. It provided the
terms and procedure under which all natural persons should register themselves in
the Republic of Bulgaria. Its provisions covered all Bulgarian citizens, the aliens
who were legally admitted for permanent residence, as well as stateless persons
who had settled on a long-term basis and predominantly in Bulgaria and have been
granted refugee status.
In the Ministry of Interior centralised database was established, which
functioned as an integrated information system and included: a register of the
population, a register of aliens and refugees who were permanent or long-term
residents, a register of ID documents (passports, ID cards, driving licenses, alien
and refugee documents for permanent and long-term residence), a register of motor
vehicles, a register of stolen vehicles (Bulgarian or wanted by Interpol), a register
of stolen or missing identity documents, of invalid foreign documents, of
prohibitions to enter or leave the country, of administrative sanctions for violations
of the passport and visa regime, of wanted persons (including those wanted by
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Interpol), a register of issued visas and rejected visa applications, a register of
individuals with a criminal record, information about travel of Bulgarian nationals
and vehicles abroad and about travel of foreign nationals and vehicles through
Bulgaria. The population register included digitised photographs of every person
and their signatures which were accessible by computer. 
• The Council of Ministers Decree? 70/27. 03. 1998 adopting the Rules of Structure
and Operation of the Interdepartmental Council on Border Checkpoints; 
• The Council of Ministers Decree? 35/25. 02. 1999 adopts Regulation on the
Terms and Procedure for Issuing Visas by the Diplomatic and Consular
Missions of the Republic of Bulgaria.
Requirements and conditions for crossing the border
Sanctions concerning the illegal crossing of the border
Penal Code: pursuant to Article 279 a person who enters or crosses the state
border without permission of the respective authorities, or with permission but not
through the border checkpoints, shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for up
to five years and a fine 
Sanctions concerning false and forged documents
Penal Code: Article 308 of the Penal Code sanctions the production and use of
false and forged documents with “deprivation of liberty for up to 5 years”.
Foreign Nationals Act: pursuant to Article 80, Para.1, Item 2 in relation with
Article 10, Para. 1, Item 7, when a foreign national attempts to enter or transit the
Republic of Bulgaria using false or forged documents, the Minister of the Interior
can issue an order depriving him/her of the right to stay in the country.
Sanctions concerning illegal emigration to the Member States
Bulgarian Identity Documents Act: under Article 76 a ban on leaving the
country for a one-year period was imposed on Bulgarian nationals who had
violated the immigration law of another country or had been expelled from another
country.
Sanctions concerning the facilitation of illegal immigration/emigration
Penal Code: pursuant to Article 280 a person who takes another person across
the state border without permission of the respective authorities, or with permission
but not through the border checkpoints, shall be punished by deprivation of liberty
for up to six years and a fine of up to one million Lev.
Foreign Nationals Act: Article 51 regulated the administrative and criminal
liability of carriers’ officials, while tour operators wer subject to liability sanctions.
Failure to comply with their duties as stipulated in the FNA resulted in the official’s
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punishment with a fine of up to 5,000 Lev and the legal entity is imposed a liability
sanction of up to 6,000 Lev.
Legislative steps have continued with the amendments of the above mentioned
laws and by-laws.
Strict enforcement of existing legal obligations have always been of utmost
importance. 
The Bulgarian police authorities have to continue their efforts with a view of
ensuring the enforcement of all legal obligations imposed on tour operators. For
this purpose, they would meet their need of information via an intensification of
their contacts with the Member States in the framework of police co-operation.
Border Police Staff
The total number of staff employed by the National Border Police Service
(NBPS) as of 18 October 2000 was 8,751, of whom 4,707 were professional officers
and 4,044 military conscripts. The replacement of conscripts by professional police
officers was to be completed and was completed in March 2002.
The staff of the NSBP was slowly but steadily shifting from a military-type
organisation towards the establishment of an independent and highly professional
body for border policing. The shift was initiated by the Council of the Ministers
Decree Nr. 59/01 and 60/012 and — as a first step — included the reduction of the
number of conscripts and a slight rise in the number of policemen. As a next step
— again aiming at reducing the number of conscripts and increasing the number
of policemen — the transformation was supposed to be finished by the end of
March 2002 with a further increase of the staff of the NSBP by 2100 policemen.
Administrative structures
In view of ensuring effective enforcement of legislation in the field of border
control and migration, the National Border Police Service (NBPS) placed special
emphasis on the establishment of appropriate administrative potential of managing
structures and professionally trained police officers equipped with the essential
modern technical devices.
The NBPS updated its 2005 Concept and Development Plan in view of
complete adoption and implementation of European standards and practices in the
field of border control.
Regional border units were carrying out accelerated personnel recruitment and
technical renovation. The first transformation was ordained by Government Decree
in June 1999 resulting in the appointment of 600 commissioned and non-
commissioned officers in the place of 1000 military conscripts. The second stage
of that process was planned for 2001 and another 2000 military conscripts were
replaced by 1300 professional police officers. The updated Development Plan
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foresaw the final demilitarization of the service (replacement of military conscripts
with full-time police staff) to be completed by the end of 2002.
A new specialized unit for combating illegal trafficking in women for the
purpose of sexual exploitation was created with the NBPS. The unit was
subordinated to the Outdoor Surveillance Department and its basic functions and
tasks included to:
• Perform overall examination and investigation of the existing organizations
dealing with illegal trafficking across Bulgarian state borders ;
• Find out the modus operandi of illegal channels;
• Find out organizers and performers and their interrelations;
• Carry out joint actions and exchange information with other competent
services;
• Exchange intelligence and cooperate with relevant foreign police.
A specialized unit /sector for combating trans-border networks dealing with
illegal migration and trafficking in human beings was also set up with the National
Service for Combating Organized Crime. The main task of this unit was to co-
ordinate outdoor surveillance at a national level and directly to cooperate with the
police authorities of other countries. Among the tasks assigned to this unit were
drawing up of situation reports and risk assessments, as well as strengthening
cooperation and interaction with the National Border Police Service in the field of
trans-border trafficking in human beings and trafficking in women and children
with the purpose of sexual exploitation.
Training
The Centre for specialisation and professional training of National Border
Police staff was opened in Pazardjik in October 2000 in implementation of a
PHARE Twinning Project with Germany in order to create the appropriate
structure for an efficient and specialist training of border police.
It employed 149 trainers delivering four core courses: 
• Initial police training (Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, Police Law, EU
Law, Psychology, Border Police Training, etc.)
• specialised police training; 
• tailor-made courses for border police officers (border police at checkpoints,
border guard police, border police at river and maritime border);
• foreign language training. 
In addition to core training, the Centre offered senior management courses and
training of trainers in: the following subjects: European integration—EU Law;
Schengen Information System; visas and the visa regime of Bulgaria; transborder
crime; human rights; refugee law and asylum; technical equipment for checking of
travel documents and border surveillance; and the Border Control Automated
Information System.
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A PHARE twinning programme was implemented jointly with Germany to
further develop the training courses. The programme was  completed by the end of
2001 and provided all border control officers with the knowledge and skills to work
to EU standards and rules.
Technical equipment at the borders
The attainment of the EU requirements and standards regarding the technical
equipment at border checkpoints was supported by additional investments under
PHARE projects, from the national budget, the National PHARE Programme and
other donors. The technical facilities at border checkpoints were aimed at
enhancing the effectiveness of the control activities and reducing border-crossing
time. A specialised laboratory and a database of false, forged and counterfeit
documents was planned to be set up by 2004.
In 2001, the green border was controlled by means of eight Bulgarian infra-red
mobile systems MUSON and SNOG; border police duty patrols were equipped
with 236 portable night vision devices. Access in the vicinity of the green border
is controlled by an alarm system that is fully functional on a 350-km perimeter (the
border with Turkey is covered on its total length).
The Border Control Automated Information System, which included 222
computerised working stations at the border checkpoints, allowed the registration
of all persons crossing the border. Since October 2000, an Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (AFIS) has become operational. The computer workstations
were installed at the main border checkpoints.
Ten border checkpoints (Varna, Burgas, Malko Turnovo, Kulata, Vidin, Ruse,
Kapitan Andreevo, Sofia Airport, Gyueshevo, and Kalotina) employ DOCUBOX
secondary control devices. 
Under Phare 1999 and Phare 2000, the Commission invested EUR 16,5 million
for the purchase of communication equipment and vehicles to be put into operation
at the Black Sea blue border and the green border with Turkey. 
Border Police authorities at the border checkpoints were currently upgrading
the equipment for primary and secondary document control by installing modern
document analysis machines. 
Depending on the type of border traffic and the assessment of risk levels, the
border checkpoints are equipped to detect illegal immigrants concealed in vehicles
as well as prohibited and restricted goods.
The Bulgarian authorities had to continue to modernise and extend their
equipment at the borders. In particular it was planned to purchase three VSCs
modern computerised systems for secondary control of documents.
Border co-operation with neighbouring countries
Bulgaria’s border co-operation was at that time based on existing bilateral
agreements with Greece, Romania, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
Macedonia.
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Repatriation of illegal residents to Bulgaria: existing readmission agreements
and drafts onreadmission agreements with nearly all the EU member States
Visa policy
Bulgaria was engaged in a process of aligning its visa policy with the EC
acquis.
The issuing of visas is regulated under the Foreign Nationals Act and the
Regulation on the Terms and Procedures for Issuing Visas by the Diplomatic and
Consular Missions of the Republic of Bulgaria. 
By 2001 Bulgaria had, to a great extent, brought its visa policy into compliance
with Council Regulation (EC) No 574/1999 of 12 March 1999 (which adopted the
visa list of the repealed Regulation 2317/95) determining the third countries whose
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the
Member States. Bulgaria had adopted unilaterally a visa-free regime for individuals
carrying ordinary passports who were citizens of the Member States of the
European Union and the European Free Trade Association, the United States,
Canada, Japan, Israel, New Zealand, and Australia holders of ordinary travel
documents. Bulgaria also maintained a visa-free regime under bilateral agreements
with the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Lithuania,
South Korea, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, San Marino, Tunisia, FYROM,
and FR of Yugoslavia.
In 1999, Bulgaria introduced a visa requirement for the citizens of Cuba and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in 2000 for the citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Following a
decision in December 2000, Bulgaria had also initiated procedures for introducing
the visa requirement for the citizens of Georgia, Russia, Ukraine and Tunisia.
Based on Government Decision of December 2000, a procedure had already
started for the termination of the visa-free agreements with Georgia (from 19. 12.
2000), the Russian Federation (from 12. 12. 2000), Ukraine (from 13. 12. 2000)
and Tunisia, in accordance with the revocation mechanism laid down in the
agreements (within 6 months’ unilateral notice for the first three countries and 30
days’ notice for Tunisia). The Bulgarian negative visa list was therefore largely
harmonised with the corresponding EU/Schengen list . At that time the only
difference between the two lists was that Bulgaria continued to maintain on a
bilateral basis visa-free regimes with Macedonia and the FRY. To the Commission
it was explained that these were neighbouring countries with ethnic Bulgarian
minorities and with whom Bulgaria maintained close economic ties. 
Under the Regulation on the Terms and Procedures for Issuing Visas by the
Diplomatic and Consular Missions of the Republic of Bulgaria 62 countries were
considered as high-risk countries from the point of view of illegal immigration. The
citizens of those countries were required to comply with additional requirements
for obtaining Bulgarian visas. These requirements included proof of the purpose of
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the visit, availability of sufficient funds or ticket to prove intent to return,
availability of sufficient funds for supporting, a monetary guarantee by the inviting
party, etc. 
In compliance with Regulation 574/99/EEC of 12 March 1999 and Regulation
1683/95/EEC of 29 May 1995, Bulgaria introduced from June 2001 a visa
requirement for the citizens of Tunisia, Georgia, Ukraine and the Russian
Federation.
Bulgaria will end its bilateral visa-free agreements, not compliant with the
acquis, before accession and will fully introduce acquis compliant airport transit
visas (ATVs).
The new Bulgarian Identity Documents Act and the Regulation on the Terms and
Procedure for Issuing Visas by the Diplomatic and Consular Missions of the
Republic of Bulgaria are in compliance with Regulation ? 1683/95 of the EU Council
of May 29, 1995 laying down a uniform format for visas. Under Bulgarian law visas
are in the form of stickers which are placed in a foreign travel passport or other valid
document which entitles the bearer to cross the border. The only exception which is
not in full compliance with the acquis is that the transit permits which are issued to
Turkish citizens who are permanent residents of EU Member States or are in
possession of visas to visit such states are different from the other type of Bulgarian
visas due to the use of a different sticker. The new Bulgarian visa sticker complies in
full with the format that was established by ISO 7810 and contains all data and the
protective measures that are required under the EU Council Resolution. Use of the
new Bulgarian visa sticker started in the beginning of 2001.
Visas were issued by the Bulgarian diplomatic and consular representations. As
of 31 December 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Visa Centre was connected
with 60 Bulgarian representations. Links to the remaining 20 were under
preparation. Under this on-line link, every visa application was transmitted to the
Visa Centre which, after consulting the database of the Ministry of the Interior,
granted or refuseed the visa. This Visa Centre was also connected with every
border checkpoint. 
All visa applications were handled through the visa section of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (established 1996). The centre was connected online to Bulgarian
consulates to increase efficiency. This also helped combat corruption, as people
issuing visas were unknown to those applying for them. The people working at the
centre had sole responsibility for issuing visas in Bulgaria, although consular officials
wrote comments and recommendations. In 2000 they 208, 000 visa applications were
handled. In response to this workload new staff was employed from 2001.
Administrative structures
The Visa Center established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which issued
visa permissions, has electronic connection to the Bulgarian diplomatic missions
abroad and to all border checkpoints. An interdepartmental information exchange
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system controlling the entry of foreign nationals in Bulgaria has been developed.
The system aligns the Bulgarian national standards to those of the Schengen
Agreement member states. It has been set up in close cooperation with experts from
the member states. In view of securing an institutional guarantee for a positive
effect, the introduction of standards has been promoted by the adoption of secondary
legislation establishing an additional statutory basis in the field of extradition as well
as of secondary legislation regulating the status of consular officials.
In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a computer system for visa control based on
specially designed software is operational. It is based on an existing on-line
connection between the Visa Centre at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Bulgarian diplomatic missions abroad on the one hand, and between the Visa
Centre and the Bulgarian border checkpoints on the other. Within the network,
information about every visa that has been issued goes automatically into the
database accessed by the Bulgarian border checkpoints and by the National Border
Police Service. This ensures protection to every Bulgarian visa that has been
issued, i.e. the border control authorities check not only the validity of a Bulgarian
visa, but also the presence of its holder into the database of persons who have been
granted visas. 
Information campaigns
Information for Bulgarian nationals
The Bulgarian authorities were aware of the necessity of informing their
nationals precisely on the forthcoming visa free regime. Shortly after the decision
of 1 December 2000, it was explained by the authorities what visa free travelling
to the EU would mean and above all what it would NOT mean. However, in order
to prevent unjustified expectations, they conducted another information campaign
before the entry into force of the new visa regulation.
Information for tour operators
It was decided to establish regular working contacts for exchange of
information between the Directorate International Co-operation of the Ministry of
the Interior, the Bulgarian Tour Operators Association (BTOA) and the consular
services of the Member States. These contacts addressed in particular the
consequences of the new visa free regime.
Conclusions
Bulgaria made significant efforts to address most of the EU requirements in the
above discussed areas. The speedy introduction of new passports with high levels
of document security and the new computer systems for issuing of passports and
visas systems were examples of Bulgaria’s efforts, as well as, the development of
the Border Police Service since its creation in 1997. As regards the repatriation of
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illegal immigrants, Bulgaria concluded re-admission agreements with all the
Member States .
As a result since March 2001 Bulgarian nationals have no longer been required
a visa to travel to EU Member States. This effect was achieved not only because of
legal and administrative reforms undertaken by the Bulgarian authorities but
mainly because of the enormous political will and determination,which led to the
speedy and appropriate political decisions .It is worth noting the political
consensus reached among all the institutions and their concerted efforts in the rapid
adoption of all necessary legislation.Political leaders played an important role
through their regular meetings with EU counterparts by providing information
about the continuous efforts and results achieved by Bulgaria.
Recommendations to Western Balkan Countries
The experience of Bulgaria coming off the EU Negative Visa List, could
provide some key strategies for most of the Western Balkan countries.
However, WB countries should not be grouped and regarded as a’ package’
because the countries of the region are different in terms of their preparedness for
EU accession, reflecting each country’s track record. Each of them has nation
specific problems. At the same time, it is very clear that visa policy, which is part
of justice, freedom and security area, will have regional dimension as well.
The Western Balkans is a particular challenge for the EU. Enlargement policy
needs to demonstrate its power of transformation in a region where states are not
marked by stability and societies are divided. A convincing political perspective for
eventual integration into the EU is crucial to keep their reforms on track. But it is
equally clear that these countries can join only once they have met the criteria in
full. This will be more than necessary as regards justice, freedom and security
where it will be expected that responsibilities are shared. An example could be
given with the integrated border control, which in most of the countries is still in
preparation. Different visa regimes operate in the different countries. As regards
migration, the readmission agreements have to be fully enforced.
Although some of the countries are not yet EU candidate countries and some
are, all of the countries should put efforts to implement and convince the EU
Member States they are implementing certain reforms.
Here are some general recommendations for all the countries:
• unilateral abolition of visas for citizens of the European Union;
• strengthening controls on all borders through efficient development and
implementation of Integrated Border Control/Management with support and
guidance of the EU experts;
• establishing joint patrols along shared borders with some of the neighbouring
countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy etc.;
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• signing readmission agreements with EU, which will increase trust and
confidence towards the WB countries;
• improving the quality of all identity documents;
• introducing new/if not existent/criminal offences related to migration;
• harmonizing the legislation with the acquis;
making concerted political efforts to achieve the removal of the countries from
the Visa Negative List.
The removal of WB countries from the Visa Negative List might appear
difficult and not very close today to some of the countries. In the medium terms,
however, the efforts towards real reforms, effective border control could enhance
the growth of confidence in each of the countries and could make their removal
from the EU Visa Negative List less serious concern.
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MODERNIZING THE EU VISA SERVICE: 
AN ALBANIAN PERSPECTIVE
by
Albjon Bogdani1
Context
The commitment of the EU to welcome the Western Balkans into an enlarged
common European space is vital for the ongoing political, socio-economic, and
cultural transformations taking place in the region. The recent initiative to liberalize
and facilitate the EU visa regime has given a new momentum to the processes of
integration by enhancing the freedom of movement for people from the Western
Balkans. The considerable investment in integrated border management and the
serious reforms undertaken by countries in the region is paying off as the greater
majority is partly unburdened from the previously highly restrictive visa regime
responding to the danger posed by criminal minorities in the region.
As the report of the International Crisis Group on EU visas and the Western
Balkans points out, it is of utmost importance that the EU recognizes that an
unwarranted tight visa regime could lead to a ghettoization of the region by
“fostering resentment, inhibiting progress on trade, business, education and more
open civil societies”.2 Similar concerns are also echoed in the report The Balkans
in Europe’s Future by the International Commission on the Balkans, which
advocates the need for EU investments in the development of “smart borders” that
increase freedom of movement for citizens in the region through a “smart visa”
approach.3 Recently the Commission warned that European-minded people from
potential EU candidate countries in the region remain marginalized and isolated,
1 The author is cureently associate professor in the Departments of economics and political science at
the University of New York Tirana.
2 International Crisis Group (2005) EU Visas and the Western Balkans (Europe Report Nº168 — 29
November 2005).
3 International Commission on the Balkans (2005) The Balkans in Europe’s Future.
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especially when compared to the greater freedom of movement enjoyed by citizens
of countries such as the Russia Federation, Ukraine, and China as well.4
This paper is animated by an anthropological take on the issue of the visa
application process and is mainly concerned with the improvement of visa services
offered by consular offices and embassies of EU member states operating in the
Western Balkans. While focusing on Albanian experiences of obtaining Schengen
visas, the paper offers different perspectives on low-cost investments that would
considerably improve the present visa regime in the region as a whole. The following
considerations assume that while total freedom of movement within the common
European space can only be considered a long-term goal for Western Balkans countries,
there exist ample opportunities for governments in the region and EU member states to
cooperate on developing a framework for progressive visa liberalization.5
In this context, the paper explores a range of shortcomings of the current
management of consular services and proposes possible venues for improving the
quality of visa issuance system. In particular, the paper is concerned with the
operationalization of the recent initiatives for a selective liberalization and
facilitation of the EU visa regime for the Western Balkans. 
IT Development for Improved Information 
Dissemination and Interactivity
One of the most efficient improvements that can be achieved at very little cost
relates to the utilization of the internet to distribute and update information
concerning requirements and procedures of obtaining visas, as well as interacting
with visa applicants. The development of an online infrastructure would be one of
the best ways to operationalize the idea of selective visa liberalization and
facilitation given that categories benefiting from the recent engagement of EU to
promote a more progressive visa regime are generally IT literate.   
The research carried out in order to assess the quality of the online consular
services of EU member countries revealed that accessing relevant information on the
web is quite onerous and online interactivity is minimal.6 With only the Italian and
British embassy links showing up as first links, other consular services maintaining
4 International Commission on the Balkans (2006) Rome Declaration (9 May, Europe Day 2006).
http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/n-7.htm.
5 As it was recognized at the MARRI Regional Forum organized in Tirana last year, “while full visa
liberalization for the whole region for travel to the EU and Schengen countries remains the primary
aim, it is recognized that some of our countries this is a medium or long-term perspective, depending
on major reforms in areas such as the strengthening of the rule of law, combating organized crime,
corruption and illegal migration, and strengthening their administrative capacity in border control
and security documents”. See MARRI Regional Forum (2005) Declaration (Tirana, 5 April 2005).
6 While the website of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.al) provides a
comprehensive list of foreign consulates and embassies it lacks any information on their respective
official websites. In this context, the “google approach” was the research methodology followed in
order to obtain information on online consular services of EU member countries operating in Albania. 
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official websites could be reached only by rummaging around through several
google-result pages and navigating on average four intermediate hyperlinks.
Another important part of the online research consisted in the evaluation of the
information provided in each of the existing websites. The premium online service
is provided by the UK and following the lead is the Italian website. In particular,
these sites offer not only detailed information on all visa requirements and
procedures, but also offer the possibility for online scheduling of visa appointments
and provide ample information on venues for feedback and filing grievances.7
Official websites of other countries lag behind considerably, especially the Greek
one given the fact that it serves a relatively large pool of visa applications. In fact
the Greek portal stands in stark contrast to the Italian and British websites,
providing only basic contact information and visa requirements. Additionally the
Greek online consular services undermine principles of privacy and raise security
concerns because lists of scheduled appointments contain not only names of
individuals but also their passport numbers.8
In this context, the development of an online information infrastructure offers
an effective way of promoting visa facilitation through improved distribution of
information and more diverse forms of communication and interaction for Albanian
citizens applying for visas. In particular, the modernization of consular services of
EU member countries offered in Albania require the creation and maintenance of
official websites offering comprehensive information on visa requirements, links for
feedback on services provided, detailed information on complaint procedures, and
online scheduling of appointments.9 This modernization of the visa application
process would immediately benefit the categories targeted by the recent initiative for
EU visa liberalization and facilitation because they generally posses the relevant IT
skills and knowledge. Advantages of online consular services include reduced
overall time and money spent on obtaining relevant information and obtaining visas
for Albanian citizens, as well as more efficient visa issuance systems for foreign
consulates and embassies.
Developing Incentives for Better Services through Feedback 
The report of International Crisis Group EU Visas and the Western Balkans hits
the mark when it problematizes visa issuing systems of EU member countries as
7 The best practice is by far that of the UK embassy (http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk) which
provides detailed stipulations on consular policies for handling complaints and other concerns. The
official website of the Italian Embassy in Tirana (http://www.ambitalia-tirana.com) offers extensive
information on consular services offered, but requires updating (e.g. the phone contact information
was incorrect). Currently only the online portal of the Italian Consulate in Shkodra (www.consitalia-
scutari.org) offers the possibility for online booking of visa appointments.
8 While conducting online research on May 13, 2006, it was possible to access full names and passport
numbers of more than 230 Albanian citizens through the appointment lists posted on the Greek
embassy website (http://www.greekembassy.al).
9 Note that according to the website of the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Tirana (http://www.mfa.nl/
tir-en/the_embassy) visa applications can be submitted only by appointment!
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animated by some type of “consular sadism”.10 While it would be unfair to
overgeneralize, it is in place to note that to a large extent Albanian visa applicants bear
an unwarranted heavy prejudice from clerks serving at foreign consulates and
embassies throughout the country. More specifically, the strong negative presumption
towards visa claims from Albanian citizens and the lack of proper communications
skills from consular staff has lead to unjustifiable attitudes and actions from their part
— ranging from mildly insulting to outright rude and abusive behavior. 
In particular, based on in-depth interviews and regular reports from the media,
the poor and uncivilized consular services of the Greek embassy in Tirana are a
significant source of frustration and resentment among honest citizens who want to
travel abroad. The bad manners of the Greek consular staff seem to cause
dissatisfaction in other parts of the Western Balkans also. Risto Karajkov mentions
the example of a Taiwanese journalist who initiated a campaign to shame the Greek
embassy in Skopje after the frustrating and humiliating experience of being
verbally assaulted and having his passport thrown on the floor by a furious clerk.11
Part of the reason behind the distorted faces of consular staff, humiliating
interviews and the overall poor treatment of visa applicants at counters of foreign
consulates and embassies can be found in the lack of a functioning framework
addressing complaints and grievances. The lack of effective feedback channels and
systematic redressing of abuses has had two salient implications. First, it has lead
to persisting discrimination against citizens from the Western Balkans who want to
travel through the Schengen zone. Second, it has undercut mechanisms for
enhancing consular services and improving upon the meager PR conducted by
consulates and embassies as reflected by widespread public discontent and
skepticism towards particular EU member countries. 
The development of efficient procedures for redressing citizens’ grievances and
the establishment of effective feedback channels would go a long way in tackling
these problematic aspects of foreign consular services. A first step in this direction
would be the specification of a proviso which obligates consulates and embassies to
provide written explanations for rejected or denied visa applications. Yet another
step would be that of making an efficient use of feedback by visa applicants on the
quality of the service provided by individual members of the consular staff with the
goal of making these job positions more competitive.12 The existence of effective
feedback would act as a deterrent for the personnel serving at consular counters who
10 International Crisis Group (2005) p. 26.
11 Risto Karajkov (2006) The European Union and the Balkans: Disparities in the Freedom of
Movement, http://www.worlpress.org/Europe/2219.cfm. According to the article, the anger of the
Greek consular staff member had been provoked because “the man had the nerve to ask for a visa on
short notice”.
12 At this point it is important to note that much of the abusive practices describe the attitudes and
behavior of both foreign staff members and local people employed in foreign consulates and
embassies. Interviews conducted during the research revealed that many visa applicants show
particular reservations for working practices of Albanian members of the consular staff.
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all too easily overstep their authority and qualifications due to the lack of proper
disciplinary measures for abusive practices. Another possible venue advocated by
the Citizen’s Pact for South East Europe is that of introducing an ombudsman for
visa issues in order to address human rights issues related to the visa application
process. In particular, the Citizen’s Pact proposes that the task of the ombudsman
would involve the monitoring of practices of consular services of EU countries
throughout the Western Balkans and those on the external borders of the EU, as well
as receiving grievances and claims for systematic abuses.13
Visa Liberalization and Relevant Training for Consular Staff
The recent commitment of the EU for the liberalization of the visa regime for
particular categories of applicants (such as students, researchers and university
professors, business people and civil society activists) has received a warm
welcoming throughout the Western Balkans. However, public skepticism and
uncertainty lingers due the long history of discrimination of consulates and
embassies of EU member countries against citizens from the region. An important
dimension of this long history of discrimination is the negative conditioning of the
consular staff throughout the region with a strong presumption against visa claims
from applicants from the Balkans.14
In order to operationalize the engagement for the liberalization and facilitation of
the visa issuance system, a training initiative is much needed in order to educate and
guide consular staff through the successful implementation of the new visa regime.
Countering the practices of “consular sadism” will require the training of officials
working in consulates and embassies in processing visa applications with the relevant
flexibility and professionalism.15 Additionally, trainings for the consular staff should
focus on the improvement of communication skills, development of working
attitudes and practices respectful of basic human dignity, as well as the understanding
of the risks of discrimination involved. The importance of a training initiative of
consular officials should not be underestimated because as Karajkov correctly points
out, “everything that diplomacy is trying to build could be easily undone by the
13 Citizen’s Pact for South East Europe (2003) Liberalization of Visa Regime in South Eastern
Europe: Obstacles and Opportunities, p. 34 (http://citizenspact.org.yu). 
14 Indeed very recently the Greek embassy rejected the visa application of the President of the
Albanian Youth Parliament who had received an invitation to represent Albanian young people in
an international event taking place in Greece.  
15 See Risto Karajkov, p. 1. The new EU policy approach on visa liberalization requires new
approaches to the handling of visa applications so that pathetic cases of visa denials such as that of
the “Goce Delcev” folkdance ensemble from Macedonia from the British embassy in Skopje do not
occur again. According the article, the group of 45 artists who had been invited to the prestigious
Llangollen folk festival in Wales had been asked by the consular clerk to perform a dance in order
to ascertain the validity of visa applications. In the end, several members of the ensemble had been
denied visas perhaps because, as Karajkov poignantly remarks, “they just didn’t meet the clerk’s
artistic standards”. 
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actions of a single immigration official”.16 Hence, the current engagement of the EU
to liberalize and facilitate the visa regime for the Western Balkans can only be taken
seriously if coupled with the much needed investment in the human capital for the
development of an efficient and courteous consular service.
Consular Facilities and Human Resources Management 
Crowded embassy entrances are quite a familiar site in Albania and elsewhere
in the region — with many citizens applying for visas queuing even the night
before the interview day. It is certainly a disturbing sight to see a whole crowd
under the rain or else burning sun waiting for hours on end to enter the air-
conditioned consular spaces. For one thing, the visa application process ends up as
a prolonged unpleasant experience because of the lack of even the minimum
conditions of the physical infrastructure of foreign consulates and embassies. The
latter lack such basic and low-cost facilities such as shades to shelter awaiting
people from weather whims, benches to have people seat given the considerably
long time that the visa application process takes, and even a ticketing system which
make the waiting period more customer-friendly. In this context, small investments
in the physical facilities of consulates or embassies would significantly improve the
quality of the visa services offered by EU member countries.17
The problem of overcrowding can be alleviated to a great extent by the
development of an online scheduling system for visa appointments, the
introduction of a drop-box system,18 as well as the issuance of longer stay visas.
Yet another efficient way of tackling this issue would consist in a better
management of human resources available, including the extension of working
hours and the deployment of more personnel servicing at counters of consulates
and embassies throughout the country. Perhaps the more acute cases are those of
Greek and Italian consular services which server a persistent high number of visa
applicants.19 Immediate positive outcomes resulting from such investments aiming
at the modernization of the work of diplomatic-consular missions would be a
simpler, faster, and more humane visa application process. 
Reducing the Costs of the Visa Process
One of the freshest news around is that Schengen visas are scheduled to be
raised as of January 1st 2007, from €35 to €60. According to EU Justice and
16 Risto Karajkov, ibid.
17 These problems are particularly striking in the cases of the Greek and Italian consular facilities
given the large number of visa applicants that they serve.
18 The Drop Box System has been successfully used by the British Embassy in Tirana. For more
information visit http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk.
19 To put things into perspective, the average waiting period for a visa appointment at the Italian
Embassy in Tirana is one month.
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Internal Affairs Commissioner Franco Frattini, the increase of the visa fee is
necessary to finance the newly introduced biometric data system.20 Needless to say
these proposals send out a mixed message for citizens throughout the Western
Balkan countries as the visa process is already too costly and present a considerable
financial burden. In the context of the progressive steps undertaken in liberalizing
the visa regime and enhancing the effective freedom of movement of people from
the region, the EU should exempt citizens from the Western Balkans from the price
increase akin to the treatment of citizens from Ukraine and Russia.21
In addition, there are several other venues for to enhance consular services while
also lowering the overall costs of the visa application process. As the study by
Citizen’s Pact for South East Europe points out, while countries party to the Schengen
Agreement have settled for minimum documentation requirements, individual
consulates and embassies can and o complicate the process to a large extent.22 In this
context, EU member states should consider the possibility for harmonizing their
policies towards documentation required from visa applicants given that they offer the
same basic service (e.g. entrance into the Schengen area). This would efficiently lower
the costs of the application process which currently ranges anywhere from €40 to €120
due the large pile of documents that need to accompany a visa application.23
According to the International Crisis Group report, Macedonians alone spend
approximately €10 million for obtaining visas (close to one-third of the assistance
allotted to Macedonia under the CARDS program for 2005).24
Yet another approach towards making liberalizing consular services while
lowering the costs incurred by applicants would be the issuance of longer-stay and
multiple-entry visas based on a good visa record. It should be noted that costs
involved include not only those for the application process but also additional
expenditures such as travel costs.25 The utilization of credit history in delivering
visas would also have other positive effects such as a smaller number people
applying for visas each year, a reduction of the average time of the process of visa
application, and an increased overall efficiency of the current visa issuing systems.
Lastly, another effective way for lowering visa expenses relates to the development
of an interactive IT infrastructure for consular service previously discussed. The
exemption of the Western Balkans from the proposed fee rises for Schengen visas
and the streamlining of visa procedures (fewer required documentation and issuance
20 B92 (2006) EU Approves Visa Price Hikes, 28 April 2006 (http://www.b92.net). Also see
Aleksandar Mitic Open Schengen (Transitions Online, 6 April 2006) http://www.tol.cz. 
21 “Not 60 Euros” is part of the campaign organized by Citizen’s Pact for South East Europe against
the increased visa fees for EU countries. Check http://citizenspact.org.yu/not60htm for more
information and how to get involved. 
22 Citizen’s Pact for South East Europe, p. 48.
23 International Crisis Group, p. 9.
24 International Crisis Group, ibid.
25 For instance, one-year valid visas generally allotted to students studying abroad mean that in order
to finish a four-year program one has to travel at least eight times back and forth for visa renewals. 
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of longer-stay multiple-entry visas) are crucial for the liberalization of the EU visa
regime. Easy access to the common European space requires affordable visas. 
Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 
The quality of consular services provided by EU member countries in Albania
has been characterized by inefficient information dissemination, low interactivity,
high financial costs, lengthy processing time, poor serving facilities, and
insufficient and poorly trained human resources long conditioned with a negative
presumption of Albanian visa applicants. And much of this is true for EU visa
issuing systems in the region of the Western Balkans as whole. This has meant both
poor services offered for citizens who want to travel through the EU and recurring
cases of discrimination or even outright abuse. Importantly, the poor service
provided has also lead to ethical and political costs for EU member countries which
suffer public dissatisfaction because of the poor PR of consular officials. 
The following recommendations to EU member states aim at modernizing the
current EU visa services and at facilitating the process of visa liberalization for the
Western Balkans:
• Developing a modern IT infrastructure for improved dissemination of
information and interactivity through the construction and maintenance of
official websites; 
• Developing a feedback system for complaints or other input by visa applicants
in order to systematically address grievances and provide incentives for better
services; 
• Training consular staff on the recent EU engagement for visa liberalization and
facilitation in order to reverse the previous negative presumption for visa
applicants; 
• Reducing the overall costs of the visa application by streamlining visa
applications and exempting citizens from Western Balkans from the costs of
the new biometric data system;
• Investing in the physical infrastructure of consular facilities serving visa
applicants and improving human resources management by deploying more
staff as needed. 
The Albanian perspective offered in this paper points to low-cost investments
which would significantly alter the current visa regime in the country and which
could also be implemented on a regional level as well. The commitment of the EU to
liberalize and facilitate the visa issuing system for the Western Balkans should
translate into concrete steps which aim at the enhancement of the quality of the
service provided. The implementation of the discussed proposals along with an
effective public awareness campaign would go a long way in making the visa process
faster, cheaper, fairer, more civilized, and friendlier for the future European citizens.
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EU STANDARDS IN MIGRATION POLICY, VISAS AND
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
by
Gordana Ilić-Gasmi1
Introductory remarks
The Schengen Agreement2 (1985) presents the idea of the free movement of
people, but also a fear of immigration and cross border crime. The Schengen
Agreement was followed by the Convention on its application (1990) which came
into power in 1995. Those are the basics of a “Schengen Acquis” which is today an
integral part of the Acquis Communautaire and, of course, much richer in
regulations, with many soft laws, e.g. recommendation on European standards in
migration policy, the right to enter, stay and return of foreigners, as well as issues of
preventing illegal migrations and protection of personal data which are addressed to
EU member states.
The Convention on the Application of the Schengen Agreement established the
Executive Committee with the goal to regulate normatively the provisions from the
Schengen Agreement and to control their application. Besides that, the Convention
further regulates issues of eradicating control on internal borders of members of the
Schengen Agreement and the basis upon which foreigners may enter: all persons
who are not citizens the European Community.
Concrete implications for third country citizens, those countries which are not
members of the Schengen Agreement, mean that the rejection of a visa application
1 Senior lecturer at the University Singidunum, Belgrade, National legal advisor to the International
Organization on Migrations for Serbia and Montenegro and special advisor to the Director of SCG
European Integration Office.
2 It was signed by the Benelux countries (Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg), FR Germany and
France which make up five original members and the number of countries grew later. The Schengen
Agreement first implied gradual suspension of control on common borders. See: “Sporazum iz
Sengena — Za Evropu bez granica”, ed. D. Lopandic and M. Janjevic, 1996, Belgrade, p. 225.
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for one country of the Schengen automatically eliminates the possibility of obtaining
a visa in another member country.
The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) in its provision 100c introduces the common
visa lists and a unique visa form for the members of the EU. In this way, issues
connected with the visa regime (list of third countries which need visas) are moved
to the jurisdiction of the European Community, i.e. the first pillar of supranational
decision making, unlike other judiciary and internal affairs issues which make up
the third pillar of intergovernmental cooperation of EU member states.3
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), which is a revision of the Treaty of
Maastricht, brings novelties — besides “communalizing” the area of visas, such as
more jurisdiction of EU bodies (Commission, Council of Ministers and the
European Parliament), a step toward integration, the Schengen Acquis was
integrated in the EU Treaty. This is particularly important, because at the signing
of the Schengen Agreement, it was not a part of the Acquis: it was not legally and
formally connected with EU law because it was not signed by all EC members.
Further evolution in the EU: the Treaty of Amsterdam proclaims the creation
of an area of freedom, security and justice, which was further confirmed with the
Treaty of Nice (2003).
The White Schengen list and the freedom of movement in the EU
One of the four liberties which are the basis of the EU is the freedom of
movement of people in the EU — the most visible right of citizens (according to
the latest data, around seven million people lives in other EU member states).
However, freedom of movement, as a precondition for the successful
functioning of the EU single market, does not apply to citizens of the third
countries, who are subject to the control of travel documents, and in many cases
the need for having a visa to enter the EU. Nevertheless, the visa does not
guarantee the automatic right to enter the EU and does not cancel the foreigner’s
obligation to report their presence when he/she enters the Schengen space. This
reinforces the thesis of a the security concept of the visa regime, which is not so
obvious at first glance. More precisely, one of the key reasons for introducing visa
requirements in the EU is exactly the fight against organized crime and illegal
migration flows, as well as the degree of internal security. 
The freedom of movement for the citizens of EU is continually evolving in a
positive direction. The new EU Directive on Freedom of Movement for EU
Citizens within the EU (April 2004) is based on the concept of EU citizenship and
facilitates the administrative procedure within the EU, especially in regard to
connecting families, studying and similar issues.
3 Dr. Stipe Ivanda, “Schengenski sporazumi i unutarnja sigurnost”, Zagreb, 2001, p. 17. “The third
pillar reflects integration the least”.
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The Schengen Agreement itself does not encompass all EU member states,
without Great Britain and Ireland, with Iceland and Norway (from 2001), and
Switzerland (from June 2005). It represents the example of a functioning multi-
speed Europe. The Agreement however, does not define the EU’s visa regime as
this is done by the Council of Ministers with its Regulation from 2001. 
Having in mind the complexity of the application of Schengen Information
System, as well as the creation of the new Visa Information System (VIS) in the
EU, and the need for full harmonization of administrative practice, the new EU
member states have a transition period for the application of Schengen, but they
also apply EU criteria towards third countries. Very often the application of the
criteria is very rigid on the part of the new EU member states, which is confirmed
by numerous examples. 
EU criteria for classifying the countries
Council Regulation number 539/2001 with amendments 2414/2001 and
453/2003 on classifying the countries has criteria and country lists. The black list
— countries whose citizens need visas consists of over 130 countries and the white
list, countries whose citizens do not have the obligation of possessing a visa for
entering the Schengen space, of around 40.
Criteria:
1. illegal migrations;
2. public politics and security;
3. international relations, and
4. regional implications and reciprocity.
The example of Romania and Bulgaria serve as an example for the liberalization
of the EU’s visa regime (Commission Proposal, EP Opinion, political agreement of
the Council for Judicial and Internal Affairs on the level of EU ministers and
formalization of the decision — Council Regulation which terminates the status of
Romania and Bulgaria on the black visa list from 1995). There are opposite examples
of transfers from the white to the black list — the example of Ecuador (2003) when
the European Commission concluded that the set criteria were no longer met and
proposed to the Council of Ministers that this country be put on the black list.4
EU demands: prevention of illegal migrations (readmission agreements as one
of the ways of combating illegal migrations, but not the only one); efficient border
control, security of travel documents and harmonization of national visa regimes
with the EU’s visa regime towards third countries.
Where are we?
4 Grupa 484, M. Ivanović, “Ka beloj šengenskoj listi”, Belgrade, 2005, p. 17.
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SCG successfully concluded preliminary negotiations on visa relaxations for
certain categories of SCG citizens in Brussels in the end of April, 2006. On that
occasion the EU preliminary accepted SCG’s proposal for visa relaxations.
In the first place for selective liberalization are students and professors, and
then business people, state officials, journalists and athletes as well as people who
require medical treatment in the EU countries.
Negotiations are expected to start in the second half of 2006, after the Council
of Ministers approves the mandate to the Commission.
Unfavorable elements in upcoming negotiations on visa relaxation:
— SCG does not have an agreement on operative cooperation with the Europol
(like Romania, Turkey, Russia, Switzerland etc.);
— The EU criteria in visa policy towards third countries are not fully applied,
especially towards African and Asian countries with high degree of
immigration risk, i.e. not all countries from the black list are included;
— Institutional frameworks — because of Montenegro’s secession after the recent
referendum, the EU is faced with the need to prepare two mandates for
negotiations.
Favorable: SCG has successfully participated in the Regional CARDS
Program in the Areas of Visas, Asylum and Migrations 2004-2006 and has signed
the National Strategy with the recommendations and action plan for harmonization
with the EU standards in the area of migration policy.
What do future visa relaxations of the EU consist of? 
According to the positive legal frameworks of the EU, which define possible
deviations and relaxations in the process of submitting the visa application, if and
according to amended Common Consular Instructions (December 2005) of the EU,
which instituted a unified practice in the consulates of EU member states, the
following visa relaxations are envisaged:
— decrease in the number of documents which are submitted with the application;
— absence of strict obligation for submitting the application in person;
— issuing visas for a longer period of time (1-5 years), especially intended for
researchers residing in EU countries due to research projects, and business
people;
— cheaper or free visas for children up to the age of 6, students, and scientists.
The EU predicted that the increase in prices, which is 60 EUR starting in 2007,
will not apply for countries that start negotiations on visa liberalization by the end
of 2006, but that the application of the increase in prices is postponed and prices
set in the future Agreement will apply. The increase in prices was introduced at the
request of France (April 2006). The announcement itself had a very negative
reception in most of the third countries.
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5 CEPS Policy Brief, No 85/November 2005, “An Interim Plan for South-East Europe — Customs
Union with the EU and a Regional Schengen for the Free Movement of People”, Michael Emerson,
http://www.ceps.be
What is a positive trend in the direction of the white Schengen list is the fact
that negotiations on visa relaxations is the first step in the upcoming visa relaxation
of the EU towards countries of the Western Balkans. Macedonian representatives
have also had preliminary consultations on visa relaxations with representatives of
the EU, and the same procedure is predicted for other countries (Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Albania). 
Regional cooperation
Every country in the Western Balkans has adopted the National Strategy for
Harmonization of Regulations and Administrative Practice with EU standards in
the area of migration (December 2005) with foreseen deadlines for harmonization
lasting from 6 months to 2 years.
Regional cooperation presents one of the important preconditions for visa
liberalization with the EU. In this way, the EU indicates its position to relevant
countries: “Do not ask from the EU what you are not prepared to give to one
another in terms of freedom of movement, free trade and regional cooperation.”
The current situation in the visa regime is an incoherent structure of the region:
Croatia is on the white list, unlike other countries. Therefore, the EU appears as a
centripetal factor in the region, contrary to the economic stimuli of the EU towards
the region, which acts as a centrifugal element. The latest example is the creation
of a regional free trade area, on the initiative of the EU and under the auspices of
the Stability Pact starting from 2007, as a form of removing barriers. 
The reason for the restrictive policy is the identification of the region as a
primary source of illegal migrants and one of the main areas of transit. This is
stated in the Europol Report (March 2006), which, together with Russia, Ukraine
and Turkey, are the most commonly used countries for transit, mentions the Balkan
region, and in particular Serbia and BiH, as well as Northern Africa.
The CEPS proposal (M. Emerson, Brussels) on the regional Schengen area
(November 2005) preceded the Commission’s initiative on visa liberalization with
certain countries of the Western Balkans. Analyses of this influential Center
pointed out the danger of creating a “ghetto” in the the Western Balkans due to the
restrictive EU visa policy. On the other hand, the flows of organized crime,
trafficking and smuggling humans, drugs and weapons remain untouched by the
rules of the EU visa policy, warned CEPS experts. The essence of Mr. Emerson’s
proposal is based on the need that the EU stops demanding from new member
states and candidate countries to apply a Schengen visa list for the countries of the
Western Balkans. Border controls would still be retained for security reasons, and
the passports would be checked according to the black list of criminals with the
help of Schengen Information System (SIS).5
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Lessons from regional cooperation
Through the past regional cooperation a regional network of representatives
from ministries of the Western Balkan countries was established (CARDS seminar,
MARRI conferences etc.). It is this regional network that is one of the necessary
preconditions and basis for the further success of regional cooperation. 
The new form of results produced: the regional understanding, which was
helped by numerous theme seminars in which regional aspects, implications and
the complexity of migration, asylum and visas in the Western Balkan region were
discussed. In this way the representatives of these countries have realized that they
share the same or similar problems which helped create regional understanding and
responsibility for solving these issues on the regional level.
Identifying the national legal and administrative gaps in comparison to the EU
Acquis on migration and visas produced a regional level of responsibility of
governments — learning from neighbors successful examples (introduction of visa
stickers according to the Schengen criteria, legal and administrative harmonization, etc.)
The application of the “Better my neighbor policy” on the issue of visas —
SCG has bilaterally agreed to abolish visas for all countries in the Western Balkan
region, except Albania. The good neighborhood principle is promoted by the
numerous regional projects of cooperation between countries of the Western
Balkans. In this way, the EU clearly states: “Do not ask from us what you are not
prepared to give to one another in terms of freedom of movement”. 
Finally, as a contribution to the harmonization of the migration and visa policy
with EU standards Regional Recommendations within the CARDS AMV Program
in the field of visas, asylum and migrations were adopted at the end of 2005. A
Track for the integral solving of issues of asylum, migrations and visas in the
countries of the Western Balkans was prepared within the regional CARDS AMV
which was complemented by the EU and preceded the announcement of visa
liberalization towards the countries of the Western Balkans.
Upcoming tasks — preconditions of EU’s visa liberalization
For reasons of efficient harmonization with relevant EU standards the following
tasks and activities for every country of the Western Balkans have been identified:
— common visa register,
— forming normative frameworks synchronized with the EU principles — law on
foreigners and according legal acts,
— integrated migration management — development, coordination and
implementation of rules, institutional structures and procedures through inter-
agency cooperation and participation in regional and international cooperation,
— further training of professional border police,
— a computerized system for border crossing surveillance,
— strategy for integrated border management and its application,
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— taking over of border control by the police (process completed in Montenegro,
and waiting for its completion in Serbia),
— police border cooperation with the neighbors,
— application of CARDS Regional Road Track for the countries of the Western
Balkans,
— abandoning the practice of issuing visas at the border,
— progress in combating trafficking and illegal migration on the national and
regional level.
EU — a moving target
The process of harmonization with the EU Acquis in the areas of visas and
migrations is a very complex one and can be characterized as “jumping on a train
moving at average speed”.
This is illustrated by the Acquis development in this area — the new EU
Directive on Researchers (October 2005): liberalization of entry and stay for
researchers from third countries.
The fact that the EU is permanently developing is proved by the latest
Commission Proposal to move decision making on issues of police and judiciary
cooperation from the third (intergovernmental) to the first pillar of the EU, with a
supranational decision making system (Report on the Future of the EU, European
Commission, may 2006). Commission’s proposal is based on Article 42 of the Treaty
of the European Union.6 The explanation of this proposal is based on the need for a
more efficient resolution of common border security of EU member states.
Another more recent example of the EU as a moving target is the Vienna
Declaration on the Security Partnership (May 2006) between the EU and its
neighbors. The Vienna Declaration is focused inter alia also on challenges of
managing migration flows as one of the areas of security threats (besides terrorism,
organized crime, drugs and corruption).
A Europe without borders or “Fortress Europe”?
The answer to the question is somewhere between the efforts to regulate
migration as a social phenomena on one side, and prevention of criminal illegal
migrations on the other.
The freedom of movement is set as a basic human right, as well as protection
of refugees which is contrary to the justified fears of EU member states from the
overflow of illegal migrants and the need for strengthened control of the EU’s
external borders.
6 Quotidien EUROPE, No 9187, Tuesday, May 9, 2006.
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Exempli causa: the abuse of issuing visas in the tourist sector under the mask
of false hotel reservations as encouragement to illegal entries to the EU. This
example is stated in the Europol Report from May 2006.
It can be concluded that the faith of the Western Balkan region towards the
Schengen wall of the Union depends greatly on internal reforms in the areas of
justice, internal affairs, successful regional and border cooperation, as well as
prevention of illegal migration and trafficking.
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THE MARRI STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION
by
Qirjako Kureta1
The Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) was formed
within the context of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Since July 2004 this
initiative is under regional ownership as part of the South-East European Cooperation
Process (SEECP). MARRI is governed by its five MARRI Member States (Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro), who meet
twice a year at the MARRI Regional Forum. MARRI covers the following areas
(including a cross-cutting programme Access to Rights (AtR)): asylum and refugees,
migration, integrated border management and visa policy and consular cooperation.
MARRI top priority is the enhancement of regional cooperation in its fields of
activities among countries in the region, as a vital part of EU integration process and
in line with the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans.
The MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje was opened in November 2004 and has
been fully functional as of January 2005 to serve as a secretariat to the MARRI
Regional Forum and to accomplish MARRI political commitments. 
In fact, the concept of regional ownership that has been developed by and
within MARRI has proved to the utmost importance in voicing the needs and
efforts of the MARRI Member States. All MARRI Regional Forum Members have
their State Officials in the MARRI Regional Centre, acting as a hub for
consultations, dialogue, training, capacity building, information exchange and
other regional activities.
The MARRI Regional Centre has consolidated its role as a platform towards the
European integration of the MARRI Member States, as well as its purpose of
becoming the voice of the region. Regional ownership, as well as enhanced regional
cooperation, has become an important asset by the works of the MARRI Regional
Centre in Skopje.
1 Mr. Qirjako Kureta is State Official of Albania in the MARRI Regional Centre dealing with visa and
consular cooperation.
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In our main political and strategic activities focus was given to intensified
cooperation with the countries in the region and relevant international
organizations to further create synergies. A number of formal and informal
meetings with stakeholders and other relevant bodies has been conducted with the
aim to further develop the MARRI initiative. Consultations with the relevant
authorities in MARRI Member States, European countries and international actors
(e.g. European Commission, IOM, ICMPD, UNHCR) were taken up and will be
enforced henceforward.
The essential instruments of a coherent approach to MARRI issues comprises
of three guiding principles: strengthening regional ownership, enhancing regional
cooperation and supporting EU integration. In this context, the MARRI strategic
approach to implementation of its work is set in the framework of four main areas: 
1. Policy harmonisation on a regional level. MARRI provides a platform for
regional cooperation and information exchange, bringing its countries together for
joint discussions, establishing positions of a common interest and joint actions.
2. Awareness Raising. MARRI identifies mechanisms of harmonisation through
awareness raising activities in order to strengthen regional cooperation. 
3. Legislation reform. Meeting EU policy and EU acquis legislation standards, in
all MARRI areas, and implementing reforms, is a key to a successful migration
management and a necessity to support EU integration. 
4. State administration capacity building. Strengthening the state structure and
increasing their capacities to implement reforms remains a priority, whereas
MARRI provides expert and technical assistance.
On the highest political level, the MARRI Regional Forum Ministerial
Meeting held in Belgrade on 7 April 2006 emphasised the commitment for
intensifying regional co-operation in MARRI fields by making better use of the
existent mechanisms (i.e. the MARRI Regional Centre), as well as by facilitating
exchange of information and experience in the region. This has been perceived as
a strong commitment of the participating states to foster further regional
cooperation and the harmonisation of current practice and legislation with the
standards of the European Union. 
Furthermore, in the Belgrade Declaration the Ministers of the MARRI Member
States responsible for the area of migration, asylum and refugees underlined the
importance of continuous dialogue between the Member States to promote security
and stability, enhance the cooperation in the area of migration, asylum and
refugees, and to strengthen the institutions dealing with it in our Member States in
the Stabilisation and Association Process. In this context, they especially supported
the concept of regional ownership, which proved to be essential for attaining the
goals of the Initiative. 
During the past Serbia and Montenegro Presidency of MARRI, there were
efforts made by the MARRI Regional Working Group on Consular Cooperation in
establishing a factual overview on these issues as a basis for developing early
warning system. Mainly stressed the need of:
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— Establishing a last cooperation for regular information and experience
exchanges in the process of harmonisation with the acquis and EU standards;
— Establishing and agreed framework for development of a regional early
warning and alerting system;
— Establishing a facilitated uniform visa regime for MMS citizens in the MARRI
area and a common approach towards the conditionalities set by the EU for the
facilitation of the visa regime.
I informed the participants in this meeting about the workshops to be organized
by MARRI RC during this year.
There was also opening of the process of dealing with orderly migration, where
MARRI started with a process of exchange of information and networking on
labour migration. There was also significant regional cooperation in the field of
readmission, where the signing of the EU-Albania Readmission Agreement is
especially taken note of as well as the separate bilateral readmission agreements
between the EU Member States and other MARRI Member States, respectively. A
mechanism for regular gathering and exchange of information in the field of
asylum was also established. 
As far as the specific work of the MARRI Regional Centre, we emphasise the
importance of the adoption of the Strategy and Programme of Action of MARRI for
2006 and 2007, adopted during the MARRI Ministerial Regional Forum held in
Belgrade in 7 April 2006, for its future work. The Programme of Action represents
an operational plan to realise the goals set out by the MARRI Strategy. It provides
a practical and coordinated framework for action in the four main MARRI areas:
asylum and refugees, migration, integrated border management and visa and
consular cooperation issues. The strategy for realisation of MARRI Regional
Centre goals is prepared with reference to National Action Plans in the region and
with input from offices of national coordinators in MARRI fields. The aim of the
document is to demonstrate how cooperation on regional and national level and
how the MARRI Regional Forum can facilitate intensified regional co-operation
and is able to assist the MMS on their way into the European Union. 
In a relative short period (between November 2005 and May 2006) MARRI
Regional Centre organised these main activities: 
Meeting of National Coordinators on Anti-trafficking 
in Persons, Ohrid, 22 November 2005
During the meeting the respective national coordinators agreed on further
enhancement of their regional cooperation through the regional platform of anti-
trafficking in Human Beings in the MARRI Member States. The platform envisages
two meetings in 2006, during which the national coordinators together with special
invitees from the neighbouring countries, the European Commission, international
organisations and other relevant stakeholders would discuss current regional
cooperation, activities, projects, important issues on suppressing this phenomenon
as well as come to join conclusion and commitments for the future actions. 
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MARRI Regional Forum in Prčanj, 28-29 November 2005
Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and relevant representatives
responsible for issues of migration, asylum and refugees of MMS reaffirmed its
commitments for managing population movements in South-eastern Europe and
agreed to continue to give its full contribution to future coordination and realisation
of MARRI activities and priorities. 
National Round Table on Migration, Podgorica, 20 February 2006
This meeting aims to assist in the creation of the national working groups on
migration in the five countries of the region, which should be a basis for a regional
approach to the migration issues. The next step is the creation of a Regional Group
of MARRI Member States Representatives to meet regularly within the MARRI
Regional Centre in Skopje. Its primary objective is to evaluate experiences and
work towards strengthening regional cooperation and harmonizing standards in the
field of migrations, while shaping future common approaches regarding new
migration-related trends and challenges in the region, in line with the Tirana
Declaration of April 2005 and national strategy developed within the Regional
CARDS Project on Asylum, Migration and Visa in the WB countries. 
Meeting of Regional Working Group on Consular Cooperation, 
Skopje, 22-23 February 2006
The MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje organised a second meeting of the
Regional Working Group on Consular Cooperation (RWGCC) on 22-23 February
2006. The participants were representatives of the Consular Departments of the
MARRI Member States, who followed-up on the first Meeting of the RWGCC
held in Skopje on 13-14 September 2005.
(RWGCC is established by decision of the Ministers on MMS in Regional
Forum, held in Tirana on April 2005. It was a expression of the will of the five
MMS to set up a regional mechanism to support cooperation between them. The
mission of RWGCC is to make functional network of consular departments in five
MFAs/MoIs, based on the philosophy of regional responsibility for protection of
area of five MMS from irregular migration and human trafficking and increasing
of regional cooperation in visa field, in line with EU standards. The activity of the
RWGCC aims at identifying the prerequisites of building and consolidation of the
mutual trust and constructing the basis of harmonizing of policies, procedures and
infrastructures in visa field).
The overall objective of the meeting was to discuss and adopt the plan of
activities in the field of consular cooperation for 2006 to be focused on in two main
fields:
1. Visa harmonisation (policies, institutions, regimes, practices, procedures etc)in
line with EU standards;
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2. Exchange of information on irregular migration and human trafficking issues,
related to falsifying of passport and visas, training our experts on how criminals
attempt to forge and falsify travelling documents etc.
Workshop on Labour Migration for Integration/
Development in WB, Zagreb, 22-24 February 2006
It gathered representatives from the Governments of MMS, while presentations
were held by IOM, UK and regional experts. The Workshop serves as a platform
for discussions for the further development of policies and programmes on
migration within/from the Western Balkans, in a spirit of positively implicating
their economic and employment dimensions while contributing to combating
possible irregular movements. Discussions included both the analysis of
possibilities for intraregional labour migration and the analysis of the impact of
labour migration from the region to third countries at both ends of the migration
spectrum. 
In order to answer regional migration challenges, MARRI also developed a
cross-cutting program labelled Access to Rights (AtR), whose main goal is to
strengthen or reform legislative and administrative systems to guarantee access to
social and economic rights for refugees, returnees, displaced, minorities and other
vulnerable groups. Such a strategy underlines provision of technical expertise for
States to adopt EU instruments (acquis communautaire) to deal with solutions of
sustainable return and social integration. During the year 2005, AtR developed and
prepared several projects for implementation (e.g. in Macedonia and Montenegro).
In addition, AtR team has developed project ideas for implementation in Serbia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and is exploring possibilities of continued
cooperation in Macedonia and Montenegro. Up to date activities also include the
second AtR Regional Workshop on Integration Issues (Returnee integration from
readmission agreements) held in MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje on 15
December 2005, which was attended by five MARRI Member States.
Regarding the next steps, MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje, through
realisation of specific projects, supports the implementation of national programs
in further improving strategies and action plans that will result in increase of
regional ownership and regional cooperation among relevant actors. 
As of 7 April 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina took over the year-long
Presidency of the MARRI Regional Forum. Along with the MARRI Regional
Centre in Skopje, special efforts are to be invested in the process of further
development of regional ownership principle. 
In the capacity of MARRI Presidency, Bosnia and Herzegovina shall:
— advance regional ownership and cooperation, which is imperative for
successful implementation of MARRI objectives.
— emphasise the relevance of establishing and developing cooperation with other
international organizations and initiatives in the region based on the principle
of complementarity.
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— increase cooperation between governmental agencies responsible for
migration, asylum and refugees on regional and national level with an
objective to develop good migration governance in the MARRI region.  
— endorse development of capacity building in the field of migration, asylum and
refugees.
— support activities related to follow up of CARDS Regional Project on Asylum,
Migration and Visa in the Western Balkans.
— encourage MARRI Member States in the process of strengthening
harmonisation of existing policies, synergising acquired knowledge,
experiences and best practices on the road towards EU integration.
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall support to maximum extent the MARRI
Regional Centre in implementation of its Strategy and Programme of Action
prioritising the following areas:
1. Implementation of readmission agreements in the MARRI region;
2. Increased cooperation in the field of fight against illegal migration, anti-
trafficking and anti-smuggling;
3. To develop sustainable and effective asylum systems including protection of
refugees and their integration as well;
4. Exchanging the best practices on migration management;
5. To enhance durable solutions for reintegration of labour emigrants and explore
possibilities of the impact of remittances on development in the region;
6. To maintain and support durable solutions related to the access to rights of
returnees;
7. To pursue complementarity with other stakeholders in the region involved in
border management process, namely Regional CARDS and Ohrid Border
Process.
More specifically, the focus shall be given to the following projects of the
MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje in the upcoming period: 
1) Workshop on Implementation of 
Readmission Agreements — Technical Aspects.
(In the second half of June)
The objective of the workshop will be: 
— To identify the gaps in the field of implementation in regard to admission of
the nationals of MARRI Member States as well as third country nationals and
questions related to successful return policy
— To develop a regional strategy and network of national experts. This will
enable countries to implement concluded readmission agreements more
successfully;
— The strengthening of the capacities of national institutions in combating illegal
transit migration;
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— To increase regional cooperation in this field.
It is envisioned that several experts from EU Member States and Switzerland
get invited to the Workshop. 
2) Workshop on Management of Illegal Transit Migration in MARRI Region 
This workshop shall be co-organised with Budapest Process, i.e. it’s Working
Group on SEE. The gathering will provide a good opportunity to increase the co-
operation between policy makers and law enforcement agencies, with the
involvement of SECI and other international organisations. In this respect, MARRI
framework serves as the ground for the awareness of the region on illegal flows in
changing circumstances — response on political imperatives in the region. The
next step would be the creation of permanent Working Group within MARRI,
providing exchange of information and facilitating co-operation between the
institutions in the region, its neighbourhood and other interested States and
organizations. 
3) Workshop on Establishment of Co-operation between 
Academia and Governmental Institutions 
This Workshop aims to create a specific approach towards awareness-raising
transfer of practical experience on implementation of legislation on migration in
practice to the students of law, journalism, social and political science. It is foreseen
for Autumn 2006 where the mentors form the faculty and the relevant ministries
should monitor the results. The expected most valuable outcome would be the
knowledge gained through this very specific co-operation and the interest of some
of the students to continue their professional career dealing with migration. The
end result of the project will be demonstrated on regional level, with further co-
operation of the universities in the region and numerous other follow-ups, such as
moot courts and other forms of competition. 
4) Workshop on Migration Management Systems in MARRI Region 
This concept is based on the results of Regional CARDS Visa, Migration and
Asylum project and is foreseen for the end of October or mid November 2006. The
representatives from new EU Member States shall be invited, whereas they will
present and share their best practice in this field. The Workshop related to this one
would be targeted to the Parliamentarians — to raise the awareness on migration
governance and the responsibility of politics for all the aspects of migration policy
(interaction of different policies -economic, employment, education,
demographics, health, social, security and defence). 
5) Workshop on Labour Migration 
This Workshop shall be follow up of the Workshop on Labour Migration for
Integration/Development in Western Balkans held in Zagreb on 22-24 February
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2006. It will be dedicated to the potential of return of retired economic emigrants
to the region and the potential of their possible investment of remittances, as well
as development. 
6) Workshop on Anti-trafficking 
In this Workshop, MARRI is envisioned to serve as the platform to articulate
further steps to enhance new challenges in the region, in particular about the
indicators on increased growth of smuggling versus trafficking (it is foreseen that
the project thematically dedicated to these aspects is to be launched in the Autumn
this year -in the framework of USAID and ICMPD). MARRI shall be a member of
Advisory Board and shall facilitate co-operation between national co-coordinators
for Trafficking of Human Beings. 
As conclusion, I would like to stress that the work of the MARRI Regional
Centre in Skopje, which is both promising and difficult, paves the way for progress
on MARRI issues, taking account of the root causes of migration and its
consequences. It creates synergy between the regional actors who have an
overview of the policies undertaken in both the European Union and in the MARRI
Member States. That sort of overview has enabled the MARRI Regional Centre to
propose and implement practical measures which are founded on an in-depth
analysis of the political and socio-economic factors in the countries in the region. 
As a general approach, solutions to the problems of the region should emanate
from the countries of the region. It is clear that institutionalised multilateral
regional cooperation functions in a complementary and supportive way to the
European integration process of the countries in the region. Coordination of action
and common goals boost their European course, strengthen their voice and
reinforce EU efforts to form an effective regional policy. In this respect, the
MARRI Regional Centre experts have worked in close and fruitful cooperation
with a number of international governmental organizations managing to strengthen
its partnerships with the relevant stakeholders and counterparts involved in
relevant areas on the national, the regional and the international level. 
The operational progress was achieved, but several preconditions must be
assured to continue with success in the future, i.e. regional ownership, common
interest and sustainability. 
It is absolutely clear that the future activities of MARRI are to be seen in the
framework of regional cooperation and regional ownership, strengthening the role
of MARRI as a “voice of the region”.
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE REGIONAL
ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE “THE WESTERN 
BALKANS: REGIONAL RESPONSE TO THE VISA
LIBERALIZATION ISSUE”
To the EU countries and EC:
— EU visa policy toward WB countries is hampering reforms in the WB countries
and the European integration process
— We are inviting international non-governmental and intergovernmental
organizations to continue their support in reform processes in related sectors
and the promotion of the visa liberalization issue  
— We support the current initiative of the EC and talks with the WB countries on
the facilitation of the visa regime for certain categories of citizens
— Simultaneously with the visa facilitation negotiations, the EU should draft in
cooperation with the WB countries, a roadmap for visa abolishment. The
roadmaps should rely upon the results of the EC CARDS programme/projects
which are/were implemented and actual achievements of each country in
reforms in the fields of migration, asylum, visa and integrated border
management
To the WB countries: 
— To facilitate/liberalize the visa regime within the WB region 
— All WB countries should accelerate reforms towards achieving the EU
standards in the area of the visa, asylum, migration and border management 
— WB governments, using existing mechanisms of regional cooperation
(MARRI, SEECP etc.) and through multilateral consultations, should
permanently cooperate in:
— Periodic analysis of the achievements of each country (with special
attention to the periodic statistical reports on migration as a common ground
for defining regional migration policies), 
— Exchange experiences and best practices in proper reforms and 
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— Share in the examples of other Balkan countries and new EU member states
— In accordance with achieved results in reforms on a regional level, the
governments should formulate regional proposals to the EU concerning the
gradual achievement of the objective of visa abolishment for all WB countries
— The Civil sector in the region should strengthen cooperation in further
promoting the idea of visa abolishment through: 
— Joint activities towards raising the awareness of the issue at the regional
level 
— Joint advocacy towards the EU and its member states.
The main conclusion would be to request from
EU to make urgent changes in its visa regime, so as to
facilitate movement of people from the Western
Balkans to the Union. Then, the West Balkan coun-
tries should focus their attention on making a com-
mon “road map” for visa abolishment. At the same
time, the Balkan countries are requested to facilitate
movement of people in the region by making changes
in their visa policies. 
Prof. dr Blagoje BABIĆ
The EU visa policy should be liberalised through
its co-operation with the West Balkan countries so as
to prevent further slowdown of the reforms and their
integration into EU. Building of a common “road
map” for visa abolishment should be based on
CARDS programmes and that would bring about fur-
ther progress in the fields that regulate migration, asy-
lum and integrated border management.
Dr Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ
ISBN 86-7067-092-5
